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MUSLIM IDENTITY AND ISLAMIC FAITH IN SARAJEVO 
Among the dominant themes in contemporary world affairs are 
the political role of Islam and the problem of national 
minorities in socialist states. The present thesis seeks to 
examine these issues through the anthropological investigation of 
a Muslim minority within a multi-national, federated socialist 
state - the Muslims of Bosnia-Hercegovina in Yugoslavia. 
The Yugoslav state is a constitutional federation of several 
diverse nationalities, all of which seek to preserve, assert and 
develop their distinct political identities within the fragile 
power balance system of Yugoslavia. The republic of Bosnia- 
Hercegovina is dominated by three such nationalities - the Serb, 
the Croat and the Muslim. These three correspond to three 
religious faiths; the Serbs are Orthodox, the Croats are Catholic 
and the Muslims are of the Islamic faith. Whilst the state does 
not officially recognise this correspondence, for ordinary 
Bosnians it is fundamental; national and religious identity are 
seen as inextricably linked. It is the nature of this link which 
forms the focus of my study, the fieldwork for which was carried 
out in the Bosnian capital of Sarajevo. 
For Sarajevo's Muslims Islam provides a "double identity", 
two ways of conceptualising collective identity. One the one hand 
Islam distinguishes Muslims from their Serb/Orthodox and 
Croat/Catholic neighbours, whilst on the other it gives them 
membership in a worldwide religious community transcending the 
bounds of Yuqoslavia. Both aspects of identity find expression in 
Muslim religious life. Thus male death rituals assert Bosnian 
Muslims' identity as members of the Islamic Umma, whilst mortuary 
rites performed by women are seen as distinguishing Muslims from 
their non-Muslim neighbours. In this and other ways religion 
becomes a medium for identity assertion. At the same time the 
discourse of identity is one through which rivalling religious6 
orientations may compete. For example, the state authorised 
Muslim establishment promotes a rapprochement of Islamic and 
socialist ideologies and of Muslim and Yugoslav identity, whilst 
a new, semi-clandestine Islamic tendency looks constantly to the 
outside Muslim world, seeking to ally Bosnian Muslims with it. 
As an ethnographic study the thesis examines a number of 
issues including the perception of town and neighbourhood as 
separate conceptual spaces, the role of ritual, gender relations 
and the nature of religious rivalry. Through this approach to 
Sarajevan Muslim society it attempts to illuminate some broader 
questions concerning the political role of Islam in the modern 
world, the development of nationalisms and the nature of 
relations between minorities and the socialist state. 
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PREFACE 
This work is about the role of religion in creating and expressing group 
identity within a Muslim minority in socialist Southeastern Europe. It touches 
on subjects such as Islamic fundamentalism, sufi mysticism, nationalism, 
socialist society and the relationship between the state and minority groups. 
These themes are of potential interest to an audience wider than the 
anthropological one but the present work is essentially an anthropological 
monograph, the research for which was conducted principally through the 
traditional ethnographic method of participant observation during f If teen months 
of 1985/86. 
Access to the facilities of Sarajevo's Oriental Institute, Ethnographic 
Museum and excellent Gazi Husrevbeg library allowed me to conduct a certain 
amount of historical research but statistical or questionnaire based study 
presented a problem. This problem lay in the need for me to have both a persona 
acceptable to those whom I counted as informants and a purpose and plan 
acceptable to the authorities. In the end I was faced with a choice. Either to 
be a fully fledged, high powered foreign scholar doing archival research, 
interviews with public figures and questionnaires, or to attempt to find my own 
quiet niche in the ordinary life of the Sarajevan Muslim population. The two 
were incompatible since pursuing the former course would have cut me off from 
a public which tends, whenever possible, to avoid contact with officialdom and 
authority. As an anthropologist I therefore chose the latter course. My 
affiliation to the Oriental Institute gave me a legitimate status and the chance 
to read and to converse wi th Or ien ta 1 is ts, bu t lef t me su ff ic ien t ly f ree and 
anonymous to conduct other research. 
- 
Even in my role as participant observer the research was. perforce (with 
many informants), low key as a result of their unease with formality. Thus my 
few attempts to tape conversations and interviews were met with suspicion or 
reluctance. People were happy to converse and explain things to me within the 
framework of a personal relationship, but if they realised that I was attempting 
anything even approaching a questionnaire (an informal series of questions, 
notebook in hand, about the informant's childhood, family, marriage etc. ) they 
grew embarrassed or cagey or evasive. Other factors also imposed restrictions 
on the nature of my fieldwork. For example, before leaving for Bosnia I had been 
particularly interested in the dervish orders. It transpired, however, that these 
orders did not reciprocate my feeling; they were not interested in me and not 
very forthcoming. At the same time I formed few relationships with non-Muslims 
or with hard line atheist Muslims. This was partly due to lack of time but more 
importantly it was the result of a need to be seen by my principal informants 
as being part of their world and loyal to it, not flitting about with divided 
loya 1t ies. 
The constraints and limitiations associated with fieldwork in Bosnia entail 
that this thesis cannot be an attempt at an exhaustive analysis of every aspect 
of the Bosnian Muslim situation. Rather it is offered as an anthropological 
examination of a certain aspect of it: popular Muslim conceptions of collective 
Identity and Islamic religion, and the uses thereof. 
My research has been financially supported by grants from the Economic and 
Social Research Council of Great Britain and from the General Board of the 
University of Cambridge. To both benefactors I am most grateful. During my stay 
in Bosnia I was affiliated to the Oriental Institute of Sarajevo where every 
kindness was extended to me. In particular I would like to thank the '.,, ýstitute's 
- 
president, Professor Sulejman Grozdanid, and Dr D2emal ýehajid for all their 
help. Naturally neither man is responsible for the opinions put forward here. 
I am indebted to my supervisor, Ernest Gellner, whose pertinent criticisms 
and ever useful suggestions have been of immense value and whose own work is a 
constant inspiration. Basim Musallam read various drafts of the thesis and 
through his specific comments and his knowledge of Islamic society in general 
has widened my own understanding. The kindness, encouragement and suggestions 
of Alexandre Popovic have also helped me considerably. 
Pascal Boyer, Chris Hann, Nancy Tapper, John Barber and Steve Hugh-Jones 
read versions of the thesis at various stages and I have benefited greatly from 
their comments and encouragement. 
Finally I would like to thank all those Sarajevans who made the research 
possible by welcoming me, tolerating my linguistic and social inadequacy and 
trying to teach me what I wanted to know. They are too numerous to mention 
individually but I would like to record my particular thanks to the Karakat 
family without whose kindness, patience and care my stay in Sarajevo would have 
been far less pleasant and fruitful. 
The thesis does not exceed 80,000 words in length and is the result of my 
own work, including nothing which is the outcome of work done in collaboration. 
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NOTE ON PRONUNCIATION 
In Yugoslavia both a Latin and a Cyrillic script are employed. The former 
has been used for Serbo-Croatian terms in the present work. In spite of its 
broad simillarity the Serbo-Croatian Latin alphabet does contain some letters 
which do not form part of the English Latin alphabet. At the same time some 
identical letters are pronounced differently. 
C c like the ts in: Catsup 
d like the Ch in: Charm 
d like the T in: Tune 
D d like the J in: Jam 
D2 d2 similar to D/d but somewhat softer 
H h like the ch in: Loch 
i j like the Y in: Yellow 
§ like the Sh in: Shoes 
± like the S in: Pleasure 
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INTRODUCTION 
Among the dominant themes in contemporary world affairs are the political 
role of Islam and the problem of national minorities in socialist states. One 
aim of the present work is to examine these issues through the investigation of 
a Muslim minority within a socialist state - the Muslims of Bosnia-Hercegovina 
in Yugoslavia. 
Islam has generally been studied in the context of the Muslim dominated 
societies of North Africa and the Middle East. In spite of the fact that almost 
a third of the world's Muslims are members of minority populations within 
states as diverse as India, China, Malawi, Fiji, the Soviet Union and the U. S. A., 
these minorities have either been neglected or treated as marginal to the 
Islamic world. Thus their religious practice has been a focus of interest only 
when it Is viewed as syncretic, deviational or somehow "unIslamic". This is 
surprising in view of the fact that scholars of Muslim society frequently note 
the all-pervasive nature of Islam, a faith which is not merely practised in the 
mosque but informs every aspect of social and economic life; Islam tells the 
believer not only how to pray but how to trade, marry, inherit and greet people 
in the street. If its influence is indeed so pervasive, even the remotest Muslim 
minority with the most syncretic rituals must have some Islamic blood in its 
social veins. 
Treating the Muslim minorities as wholly distinct from the rest of the 
Islamic world may therefore be a mistake in itself. Furthermore, to ignore,, these 
societies is to ignore cases which should be of particular interest for the 
study of Islam's political role. This interest derives from the fact that, in the 
minority context, Islam is central to the Muslim community's identity. 
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As the major and in some cases (including the Bosnian) the sole source of 
the minority's cultural specificity, Islam is crucial to that minority's self- 
definition of identity and thus likely to be instrumental in its political 
behaviour. This is rarely the case in the Muslim majority society because here 
Islam is but one of many characteristics which citizens have in common; most 
Egyptians have Islam in common but they also share a language, a social 
structure and a common history. Islam is not then crucial (although it may, 
ofcourse, play a political role) and becomes so only in cases where the Muslim 
majority finds itself under the domination of foreign, non-Muslim powers. Thus 
Iranians and Afghans turned to Islamic fundamentalism and an idea of themselves 
as specifically Islamic peoples only in their respective struggles against 
American interference and Soviet invasion. 
In the Muslim minority a self-perception as a specifically Islamic society 
is almost inevitably present. Religion is therefore of importance to the group's 
political identity and may become the medium through which political claims and 
statements are made. Clearly the constraints Imposed by existence as a minority 
make the emergence of Islamic fundamentalist movements seeking changes in the 
nature of the state unlikely (and in the Yugoslav case a near impossibility) and 
thus we will not expect to find Iranian style Islamic activism in Bosnia. Here 
the political role of Islam is more muted, but nevertheless exists. Thus there 
has emerged in Sarajevo a puritanical and scripturalistic Islamic tendency which 
opposes, albeit quietly, both the official Muslim establishment and the idea that 
Bosnia's Muslims are but one of the many populations which make up the 
brotherly and united socialist federation of Yugoslavia (see chapter f ive). These 
facts make the study of the Muslim minority central rather than peripheral to 
an understanding of Islam's contemporary political role. 
- 
The socialist Eastern bloc is currently chequered with nationalisms. 
Yugoslavia provides a particularly interesting context for the study of this 
phenomena because here incipient nationalism is endemic both for historical 
reasons and, paradoxically, because it is encouraged by a state which at the 
same time fears its consequences. The federal nature of the Yugoslav state and 
the Constitution's recognition of ethnic groups as political entities 
(nationalities with guaranteed collective rights) fosters the desire of these 
groups to preserve, assert and develop their specific identities, for without 
them they have no legitimate claim to political advantage. The incipient 
nationalisms of the various groups are sometimes activated resulting in open 
conflict between them. The cohesion of the federated state is thus constantly at 
risk and the threat is one that its own Constitution has fostered. It is in this 
context that the case of the Bosnian Muslims (whose nationalistic tendencies as 
yet remain incipient) must be considered. 
Official nationalities policy plays an important role in conditioning the 
relationships between Yugoslavia's peoples but official policy is not the whole 
story; nationalisms are shaped not only from above but from below by popular 
perceptions of the nature of collective identity. The former may influence the 
latter but official policy and popular perception may also differ or conflict and 
this is so in the case of the Muslim population. The Muslims constitute one of 
Yugoslavia's nationalities. Their cultural specificity derives solely from their 
religious affiliation for in no other important respect do they differ from 
their Serbian and Croatian neighbours within Bosnia. When the state granted them 
the status of a nationality it therefore created a political community from a 
religious one. Nevertheless, It attempts to deny the religious character of this 
nationality and in official eyes there is no connection between membership of 
the Mus 1 im na t iona 11 ty and af fiI ia t ion to the Is lam ic fai th. In the popu lar 
- 
conception, however, religious and national affiliation are inextricably linked. 
It is the nature of this link which forms much of the focus of the present 
work. 
The anthropological concern with ethnicity should allow light to be cast on 
the nature of popular perceptions of identity. It is the case, however, that 
anthropologists have tended to study ethnic identity through an examination of 
the boundaries existant between various neighbouring groups. Ethnic group X is 
studied in relation to ethnic groups Y and Z. Yet such groups do not def ine 
their identity merely in relation to neighbours, other criteria also form part of 
their conceptualisation. In the case of the Muslim minority one such criteria is 
a self-perception as a specifically Islamic group and thus as a community which 
not only has boundaries with local non-Muslim groups but also membership of the 
worldwide Islamic Umma. This is certainly the case in Bosnia and the theme of 
multiple identity will be pursued in the pages to follow. 
The themes of Islamic religious organisation and the conceptual isat ion and 
assertion of collective identity form the focus of the present work. More 
specifically, three questions are addressed: 
1. How does the political context of Yugoslavia affect religious life? Secular 
authorities inhibit religious expression both directly and indirectly. Direct 
inhibition occurs through the threat of persecution. Indirect inhibition is the 
result of the state's policy of authorising official religious establishments to 
organise the religious life of believers. These religious establishments are 
unwilling to have their authority, already limited, eroded yet further by 
competition from rivalling religious leaders or orientations. Bosnia's Muslim 
establishment thus attempts to monopolise control of Islamic religious pr-actice 
and to combat potential rivals. Under the eye of the state such religious 
- 
rivalry and dissent as exists is often of a secretive and subdued nature. 
On what sources can the Muslim minority draw in its construction of 
identity? To what extent do the Bosnian Muslims consider themselves 
Yugoslavs /members of an identity group distinct from others in 
Yugoslavia /members of a worldwide Islamic community transcending the boundaries 
of the Yugoslav state? 
3. What is the relationship between religious organisation and the assertion 
of identity? The answer to this question lies in the fact both that religion is 
a medium for identity assertion and that the discourse of identity is one 
through which rivalling religious orientations may compete. Thus, for example, in 
Bosnia male and female death rituals express different aspects of collective 
Muslim identity. At the same time competing religious leaders promote varying 
visions of Islam and of Bosnian Muslim identity. The official Muslim 
establishment, mindful of the need to allay any fears on the part of the state, 
suggests the compatibility of Islam and socialism and the fact that Muslims are 
and must be loyal Yugoslavs. On the other hand a new religious orientation is 
emerging which stresses the association of Bosnian Muslims with the outside 
Muslim world. 
In chapter one I discuss the historical background and current political 
situation of the Bosnian Muslims. Through this examination the origins and 
evolution of the contemporary Muslim conception of group identity are 
illuminated. Bosnian Muslims see themselves as both a) an identity group 
distinct from their Serbian (Orthodox) and Croatian (Catholic) neighbours within 
Bosnia, and b) as a group which forms part of the worldwide Islamic Umma 
outside the bounds of the Yugoslav state. They thus have a double Identity. 
- 
Chapter two looks at the social structure and everyday life of Muslims in 
the town of Sarajevo. For their inhabitants, Sarajevo's Muslim neighbourhoods are 
not only geographically distant from the town centre but conceptually so. Whilst 
the neighbourhood is seen as the domain of Islamic values and customs, the town 
centre is the realm of anonymity in which religious and national affiliation are 
played down and members of different identity groups interact at work and 
school. Whilst the former is the realm of women, the latter is that of men. In 
contrast to the pattern typical of Middle Eastern Muslim societies, the ties of 
kinship are of relatively little weight amongst Bosnian Muslims whilst the 
social, economic and ritual ties between neighbours are strong. It is thus 
principally through the interactions of women that the most important social 
unit above the level of the nuclear family (ie. the neighbourhood community) is 
held together. 
The third chapter focuses on the folk evaluation of various religious 
practices. Whilst a sharp contrast between Orthodoxy and un-Orthodoxy is 
sometimes drawn (usually in the context of personal accusations) Sarajevan 
Muslims typically view religious actions as positioned on a scale of 
acceptability to God rather than as lying on one side of a deep moral or 
theological divide. The polarity of Orthodox vs. Popular Islam frequently 
employed by anthropologists is not, ofcourse automatically invalidated by this 
fact, yet in the Sarajevan context it becomes redundant. In the abscence of a 
strong social divide, whether urban/tribal, landowner /peasant or ulema/layman, 
the Orthodox and Popular labels cannot be affixed to particular distinct social 
groups and thus their potential analytical value is diminished. 
In chapter four I examine the state authorlsed Muslim establishment, the 
Islamske Zajednica, and its dual attempt to monopolise religious authority and 
to ally socialist ideology with Islamic faith. '"he popular reaction to the 
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religious bureaucracy's f irst aim Is mixed; factors such as age, sex and 
residence seem to condition Its acceptance on the part of the Mus-lim population. 
Reaction to the Zajednica's rapprochement of socialism and Is lam is 
unsympathetic; Muslims cannot accept their identity as being bound up with 
Yugoslav socialist identity. 
Chapter five considers two potential rivals of the Islamska Zajednica for 
religious authority. The first, the dervish orders, have an unrealised potential 
for whilst the brotherhoods form an obvious possible focus for those 
dissatisfied with the leadership of the Zajednica, in practice they have few 
affiliates. This is partly because their acquiscence to the Muslim 
establishment's rule does not allow them to offer an alternative to its vision 
of Islam or of Bosnian Muslim identity. 
The second is a new tendency which is at the same time mystical and 
scripturalist. It is not a formal organisation but a fluid and somewhat 
secretive network which is loosely focused around a number of charismatic male 
religious leaders who call themselves sheikhs. Their adherents find inspiration 
both in the Arab world and in the rapid growth of Islam in the West. They thus 
associate themselves as Bosnian Muslims with the outside Islamic world. Whilst 
sharing characteristics with the fundamentalists of Muslim dominated societies, 
the tendency does not call for the recognition of Sharia law by the state but 
concentrates on transforming the values and behaviour of Muslims in their 
personal and familial lives. 
The final chapter considers male and female death rituals. Sarajevan Muslim 
men differ from many of their Muslim counterparts in the high value they place 
on the rituals of women. I suggest that this is because the women's death 
ritual expresses one aspect of the Muslims' double identity, that of distinction 
- 
from other identity groups in Yugoslavia, whilst the male ritual as-serts 
another, the association with the wider Islamic world. 
Thrüugh ari Ethricýgraphic apprüach Ei nurüber. üf- 
Muslim society are then addressed; the perception of town and neighbourhood as 
separate conceptual spaces, the character of gender relations, the folk 
evaluation of religious rituals, the nature of religious rivalry. However, 
because the themes of incipient nationalism and of the co-extension of national 
and religious identity pervade the consciousness of all and strongly affect 
everyday life in Bosnia, the micro-level of social interaction and the macro- 
level of political process are closely intertwined. It is therefore hoped that 
the present study, as well as providing an analysis of the social and ritual 
life of Sarajevan Muslims themselves, may cast light on some broader questions 
concerning the development of nationalism, the position of minorities in the 
(socialist) state and the political role of Islam. 
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1. DOUBLE IDENTITY 
, elling jokes has never been something at which I've had much success 
but in Bosnia I found that even I could raise a laugh with the ones that 
begin: "There's an Englishman, an Irishman and a Scotsman... ". The variations 
and conflicts between members of different ethnic groups is something 
readily understood by Bosnians and many of their own jokes make fun of the 
stupid Albanian, the proud and lazy Montenegrin, the liberated Slovene and so 
on. (Some of these Jokes appear in an appendix at the end of this thesis. ) 
The discrete identities of these groups are recognised by the Yugoslav 
constitution itself which proclaims the state- a fe-daraticirt of i--everal 
nationalities (including the Albanian, the Montenegrin and the Slovenian). Yet 
within Bosnia the popular conception of group identity differs from the 
official conception of the state. The state recognises identity as based 
solely on nationality whilst the popular view is that identity is based both 
on nationality and on religious affiliation. 
The republic of Bosnia-Hercegovina is predominantly inhabited by members 
of three of f ic ia I ly recogn ised na t iona Iit ies - the Serb ian, the Croa t ian and 
the Muslim. Each of the three nationalities corresponds to one of three 
religions - Serbian Orthodoxy, Roman Catholicism and Islam. Whilst the state 
officially Ignores this correspondence, in popular parlance terms of national 
and of religious affiliation are taken as co-extensive; thus a Serb is 
Serbian Orthodox and vice versa. a Croat is Catholic and vice versa and a 
Muslim is a member of the Islamic faith and vice versa. Bosnians thus view 
the ident4ities of the three groups as both national and religious. 
- 
Bosnia's three iden"City groups may be described as ethnic groups, 
however, there are two reasons for avoiding this term here. The first is 
simply that the term is vague and inadequately defined. Can ethnic groups be 
discerned objectively on the basis of religious, linguistic, racial and other 
differences or do they exist merely in virtue of the subjective feelings of 
their members? Have ethnic groups always been with us or are they a 
relatively recent phenomenon? What definition of ethnic groups can exclude 
groups such as castes or classes which are endogamous, share cultural values 
and forms and consider themselves to be distinct from other such castes or 
classes? The term is a vague one but the basis on which Bosnian Muslims 
distinguish themselves from their non-Muslim neighbours is not vague. The 
Muslim, the Serb/Serbian Orthodox and the Croat/Catholic see themselves as 
distinct groups in virtue of their distinct nationalities and religions (or 
religious origins). For this reason the specific idea of a "national/religious 
group" is preferable to that of an "ethnic group". 
The second case for avoiding the term "ethnic group" rests on one of the 
propositions of this work. The Bosnian Muslims define their group identity 
partly in terms of their religious and national distinction from the other 
two groups resident in Bosnia. However, they also have a second source of 
Identity on which to draw. They are not only distinct from their Bosnian (and 
other Yugoslav) neighbours but also member-s of a wider Muslim world outside 
Yugoslavia. Muslims define their group identity both in terms of distinction 
at home and in terms of assoclation abroad. This is the double identity of 
the Bosnian Muslims. Double identity is not unique to Bosnian Muslim society; 
American Jews may feel themselves to be both distinct from non-Jewish 
Americans and members of a worldwide Jewish community, Yugoslav Gypsies 
feel themselves to be distinct from other Yugoslavs and have recently begun 
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to stress their unity with the Romany world at large, organising 
international conferences and pushing for the rights of Gypsies everywhere. 
But the double identity of Bosnian Muslims is impressive in the extent to 
which it permeates social and religious life. The two aspects of identity are 
expressed in different religious rituals and asserted by different religious 
leaders and organisations. Studies of "ethnicity" and "ethnic groups" tend to 
focus on the boundaries between neighbouring groups (an approach formulated 
by Barth, 1970) rather than examining all the components of their self 
perceptions of identity. In Bosnia, the perceived differences between Muslim 
and Serb/Serbian Orthodox, and between Muslim and Croat/Catholic, are but one 
component of the Bosnian Muslims' self perception of identity. Another is the 
relationship perceived between Bosnian Muslims and the wider Islamic world 
or Umma. 
This view of identity is at variance with that of the Yugoslav state. 
Republics and Autonomous Provinces 
Yugoslavia (literally meaning "South Slav Land") is composed of six 
republics and and two autonomous provinces. The republics are those of 
Serbia, Croatia, Slovenia, Macedonia, Montenegro and Bosnia-Hercegovina. 
In the fifteenth century Bosnia had been a feudal kingdom periodically 
dominated by the Hungarians. In 1463 it was invaded by the Ottomans who 
ruled the province for the next four hundred years. In 1878 the Austro- 
Hungarian Empire occupied the region. The Ottomans remained the titular 
rulers of Bosnia but the region was administered by the Austro-Hungarians 
who annexed It in 1908. Austrian rule ended with the First World War after 
which Bosnia was incorporated into the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, 
later renamed the Kingdom of Yugoslavia. During this period of its history 
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the region was officially partitioned between Serbia and Cr: ýatia. It was with 
the aim of scotching the competing claims of Serbia and Croatia over the 
territory that the socialist government of the post World War Two Yugoslavia 
proclaimed Bosnia-Hercegovina a separate republic. 
The two autonomous provinces are those of Vojvodina and Kosovo, both of 
which form part of the republic of Serbia. 
Each of the republics and autonomous provinces has its own governmental 
assembly which is autonomous to a high degree, though the provincial 
assemblies are less so than the republican assemblies I1 -1. Four f if ths of 
Yugoslavia's total public sector budget are spent by the regional (republican 
and provincial) assemblies. 
The Assembly of Yugoslavia, deals with matters of general economic 
administration (for example the distribution of resources between regions), 
national defense, foreign affairs and the security police. It is composed of 
two chambers, the chamber of republics and provinces and the federal 
chamber. The former consists of 8 delegations, one from each republic and 
autonomous province. The latter is composed of 220 members, 30 from each 
republic and 20 from each autonomous province. This imbalance between 
republican and provincial representatives means that the provinces wield less 
authority in federal decision making than do the republics. (For a fuller 
description of government in Yugoslavia see Nyrop 1982) 
(1) In 1988 certain sections of the Communist Party of Serbia are demanding 
greater restrictions on the autonomy of Kosovo and Vojvodina. 
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Narod and Narodnost 
Yugoslavia is a federation. Whilst the republics and autonomous 
provinces are the administrative units of the state, the federation of 
Yugoslavia is constitutionally one of peoples or nationalities rather than of 
regions. It is the nationalities of Yugoslavia rather than the regions which 
have the theoretical right to secede from the federation. The state 
distinguishes two categories of nationalities - narodi and narodhosti. 
Six narodl are recognised; the Serbian, the Croatian, the Slovenian, the 
Macedonian, the Montenegrin and the Muslim. The first five are obviously 
based on five of the six republics, although there are Serbs who live outside 
of Serbia (in Bosnia-Hercegovina, for example), Croats who live outside of 
Croatia and so on. The sixth category, Muslim, has a complicated history 
which will be discussed below. 
A number of nar-odhostl are recognised including the Albanian, the 
Turkish, the Hungarian, the Romi (Gypsy) and others. 
It is difficult to provide a good translation of the terms narod and 
narodhost since no clear criteria seem to distinguish the nationalities 
designated by the two terms. In general It is the case that a narod is a 
group the majority of whose members live within the borders of Yugoslavia 
whilst a large percentage of the members of a narodhost live outside the 
country (thus, most Turks live in Turkey and most Hungarians in Hungary). 
This equation is not, however, universally applicable: many Macedonians live 
in Bulgaria and Greece. The state's ascription of narod or narodhost status 
to different nationalities seems to be based on political and diDlomatic 
considerations rather than those of pure logic. 
This becomes clear when we examine the case of the Muslim nar-od. In the 
censuses of 1948 and 1953 respondents were required to state both t. -ieir 
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national and their religious affiliation (see Singleton 1976). The category 
"Muslim" was not at the time taken as denoting either a narod or a narodhost 
but could be given only in answer to the census question about religion. 
Bosnian Muslims thus gave their national affiliation as "Serb", "Croat" or 
"Undeclared" and their religious affiliation as Muslim. In 1961 the census 
changed in two ways. Firstly, no question as to religious affiliation was 
asked, and secondly, the term "Muslim" was permitted as an answer to the 
question as to nationality: Muslims were allowed to account themselves 
"Muslims in the ethnic sense". Two years later the 1963 Constitution accorded 
them the status of a narodhost. Finally, in 1971, the Muslim narodhost was 
upgraded to the status of a narod. The motivation of this upgrading was 
threefold: a) to put a final end to age-old disputes between the Serbs and 
the Croatians as to whether the Muslims of Bosnia-Hercegovina were really 
Serbs of the Islamic faith or Croatians of the Islamic faith (such disputes 
were related to the age-old territorial ambitions of Serbia and Croatia 
within Bosnia-Hercegovina), b) to satisfy the demands of Bosnian Muslims 
(these had grown louder since the 1966 fall of Rankoviý, the Serbian head of 
Secret Police whose reign involved the repression of the non-Serbian 
nationalities and who was widely viewed by these nationalities as a Serbian 
expansionist), and c) to curry some favour with the largely Arab and Muslim 
non-alligned world of which Tito was a figurehead. The motivation was thus a 
political one. (For a detailed account of the history of census taking see 
Petritevid 1983. ) 
Official membership of a narod or narodhost Is on the basis of self- 
ascription. Filling in the census form is not a question of ticking the 
appropriate box but of writing down one's answer in full, with the help of an 
elaborate set of instructions. (in 1981 it becarme permissable riot to 3nswer 
- 14 - 
the census question on nationality at all, however, hi-ss +. ý. an 1% of Bosnians 
choose this option. ) Citizens may write down whatever they like and will be 
noted accordingly in the statistics except in the case of those individuals 
who give an answer that is not seen as denoting any nationality at all, for 
example individuals who describe themselves by regional terms such as 
"Dalmatian" or "Hercegovinan". These individuals will be counted in the 
statistics as "Yugoslavs". 
The category "Yugoslav" came into being in 1961 as an alternative for 
those who did not wish to def ine themselves as members of any particular 
narod or narodhost. This alternative has fluctuated in popularity over the 
years. It is impossible to be certain of whom exactly it appeals to but it 
was my impression that children of nationally mixed marriages or people 
especially committed to the Communist Party, for example Party officials, 
were likely to define themselves in this way. (By no means all Party members 
do so. ) 
In 1981 almost 90% of the population of Bosnia-Hercegovina described 
themselves as belonging to one of three nar-odf, the Muslim, the Serb or the 
Croat. The exact f igures are: 
Mus I im 39,52% (1,630,033) 
Serb 32,02% (1,320,738) 
Croat 18,38% ( 758,140) 
Yugoslav 7,91% ( 326,316) 
ýrom (A more detailed breakdown of the population's national affiliation -1 
1953 to 1981 is given in appendix b. ) 
The distinction between republics and autonomous provinces Is of great 
importance in terms of political power. The basic demand of the Albanian 
nationalist movement in Kosovo is thus that their region be upgraded to the 
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status of a republic rather than that their narodnost be upgraded to the 
status of a nar-od. The material relevance of belonging to a particular narad 
or narodhost is less. Republican and provincial governments do try to keep 
the political representation of the various nationalities in proportion with 
the size of these nationalities, but no quota system is employed and thus, 
for example, in 1971 Serbs formed 14.2% of the population of Croatia but 
24.7% of the Republic's Communist Party. In the same year Serbs dominated 
the Bosnian party, in spite of being only 37.19% of the population, whilst 
Muslims, and especially Croats, were under- represented within it (see Carter 
1982 p. 35). Again, the Constitution formally guarantees the proportional 
representation of nationalities within the officer corps of the army, yet in 
1970 Serbs were found to form 57.4% of the corps whilst Albanians formed 
only 1.2% of it. Their respective proportions of Yugoslavia's population were 
36.3% and 7.7% (see Ramet op cit. p. 39). There are no official quotas based 
on national affiliation for the recruitment of government officials, 
university students, policemen, company employees or any other group. An 
individual's national affiliation therefore affects his or her opportunities 
only in exceptional cases I: ': '. 
(2) One such exceptional case is the result of the current disturbances In 
Kosovo. A man whom I knew lived and worked in Kosovo but had been born 
in the Montenegrin Sand2ak and was a Muslim by faith. He wanted to 
exchange both job and apartment to move to Sarajevo. In his transferral 
application he misguidedly stated that he was a Montenegrin by national 
affiliation, thinking that this would help his cause. As it turned out, 
this was the worst thing he could have done. Had he described himself as 
a member of the Muslim nation he would have been allowed to transfer 
whereas current policy in Kosovo aims to stop the emigration of Serbs 
and Montengrins from the region. 
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The symbolic importance of nationality status is, however, enormous in 
a federated state such as Yugoslavia. The Muslims fought hard for their 
recognition first as a narodhost and then as a narod. The appearance in 1972 
of a textbook, "The History of Yugoslavia", which treated the Muslims of 
Bosnia merely as a religious rather than as a national group provoked 
outrage amongst Muslim intellectuals. The contribution of such intellectuals 
to the presentation of Bosnian Muslims as a group with a cohesive national 
identity rather than simply a religious identity has been large. Some Muslim 
historians have written the history of Bosnia in such a way as to suggest 
that the roots of the Muslim population's cohesiveness extend back even 
further than the arrival of the Ottoman Empire and Islam to the days of the 
mediaeval kingdom of Bosnia. They further stress the distinction of Bosnian 
Muslim art, architecture, literature and music from that of the Turks, thus 
to an extent denying the relationship of the Bosnian Muslim group to that of 
other Muslims and playing down the Islamic content of Bosnian Muslim 
culture. (See, for examPle, Had2ijahit 1977). 
In the most recent census (1981) 8.9% of the Yugoslav population 
described themselves as members of the Muslim narod. Of these the vast 
majority lived within Bosnia-Hercegovina or the Sand2ak region. In Ottoman 
times the latter formed part of the pashiluk of Bosnia and although it is 
today partitioned between the republics of Serbia, Montenegro and Bosnia- 
Hercegovina, its Muslims still see themselves as sharing an identity with 
those of Bosnia. As one Muslim woman of Sand2aklian origin told me In her 
Sarajevan home: "The Sand2ak to Bosnia is like from here to the town 
square". Members of the Islamic faith who live within the Serbian or 
Montenegran Sand2ak are unlikely to describe themselves on the census as 
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members of the Serbian or Montenegrin narodl or as anything other than 
"Mus 1 ims". 
However, riot all Yugoslav citizens of the Muslim faith belong to the 
Muslim narad. Many are of Albanian, Turkish, Macedonian or Gypsy origin and 
describe themselves on the census as belonging to these nationalities. Thus 
the Islamic religious community of Yugoslavia is divided into several 
different nationality groups. These separate fragments of the Islamic 
religious community are by no means in harmony with each other. Thus Bosnian 
Muslims tend to think of their Gypsy counterparts as lazy, shiftless and 
untrustworthy, whilst the Albanians are branded as troublemakers who, if 
unhappy in Kosovo, should take themselves and their political demands off to 
Albania. This lack of harmony tends to inhibit the rise of any Pan-Islamic 
political movement encompassing all Yugoslav Muslims. 
It need not, however, necessarily inhibit the rise of a specifically 
Bosnian Muslim nationalism which relies on religious faith to make political 
claims. Whilst Macedonians, Albanians and Gypsies may be Muslims by faith, 
members of the Muslim narod are necessarily so since neither Christians nor 
Jews would consider accounting themselves "Muslims". In contrast about 4% of 
Kosovo's Albanians are Christians, as are many more within the state of 
Albania. The result is that the Albanian nationalist movement of Kosovo 
seems to have little or no religious element. By stressing their Islamic 
identity the Albanian nationalists would simply divided themselves from their 
Christian counterparts and weaken their own claim. The Bosnian Muslims, on 
the other hando would alienate none of their fellow nationals by stressing 
their religious identity In the context of a nationalistic movement, since all 
of these fellow nationals share the Islamic faith '3". It is for this reason 
that the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, the LCY, so fears the identification 
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of religion and nationality among Bosnian Muslims, and as Ramet neatly puts 
it: 
Iswants to have it both ways: viz., to derive a new nationality from a 
religion but yet to deny that derivation and suppress demands that are based on it. " (Ramet 1984 p. 155) 
For various diplomatic reasons the state Is happy to have a Muslim narod 
so long as that narod does not start claiming status and priveleges on the 
basis of its religion. 
The Co-extension of National and Religious Identity 
It has been noted that Bosnia-Hercegovina is inhabited by members of 
three religious communities; the Serbian Orthodox, the Roman Catholic and the 
Islamic. The three faiths correspond to the three nar-odl of Bosnia; the 
Serbian, the Croatian and the Muslim. This correspondence, as has been 
pointed out, is not officially recognised by the secular, socialist state 
which deems religion a private affair and has not, since 1953, asked any 
census questions about religious affiliation. In the state's view religion and 
nationality are separate. Thus in official terminology the capitalised 
"Muslim" (Musliman) denotes something quite different from the lower case 
"muslim" (musliman). The former refers to an individual of a particular narod 
whilst the latter describes a person of a particular religious persuasion or 
background. In the state's view then, it is possible to be a "Muslim" without 
being a "muslim", and vice versa"' 
(3) The Turkish nationality, like the Muslim, includes only individuals of 
Islamic religious origin. However, the existence of a Turkish state 
outside Yugoslavia and the possession of a language distinct from that 
of other citizens offers Yugoslav Turks a more obvious basis on which to 
claim national identity than would Islam. 
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In the popular view, however, national and religious affiliation are 
taken as co-extensive. Thus when someone told me a story about a "Serb" and 
I questioned the speaker as to the meaning of this term, the answer was that 
the person was of the Serbian Orthodox faith. My suggestions that the person 
in question was of Serbian origin or family were rejected as not being the 
defining characteristic of a Serb. Conversely, a person of Serbian Orthodox 
faith was defined as being a Serb rather than someone whose allegiance lay 
with the Serbian Orthodox Church. In a similar manner a Croat simply is a 
Catholic and a Muslim is a Muslim. 
In general, the terms used to refer to the three identity groups are 
"Serb", "Catholic" and "Muslim", and this usage will be adhered to here. The 
terms "Serbian Orthodox" and "Croat" are uncommon. In the Serbo-Croatian 
language "Serb" is Srbin and "Serbian Orthodox" is Pravaslav. The 
etymological distance of the two terms suggests that the term "Serb" (Srbin) 
is not merely a linguistic shorthand for "Serbian Orthodox" (Pravaslav). 
The co-extension of national and religious identity is so strong that it 
spills over into non-Bosnian contexts. The first time I met a particular 
woman she asked me what my nationality (nacija) was. I said that I was 
English but she replied that she knew that but it wasn't what she meant. 
Misunderstanding, I explained that my nationality was indeed English, it was 
my citizenship that was British. However, that was apparently not what she 
meant either, she kept stressing that she wanted to know my nationality. 
After several rounds of fruitless question and answer she helped me: "Are 
(4) Throughout this thesis only the capitalised form, "Muslim". will be 
employed. This is in adherence both to the popular Bosnian conflation of 
religious and national identity and to standard English usage. 
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you a Catholic or a Serb? ". I explained that I was neither one nor the other 
but a Protestant and was then deemed to have answered the question 
correctly. There was still a small problem since the woman didn't know what 
a Protestant was so she asked me whether Protestants had Christmas and 
whether it was on the seventh of January (as is the Serbian Orthodox 
Christmas). I told her the correct date, to which she remarked: "Ah, like the 
Germans". 
It has been seen that 7.91% of the Bosnian population described 
themselves on the 1981 census as "Yugoslavs". This fact, however, has no 
impact on day-to-day conception or speech. Nobody refers to anybody else as 
a "Yugoslav" except when distinguishing them from Russians, Australians or 
other foreigners. Occasionally a person was referred to as a "Communist", but 
only In the case of those who were exceptionally committed to the Party 
(many Party members are not) and even then the speaker might qualify the 
statement by explaining that the Communist in question was at the same time 
a Muslim, Serb or Catholic. 
I do not suggest that the idea of "Yugoslavness" is a meaningless one 
for the country's citizens or that they all consider themselves as 100% 
Muslims, Slovenes, Croats etc. and 0% Yugoslavs. Yet the way in which they 
account themselves Muslims, Slovenes or Croats seems to differ from that in 
which they consider themselves Yugoslavs. In this context it is interesting 
to consider the Communist Party's changing views on nationality since the 
war. In the 1950s the idea of 'Yugoslavism" and the existence of a "Yugoslav 
culture" was prevalent within the Party. Of course the various nationalities 
were politically recognised as separate entities but there was some feeling 
that an increasingly homogeneous society would emerge as socialism 
progressed, that there was a Yugoslav nation in the process of formation. 
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This climate was unwelcome to Croats and Slovenes who felt that 
"Yugoslavism" was simply a mask for Serbian expansionist unitarism. In 1964 
the Eighth Congress of the LCY disowned the concept of Yugoslavism. Tito 
condemned "the confused idea that the unity of our peoples means the 
elimination of nationalities and the creation of something new and 
artificial" and the Congress declared that the idea "that it is necessary to 
create a unified Yugoslav nation (is an] expression of bureaucratic 
centralism and unitarism" (see Ramet op cit. p. 56 & 57). 
In place of Yugoslavism came the idea of "Yugoslav socialist patriotism": 
"the identification with, feeling for, and love of the socialist self- 
mamaging community ... a moral force for the unity of the socialist self- 
managing of nations and nationalities of Yugoslavia" (Miladinovid 1976, 
quoted in Ramet op cit. p. 58). 
Yugoslav socialist patriotism is fostered in a number of ways - through 
the celebration of all-Yugoslav holidays, Yugoslav competition in 
international sporting events, school trips to other republics, the mixed 
national composition of army conscript regiments and the deployment of 
conscripts in republics other than their own And citizens do indeed 
identify, at one level, with the Yugoslav community. Yet Yugoslav socialist 
patriotism does not exclude, and in some sense even presupposes, national 
patriotism. Thus one writer has urged that it be understood as the 
combination of a) devotion towards one's narrow homeland, and b) devotion 
towards the wider homeland of Yugoslavia (Nikolovski 1976, cited in Ramet op 
(5) This type of deployment is not unique to Yugoslavia. Turkey, for example, 
employs the same method in the hope of encouraging Turkish patriotism. 
In Yugoslavia, however, it has a second important motive - if, for 
example, all Albanian conscripts were deployed in their homeland of 
Kosovo, trouble could reasonably be expected. 
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cit. p. 58). Yet again the secular authorities seem to want to have it both 
ways and find themselves caught in paradox. Whilst fearing the outbreak of 
nationalist movements within Yugoslavia, they allow and even encourage the 
nationalistic sentiments of its citizens. The historical development of the 
nationalities and the contemporary political system of federation mean that 
these sentiments in any case need very little encouragement to thrive and it 
is national rather than Yugoslav identity which seems to hold pride of place 
in the feelings of most citizens. 
In contemporary Bosnia, as has been seen, national identity is seen as 
co-extensive with religious identity, but this has not always been the case. 
To understand why it is necessary to take a brief glance back through the 
history of Bosnia. 
Conversion to Islam 
The mediaeval Kingdom of Bosnia was a feudal state periodically 
dominated by the Hungarians. It accomodated three faiths, that of the Roman 
Catholic Church, that of the Eastern Orthodox Church and that of the Bosnian 
Church. For many years scholars supposed Bosnian Church members to have been 
Bogomils, adherents of a dualistic heresy originating In Bulgaria, however, 
more recent work (Fine 1975) has challenged this hypothesis. 
In the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries the Ottomans began to expand 
into the Balkans. Kosovo was taken in 1389, Constantinople (hereafter 
Istanbul) in 1453, the Kingdom of Bosnia in 1463 and the neighbourtng Duchy 
of Hercegovina in 1482. Two changes in the religious life of Bosnia occurred 
after the Ottoman arrival. The first was the death of the Bosnian Church 
which is scarcely referred to in fifteenth and sixteenth century documents. 
The second was large scale conversion to Islam. This conversion was gradual 
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at first but had increased In pace by the end of the fifteenth century, Sixty 
years after the Ottoman invasion whole villages had converted to Islam. The 
level of conversion varied from region to region, in 1528 the Sarajevo region 
contained 19,619 Christian (Catholic and Orthodox) households and 16,935 
Muslim households whereas the Zvornik region contained 13,112 Christian 
households and only 2,654 Muslim households (Fine 1975 p. 384) 
The reasons for and manner of conversion to Islam have been a matter of 
speculation for decades. For a long time the most widely held view was that 
members of the Bosnian Church/Bogomil sect and of the aristocracy converted 
en masse (see, for example, Solovjev 1949 and Dvornik 1962). The reasons 
given for the wholesale conversion of the former are either that the 
Bogomils turned to Islam in reaction against previous persecution by 
Catholics or that the Church's doctrine was close enough to that of Islam to 
facilitate conversion. (The latter view is that propounded by some 
contemporary Bosnian Muslim intellectuals in an attempt to prove the pre- 
Islamic origins of Bosnian Muslim society. ) The aristocracy are said to have 
converted to the conquerors' faith in order to retain their economic and 
political advantage under the new Ottoman regime. 
The work of John Fine Jnr. (op cit. ) casts strong doubt on such theories. 
Fine shows that none of Bosnia's three churches had commanded strong loyalty 
before the Ottoman invasion, and that the Bosnian Church, in particular, was 
in a state of decay. Its monastic clergy had failed to establish a preaching 
order or to forge close ties with the populace and when King Stefan Tomas, a 
convert to Catholicism, exiled a number of its clergy in 1460, the Church was 
weakened yet further. Furthermore, conversions from faith to faith had been 
common throughout the fifteenth century; records from the 1450's show that 
the Catholic and the Orthodox Churches were competing for converts in a 
-I- 
particular area of Bosnia. The 1450s and '60s saw a number of forcible 
conversions to Catholicism. 
Furthermore, Fine shows that the Ottoman invasion was followed by 
conversions not only to Islam but also to the Orthodox Church. He also points 
out that the mass conversion of Bosnian Church members is supported by 
little written evidence: whilst there are definite records of Catholic and 
Orthodox conversions to Islam there are no unambiguous records of the 
conversion of Bosnian Church adherents to the new faith. 
The "Bosnian Church" theory does not then seem to hold water. According 
to Fine, the theory of wholesale conversion on the part of the aristocracy is 
little better supported by the evidence. The author shows that the written 
sources do not suggest a mass conversion on the part of any single group. 
Records from the 1480s prove the existence of households in which the father 
had a Slavic name and the son a Muslim one. Records of mixed marriages are 
also to be found. This evidence suggests that conversion, where it happened, 
was on an individual rather than a group or family basis. 
Such conversion would have been facilitated by the fact that, 
historically, Bosnians did not have long-standing loyalties to particular 
churches. Its motivation is, ofcourse, harder to explain. Vucinich (1963) 
suggests that individuals might have converted to avoid the devshirme, the 
system through which the Ottoman Empire recruited its civil and some 
military officials. Every five to six years a certain number of Christian 
boys were removed from their families and taken to Istanbul to be converted 
to Islam and trained for service. Although such boys often made very good 
careers for themselves, one can understand that a family might not think 
this sufficient inducement to part with its sons. There are, however, two 
reasons for which avoidance of the devshfrme seems an unlikely motive for 
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conversion. The first is that Christian Bosnians anxious to keep their sons 
could, and often did, resort to the less drastic strategy of marrying these 
sons off at an early age - no married boy could be taken in the devshirme 
(see Filipovid 1982). The second problem with the hypothesis is provided by 
the example of those Bosnians who did convert to Islam and did so only on 
the condition that their sons would not be excluded from the devshirme (see 
Jelavich 1983 volume 1, p. 41. ) 
Economic considerations may have played a part in inducing Bosnians to 
convert to Islam; it is certainly true that all the wealthy landowners of 
Ottoman Bosnia were Muslims rather than Christians. 
Group Identity in the Ottoman Period 
Late fifteenth century Bosnia contained three loose groups, the Orthodox, 
the Catholic and the Muslim, between which intermarriage and conversions 
were not uncommon. In the sixteenth century the boundaries between these 
three groups hardened. Three points must be made about Bosnian Muslim 
identity in the Ottoman period. The first is that Ottoman Bosnia was a 
society conceptually divided along religious lines, not along national lines. 
The second is that the Muslim group was strongly divided along class lines. 
Finally, no single and exclusive term of reference was used by anyone to 
refer to the Muslim group. 
Ottoman Bosnian society was conceptually divided along religious rather 
than national lines. This conception of social division was realised in the 
millet system of the Ottoman Empire (see Sugar 1977 p. 44). Both the Catholic 
and the Orthodox population were organised into official religious 
communities known as millets. Conceptually, all the Catholics of the Empire 
were members of a single Catholic millet whilst all the Orthodox Christians 
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were members of a single Orthodox millet. At the local level, Catholic and 
Orthodox communities had their own local officials, the priests, bishops and 
patriarchs. (Bosnia's small Jewish community also had its local officials. ) 
These local religious leaders were authorised to perform marriages and to 
adjudicate on matters of Church law for the benefit of members of their own 
religious community. (Although see Filipovid 1982 on reasons for which 
Bosnian Christians sometimes prefered to appeal to a Muslim kadija than to 
one of their own millet authorities. ) The Muslims of Bosnia, whilst having 
their own local kadijas (judges who administered Sharia and secular, kanun, 
law) and regional muftis (juriconsults who made legal decisions or fetvas), 
were not then conceptually distinguished from other Muslims of the Empire, 
including the Ottomans themselves. All Muslims were taken as belonging to 
the s ing le Is lam ic Umma. 
The Muslims were a group divided by strong class boundaries. In theory 
the Ottoman system accomodated two categories or classes of subject; the 
askerf and the raya. The askeri, or "professional Ottomans" as they are 
sometimes called, included all military and civil officials and members of 
the ulema such as the kadijas (Islamic judges) and mufti (juriconsult). The 
raya ("protected flock") was composed of the peasants, traders, merchants, 
professionals, and minor religious figures such as hodjas (or imams) and 
priests. Raya could be Christian, Muslim or Jewish. They paid taxes and were 
subject to restrictions on their mode of life and dress. The askeri had to be 
paid for their services and the payment was the grant of land through fief 
from the Sultan. (See Sugar 1977 and Jelavich 1983 for a fuller account. ) In 
Bosnia there were two categories of landowner, the begs and the agas. The 
begs had larger land holdings and peasants living on begliks had higher 
obligations in terms of labour and payments than did those living on agaliks. 
- 27 - 
The most reliable extant figures on class division are to be found in 
the census of 1878. This was the year in which Austro-Hungarian Empire 
occupied the region and it was the occupiers who compiled the census. The 
figures do not then strictly apply to Bosnia-Hercegovina under the Ottomans, 
however, they were taken so soon after the Austro-Hungarian occupation that 
they may be considered valid for the late Ottoman period. Moreover, the 
Austro-Hungarian presence over forty years (1878 - 1908) made very little 
difference to the class structure or land tenure patterns of Bosnian society 
which were radically altered only after the Second World War. 
The 1878 census shows: 
6,000 - 7,000 beEs and a87as (All Muslims. ) 
77,000 free peasants. (The vast majority Muslims. ) 
85,000 peasants bound in duty to landlords (60,000 Serbs, 23,000 
Croatians, 2,000 Muslims. ) 
(Taken from Lockwood 1975 p. 26) 
In addition to this there were ofcourse the urban traders and craftsmen, 
many of whom were janissaries (Ottoman infantry), and the minor religious 
figures, hodjas and priests. 
No single and exclusive term was used to refer to the Muslims. Within 
the Empire they were sometimes referred to as Boffnjeci. By Bosnian Christians 
they were called "Turks" and thus identified with the Ottomans themselves. 
Bosnian Muslims in fact sometimes used the term "Turks" self referentially. 
(Lockwood 1979). 
Changing Conceptions: The Mid Nineteenth Century Onwards 
Throughout most of the Ottoman period the Muslims were a group 
internally divided by class and conceptually distinguished from their 
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Orthodox and Catholic neighbours on the basis of religion. In the 1980s the 
Bosnian Muslims are a relatively cohesive group which is conceptually 
distinguished from others on the basis of both religion and nationality. In 
order to understand the process through which this change came about it is 
necessary to look, however briefly, at the complicated history of Bosnia from 
the mid nineteenth century onwards. 
The nineteenth century Ottoman Empire was beset with troubles. In 1830 
Serbia (which neighboured Bosnia) had, with the support of Russia, gained 
from its Ottoman masters the status of an autonomous principality. In 1869 
it became completely independent in all but name. The Empire lost lands in 
Croatia and Hungary. This loss resulted in a number of unemployed 
Janissaries (cavalry officers) gathering in the towns of Bosnia-Hercegovina. 
The begs and agas of Bosnia had, by this time, come to regard the lands they 
held as theirs by right rather than as grants from the Sultan. They imposed 
increasingly heavy and arbitrary taxes on the Christian peasants who, in 
1875, rebelled. The Empire attempted a programme of agrarian reform but was 
vigourously opposed by the Bosnian Muslim landowners. 
It was partly in order to solve these problems that the European powers 
agreed, at the 1878 Congress of Berlin, to the occupation of Bosnia- 
Hercegovina by the Austro-Hungarian Empire. In 1908, after an unofficial deal 
and In contravention of the Berlin treaty, Austria-Hungary annexed the 
region. This illegal action was contested by none of the European powers. The 
initial occupation had not been welcomed either by the Serbian population or 
by the Muslims, many of the latter resisting with arms or fleeing to 
Istanbul. The be8-s and agas had been fearful that the new regime might alter 
-he the system of land tenure to their detriment. In fact, whilst reducing t 
level of exploitation of the peasantry, the Austro-Hungarians left the system 
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very much intact. The Empire's main contribution to Bosnia was the 
introduction of modern technology, roads and railways rather than agrarian 
reform. In the political field, the Empire introduced a system of electoral 
colleges based on the three way religious division of the area. Thus the 
Serbian Orthodox, Catholic and Muslim populations each had its own electoral 
college. The system led to the creation of political parties based on 
religious affiliation; in 1906 the first Muslim political party, the Muslim 
National Organisation, was founded in embryonic form (see Donia 1981). At 
this stage most of its support came from the Muslim elite rather than from 
the peasantry. 
(In the Sand2ak region it was only after the Balkan Wars of 1912 and 
1913 that Ottoman rule came to an end. This end was immediately followed by 
widespread Christian looting and massacring of Muslims. ) 
In 1918 European negotiations in Corfu led to the creation of the 
Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes (later renamed the Kingdom of 
Yugoslavia) which included the Sand2ak and Bosnian regions and most of the 
contemporary territories of socialist Yugoslavia. The Kingdom was ruled by a 
Serbian dynasty, a fact which aroused dissatisfaction amongst the Croatians 
who wanted Serbia and Croatia to share power equally. Bosnia was a 
particular bone of contention between them since both thought that the 
region was historically a part of its own territory. During the days of the 
Kingdom the region of Bosnia was partitioned between Serbia and Croatia. 
Until the dictatorship of 1929 the Kingdom had a system of government 
including various political parties, one of which was the Muslim National 
Organisation, now renamed the Yugoslav Muslim Organisation. Its support now 
came from Muslim peasants as well as from the elites. 
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During the Second World War the Kingdom was d-ivided and chaos reigned. 
Various parts of the country were occupied by different Axis powers; Croatia 
and Bosnia by an Italian puppet state, Serbia by the Nazis and Macedonia by 
the Bulgarians who were allied with Germany and the Soviet Union. In addition 
to foreign occupation the country was riven by inter group tensions which 
had been present throughout the interwar years and which now broke out into 
a bloodbath. The Croatian fascists, the Ustashi, in alliance with the Italians 
massacred Serbs in Bosnia. The Serbian Chetnik movement which hoped to I 
establish a Serbian ruled state including the lands of Croatia and Bosnia 
massacred thousands upon thousands of Muslims, particularly in the Sand2ak 
region. I met no Sandtaklian Muslim who did not have horrific stories to tell 
about Chetnik atrocities; the Germans are considered to have been mild in 
comparison. 
The Partisan movement, led by Josip Broz Tito, attempted to include all 
Yugoslavs in a concerted effort against the occupying forces. Initially the 
Partisans' support came mainly from Serbs living under the fascist Croatian 
state (the Bosnian Muslims were not strong supporters) but later the 
movement drew in people of non-Serbian affiliation. The fascists were 
eventually defeated and it was through this liberation war, rather than a 
through internal class revolution, that the Communist Party came to power. 
The almost universal affection that is felt for Tito seems to be largely 
based, not on his social policies or Communism but on his leadership of the 
movement which put an end to the horrors of World War Two. As one elderly 
woman explained: "without Tito I doubt that there'd be anyone left alive in 
the country. " 
In the initial post-war years the Socialist Federated Republic of 
Yugoslav followed a Stalinist line but after the 1948 break with Moscow 
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policy changed. It does not lie within the scope of this work to -'well 
extensively on the nature of contemporary Yugoslav socialism but it is 
necessary to underline four points about it. 
Yugoslavia is nonaligned. It does not form part of the Warsaw pact and 
considers its own brand of socialism fundamentally distinct from that of 
other socialist states. 
Political power is decentralised, the republics and provinces having a 
high degree of autonomy. 
3. Whilst there are few private businesses (and thcse which do exist are 
small concerns - cafes and boutiques) the Yugoslav economy is a market 
economy, a socialist market economy. The state does not plan and reguiate 
economic affairs in the manner of its Soviet counterpart, it is the 
Individual business enterprises and co-operatives which set their own 
targets. This system involves... 
4. Se If -management. Enterprises and agricultural co-operatives have workers' 
councils and, if large enough, managing boards, whose members decide the 
policies, plans and goals of the organisation. Self-management is not 
confined to the economic sphere but also present in local government and 
other institutions. Thus local commune assemblies are self-managed, as are 
educational, cultural and social welfare organisations. The system of self- 
management therefore provides the form of most communal endeavour and 
offers citizens the chance of democratic participation in political anýý 
economic decision-making. (It is, however, the case that certain classes of 
citizen are over represented in the self-managing councils and board-s; Party 
members are vastly more in evidence then non-members, men are 
disproportionally present. ) 
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Four hundred years of Ottoman rule were followed by one hundred years 
of rapid and immense social change, all of which affected the self perception 
of the Bosnian Muslim group. Donia and Lockwood identify two processes of 
change in the years following the initial arrival of the Ottomans in 1463: 
"transformation of religious converts into ethnic group members ... has been a slow and gradual process extended over hundreds of years... Two 
distinct processes may be identified within this Bosnian Muslim 
e thnogenes is: f irst, differentiation of the Muslims from Christian South 
Slavs; and, second, amalgamation of the Muslim converts so that thev 
acted and thought as a single people. We contend that the latter process 
took longer and that a 'national consciousness' was not achieved until 
after World War Two. " (Donia & Lockwood 1978 p. 187) 
Leaving aside the question of "ethnogenesis" and "ethnic group" I want 
to look at the first of these two processes, that of differentiation from the 
Christians. Lockwood rightly sees the nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries as times of great change in Bosnia, and particularly of great 
change in the conception of group identity. He states that: 
"the development of South Slav nationalism in the nineteenth century... 
undoubtedly had the effect of ... emphasising the boundary between Muslim 
and Christian .... After the Austrian annexation, the Drocess of ethnic 
differentiation quickened. This was a period of heightened ethnic 
consciousness for the Bosnian Muslims. " (Lockwood 1979 p. 215. My italics) 
Christian rebellions of the nineteenth century and the collegiate 
electoral system established by the Austro-Hungarians did indeed alter the 
ways in which inter-group boundaries were conceptualised, but the word 
"emphasising" is an unspecific one which does not sufficiently indicate the 
nature of this alteration. Long before the nineteenth century Muslim, 
Catholic and Orthodox had recognised and marked differences between the 
three groups in ways which are still evident today. Thus, for example, 
intermarriage became extremely rare after the fifteenth and early sixteenth 
centuries and remains unusual in contemporary Bosnia. Christian women 
sometimes married Muslim men (after having converted to Islam) but the 
- 33 - 
reverse was not the case. In contemporary Sarajevo all the young Musllms 
whom I met reported that their parents would be very upset were they to 
marry Christians, however, the exogamous marriage of Muslim sons seemed to 
cause less concern than that of Muslim daughters. Q knew of one case in 
which a Muslim man had married a Serbian woman who did not convert to 
Islam. ) One young Muslim woman whom I met told me that her parents would be 
unhappy if her brother married a Serb or Catholic but would eventually 
accept it. They had, on the other hand, told their daugýýter that they would 
riot want her to marry a non-Muslim under any circumstances. The logic of 
this discrimination was that a woman and her children came more under the 
control of her in-laws than did a man and his children and thus the former 
might lose their religion. 
Friendships and other social relationships were and are almost as 
internal as marriage is endogamous. 1n the past this was particularly true in 
the case of women, and in rural Bosnia, was emphasised by the use of the 
veil. Rural Bosnia is dotted with small villages, some Muslim, some Catholic, 
some Serbian but very few mixed. These villages often stand within view of 
each other, on neighbouring hills and in neighbouuring valleys. Muslim 
peasant women did not veil within their own villages but only when walking 
past those of non-Muslims or when journeying to town where they would come 
into contact with non-Muslims. The veil was thus used less as a means of 
sexual segregation than as a boundary marker between different identity 
groups. 
In two cases social ties might be formed across group boundaries. The 
first was that of ýýiffano kumstvo, a type of fictive kinship established 
between parents, .3 child and a A-um (godparent) who cut a lock of the child's 
hair when it attained the age of one. (9fsano kumstvo will be discussed 7-ýýore 
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fully in chapter two. ) Muslims occasionally requested non-Muslims to be kum 
to their child. However, the bond formed by this type of kumstvo was weak; 
there was no expectation that it would engender lasting friendship Or 
obligate mutual aid and it was not believed to create a spiritual tie 
between the parties involved. 
The second case was that of friendships created in the marketplace, and 
in contemporary Bosnia at the place of employment or study. The Muslim and 
the Christian who buy, sell, work or study together may form friendships. In 
the case of men these are necessarily limited to the physical space of the 
market, factory, firm or school since men do not invite their friends home. 
Women may invite their friends home but during my stay in in Sarajevo I 
rarely witnessed a Muslim woman inviting a non-Muslim colleague to her home, 
whereas (female) Muslim friends were frequent visitors '16-. My own visits to 
Muslim homes were exceptions to this general pattern, but exceptions which 
seemed to be based on two important criteria. Firstly, I had high status as 
an interesting foreigner from a country which was seen as kulturni, 
civilised, in comparison with Yugoslavia. Secondly, although not a Muslim, 
neither was Ia Serb or Catholic and thus did not fall into one of the local 
groups from which Muslims stress their distinction. In general then, 
friendships were and are internal to the group. Those that are not tend to 
be physically confined to the space outside the home and neighbourhood. 
(6) The one regular (female) non-Muslim visitor to the homes of the ML; slim 
neighbourhood in which I lived in Sarajevo, was the Serbian milkwom3n 
who served the neighbourhood (she was a private rather than a public 
sector milkwoman). Every other morning she Journeyed into Sarajevo from 
her village, with her donkey and milk pails, and was occasionally invited 
in for a coffee by one of the housewives. 
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Names always were, and remain today, indications of 11ý. e aff iliation of 
individuals. Certain surnames (Imamoviý, Had2ijahit, Mujezinovit, Begovid, 
Spahid etc. ) are distinctively Muslim but it is above all the forename that 
bears witness to the individual's affiliation. Bosnian Muslim names are of 
Arabic, Persian or Turkish origin, although sometimes rendered in Serbo- 
Croatian form (Abdullah may become Avdo, Fatima may become Fata). Male names 
thus include Muhamed, Adnan, D2emal, Alija, Selim; women bear names such as 
Mevla, Fikreta, Amina, Hatid2a and Rabija. Those who convert from Christianity 
to Islam take new, Muslim names. The eighteenth century Sarajevan Muslim 
chronicler, Mula Mustafa Ba! teskija, in 1784/85 noted the conversion of a 
Christian and a Jew to Islam; the two men took the names Osman and Sallh. A 
young woman whom I met had converted from Catholicism to Islam and taken 
the name Azra. Catholics have their own distinctive forenames (Ivan, Marija ) 
as do Serbs (Jovan, Milka... ) 
The Muslim, the Catholic and the Orthodox always differed in their style 
of dress. Items of clothing such as the fez, for men, and dimije (flowing, 
baggy trousers) for women were distinctively Muslim. Only elderly Catholic 
women dressed in black. In eighteenth century Sarajevo official attempts were 
made to enforce a dress code. Thus in 1769/70 Bateskija notes: "The town 
crier announced in the square that Jews and Christians can no longer wear 
yellow leggings and slippers but only red ones. " Such rulings did not always 
produce the desired effect for in 1778/79 the kadija was forced to restate 
that yellow slippers were forbidden to Jews. However, whilst particular 
details seem sometimes to have been ignored, the three groups did dress in 
recognisably distinct styles. Lockwood notes that traditional peasant dress 
in rural Western Bosnia in the mid 1960s was basically the same for Muslims, 
Catholics and Serbs but that the three groups used different trimmings and 
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headgear to mark their distinct affiliations (Lockwood 1975). 
The three groups were ofcourse distinguished by their religious 
practices. Muslims tend to know little of Christian belief but are aware of 
the rituals performed by both Serbs and Catholics. Thus few of the Muslims I 
met knew that Christmas celebrates the birth of Christ but many were aware 
that Catholics celebrate it on the twenty fifth of December whilst Serbs do 
so on the seventh of January. Few knew that Easter (Catholic Uskrs, Serbian 
Vaskrs) celebrates the resurrection of Christ but all knew that sometime in 
the spring the Serbs and Catholics held a "coloured eggs festival". In the 
countryside Muslim villagers may be able to hear the loud wailing of a 
funeral service from a neighbouring Serbian village and are thus aware of 
(and amused by, as will be seen in chapter six) the nature of this service. 
For Bosnians, the type of rituals and religious customs followed by any 
individual place that individual firmly within an identity group. Thus the 
woman who wanted to know what I meant by saying that I was a Protestant 
asked me whether and when I celebrated Christmas. Others asked me whether I 
crossed myself with three fingers, as do the Serbs, or whether my people 
wept loudly at funerals. 
Clothing, names, rituals and a lack of intermarriage and inter-group 
friendships marked and reinforced group boundaries. So too did the use of 
certain different linguistic items (see chapter two). The boundaries between 
Muslim, Catholic and Orthodox were then felt, marked and clear long before 
the nineteenth century. The emergence of South Slav nationalism did not 
merely emphasIse these boundaries, as Donia and Lockwood suggest, what it 
did was to politicise them. Osman and Fatima had already known that Ivan and 
Marija bore an identity different from their own. Nineteenth century 
nationalism, Christian rebellions and the creation of an autonomous Serbia 
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showed them that Ivan and Marija belonged to a group which not only 
expressed its Identity through clothes, names, rituals and so on, but could 
use it to gain political advantage and recognition in a rapidly changing 
world. The rest of Europe was watching the Balkans, the tinderbox of Europe, 
and supporting the newly created nation state of Serbia ("Gallant little 
Serbia") and the struggles of the Christians against Ottoman rule. The idea 
of peoples or nationalities as the basis of political units prevailed. In this 
atmosphere Osman and Fatima realised that their own identity as Muslims was 
not merely religious and cultural but also a basis for political unity in the 
face of perceived threat, whether from Christian rebels, Ottoman reforms or 
Austro-Hungarian innovations. 
The arrival of the Austro-Hungarians and a governmental system in which 
political parties were based on religious and cultural identity groups 
fostered the idea of religious, cultural and political identity as 
intertwined. It was yet more strongly enhanced in the interwar period when 
the Yugoslav parliament was (until the dictatorship of 1929) dominated by a 
coalition of three parties. the Serbian, the Croatian and the Muslim. In 
contemporary Yugoslavia the concept of nationality, of identity groups as 
political units, is underwritten in the very constitution. 
From a Bosnia conceptually divided along religious lines there emerged a 
Bosnia conceptually divided along both religious and national lines. Inter 
group boundaries, which had been firm since the sixteenth century, were not 
only emphasised in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, they were 
politicised. 
The second process in Bosnian Muslim ethnogenesis was, according to 
Donia and Lockwood, that of amalgamation as a single people. The arrival of 
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the Austro-Hungarians had little effect on the class structure of Bosnian 
Muslim society which remained strongly divided between landowners. traders 
and peasantry. In the interwar period, however, the Yugoslav Muslim 
Organisation drew together both members of the Muslim elite and the Muslim 
peasantry. The advent of socialism and the federated state after World War 
Two diminished yet further the gulf between peasants and elite. 
Fieldwork in an urban environment suggested that whilst divisions of 
class and status do endure within the Muslim group (these will be discussed 
in chapter two), they are far less important than those that exist between 
the three identity groups; the Muslim, the Serb and the Catholic. I once 
walked along the main street of Sarajevo with a couple of unmarried female 
friends, Zumreta and Amra. We ran into an elderly male acquaintance of 
Zumreta's who was a muezzin at one of the central mosques. We stopped to 
chat for a while, then turned to go our own ways. 
"Salaam Aleikum", said the muezzin in Islamic farewell. 
"Ciao! ", replied Zumreta in the fashionable young style borrowed from 
Italy. 
As we made off Amra said to Zumreta: 
"Listen to you! The man tells you 'Salaam Aleikum' and you say 'Ciao! '. 
What kind of farewell is that to give to a muezzin-Poe 
Zumreta replied: 
"It doesn't matter. We're only raya. 01 
She meant, ofcourse, that we, as ordinary folk, were not expected 
to 
speak in the same way as a religious personality. Her use of the term raya 
did not, however, indicate any feeling that Muslim society is radically 
divided between the raya and the elite, the comment was made merely in the 
spirit of a jest. The term raya is today often used by young people 
to mean 
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simply "people/friends/my crowd". Thus an answer to the question "Who did 
you go to the cinema with? ", is "with raya". 
Eighteenth century Bosnian Muslims formed a religious group in the 
millet system and were socially divided along class lines. The contemporary 
Bosnian Muslims are a cohesive nat Iona I/relig ious group which distinguishes 
itself from, and is distinguished by, the other two national/religious groups 
of the region. This change in self perception of identity has been 
accompanied by linguistic changes. It has been seen that in Ottoman times 
the Muslims sometimes referred to themselves as "Turks", thus identifying 
themselves with the Ottoman Empire. It seems likely that this association 
began to break down towards the end of the Ottoman period. Avdo Mededovid 
was "The Singer of Tales" made famous through the works of Milman Parry and 
Albert Lord. He was a Sand2aklian Muslim who lived through the partition of 
the Pashiluk of Bosnia in 1878 (when the Austro-Hungarians took Bosnia- 
Herecgovina but not the Sand2ak) and the 1918 creation of the Kingdom of 
Serbs, Croats and Slovenes. For many years he served in the Ottoman army but 
speaking of his circa 1890 experiences in it seems to distinguish himself 
from the Turks: 
Ques t ion Were you all Bosnians in your company? 
Avdo Not at all. Four hundred of us all went off together from 
Senica, all Bosnians. Senica, we call that the Sandtak. We left 
from Senica and Bijelo Polje. All the Bosnians were put together 
in one camp; all the others were Albanians and Turks. We call 
those Anatolians Turks. ((Parry & Lord p. 45) 
This period had seen the Empire crumbling, the Christians (who 
associated indigenous Muslims with the Turks) rebelling and the Muslim 
landowners claiming land as their own, rather than recognising it as a grant 
from the Sultan. Linguistic disassociation from the Turks seems to have been 
the result. Contemporary Muslims, of Bosnia and the Sand2ak, refer to 
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themselves only as "Muslims,, (a term with both religious and national 
reference) rather than as Turks or Bosnians. 
Bosnian Muslim Identity as Wider Islamic Identity 
The Muslims are not only a group distinct from the Serbs and Catholics 
of Bosnia and from the Albanians, Slovenians and others of wider Yugoslavia, 
but a group which forms part of the Islamic world. This association has been 
stressed or played down at different times during the historical period 
under consideration. For the immediate pre-Austrian period Donia & Lockwood 
(op cit. p. 192) note: 
"As they increased their opposition to Ottoman reforms the Bosnian 
Muslims lost some of their intimate cultural contact with other parts of 
the Islamic world. They became increasingly alienated from the sources 
of cultural and religious activity in Asian parts of the Ottoman Empire 
and in Istanbul itself. " 
Again, the words of Avdo Mededovid demonstrate this alienation. Avdo is 
explaining the occasion on which he struck a fellow officer. 
Avdo He was swearing at me in a way that wasn't right. He was an 
Anatolian and he said 'Fuck your faith! ' It's going too far to 
say a hard thing like that. 
Question Was he a Turk? 
Avdo Oh yes. He was a Turk too. 
Question Then how could he say such a thing? 
Avdo That's why I don't like them. All their talk about Asia, Asia and 
Turkey, but they're just a pack of infidels. (Parry & Lord p. 44) 
The Austro-Hungarian occupation brought about a reversal of this self 
disassociation. Many Muslims emigrated to Istanbul - Popovic suggests a 
figure of at least 65,000 (Popovic 1986 p-272). Those who remained in Bosnia 
began to emphasise and reactivate their religious links with the outside 
Islamic world. Donia and Lockwood note that: 
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"In the Austro-Hungarian period the Bosnian Muslim elite also promoted a 
revival of cultural ties with the East. Pilgrimages to Mecca were 
common.. Wealthy Muslim landlords sent their sons to school in 11stanbul. Muslim intellectuals-founded newspapers to publish the serialiSed translations of Arabic classics and publicise the sayings of the Prophet. " (Donia & Lockwood op cit. p. 194) 
In contemporary Bosnia both aspects of Muslim identity - distinction 
from Serbs and Catholics within Bosnia and membership of the Islamic world - 
are given substance in standard rituals. In chapter six I will discuss the 
ways in which two Muslim death rituals, one performed by men and the other 
by women, express these two different aspects of Identity. 
Beyond the sphere of standard ritual, differing aspects of group identity 
are stressed by different religious philosophies and authorities in 
contemporary Bosnia. Whilst there has always been rivalry between different 
religious groups (for example, the dervishes and the puritans of the 
eighteenth century, see chapter five) the religious rivalry of today has an 
element which is new. Competing religious philosophies may include competing 
views of the nature of Bosnian Muslim group identity. Thus Sarajevo's new 
mystics and their charismatic leaders emphasise the membership of the 
Bosnian Muslims in the wider Muslim world whilst the official Muslim 
establishment stresses the alliance of Bosnian Muslim identity and Yugoslav 
socialist identity (see chapter five). For the moment it suffices to note 
that the Bosnian Muslims have more than one source on which to draw in 
their self definition of identity. 
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2. TOWN AND NEIGHBOURHOOD 
My f irst "homes" in Sarajevo were various rooms in the town cenl-re 
obtained through the tourist office. Some of the buildings were Austrian, 
some post-war, and none of the landladies were Muslims. There were mosques 
in the town, impressively attended on Fridays, but their Oriental impact was 
diluted by that of the Loto stalls, western clothes and fading advertisements 
for the 1984 Winter Olympics. The only Muslims I met were a band of 
academics, poets and publishers who frequented (along with their Christian 
colleagues) a smoke filled bar in which alcohol and conversation about James 
Joyce flowed equally freely. A Serbian, Communist acquaintance told me that 
she had friends who were Muslim believers. Whenever they were with her they 
seemed perfectly "modern" but she was sure that they were different at home. 
However, those were things one just didn't discuss with them. 
When I moved out of the tourist rooms and into one of the Muslim 
districts I realised that she was right, life in the "home" environment was 
different from life outside in the town, there was something "Islamic" about 
Sarajevo after all. Although many of the houses in the district contained the 
domestic equivalents of the Loto stall - pine kitchen fittings, tiled 
bathroom, washing machine and television - the world of the neighbourhood 
was felt to be, and in some ways preserved as, a world apart from that of 
the town outside. 
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The Town and Townspeople 
SaraJevo grew up on the site of the small mediaeval village of Vrhbosna. 
Originally it served the Ottomans only as a military base but later a court 
(Sara, p was built and Muslim converts from the countryside began to settle 
in the urban area. In 1520/30 the town's population seems to have been 
entirely Muslim (Sugar 1977 p. 51) but in 1556 a group of Sephardic Jews 
arrived from Spain and were welcomed as healthy additions to the merchant 
community. Christians were also resident in the town in this period - Shari"a 
court records show that most household servants were of Christian background 
(see ýelebi 1973 p. 117 fnote 137) In 1660 the town contained 104 mahalas 
(Turkish; residential districts) of which two were Jewish and ten inhabited 
by "Serbs, Bulgars and Vlachs", all Christian (ýelebi p. 105). A census of 1788 
shows the existence of twelve Christian mahalas, one of them, the "Frenkluk" 
or "Latinluk", inhabited by a colony of Catholics from Dubrovnik. The Catholic 
population of the town swelled after the Austro-Hungarian occupation of 
1878. 
Situated as it was on an important trade route to the Adriatic, Sarajevo 
became a thriving centre of trade and commerce and the heart of the province 
of Bosnia. The seventeenth century Turkish traveller, Evlija ýelebi, was 
greatly impressed with the town: 
"The world contains many towns by the name of Saraj: Ak-Saraj in 
Anatolia, Tabe-saraj ... Sehir-saraj ... Vize-saraj ... and others. But this 
Bosnian stone town of Sarajevo is of all of them the most advanced, the 
most beautiful and the most lively. " (ibid. p. 122) 
ýelebi notes the existence of 17,000 houses, f ive public baths, 177 
places of worship, 700 wells, 110 fountains, 176 watermills and 1,080 shops 
in which "one can buy, very cheaply, all manner of garments from India, 
Arabia, Persia, Poland and Czech land. " Whilst ýelebi's enthusiasm sometimes 
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results in exaggeration - the number of mosques and mesdtlds ("mosques" 
without a minaret) was in fact about 104, one for each mahala - the picture 
he paints of a wealthy and bustling business and religious centre Is 
undoubtedly an accurate one. 
Sarajevo is no longer a centre of trade and commerce; foreign goods are 
prized and hard to come by, usually obtained on the black market or from 
friends and relatives who travel or work abroad. 
The town's population is today almost half a million. Like other 
Yugoslavian towns, Sarajevo has grown rapidly since the war as a result of 
urbanisation. Nationwide, the urban population increased by 80% between 1953 
and 1971 and in the early 1970's one third to one half of the population of 
Yugoslavia's major urban centres (including Sarajevo) had been born elsewhere 
(Nyrop 1982). Some of the Muslims I knew and worked with were native 
Sarajevans but many were migrants or the children of migrants who had 
arrived from rural Bosnia and the Sand2ak anything from thirty to five years 
ago. 
The rural life in Yugoslavia is a hard one and most of those who live it 
would like to escape, or at least hope that their children will escape to a 
better life in the town. Those who have already left the countryside may 
extol the beauties of the landscape, the freshness of the air and so on, but 
in practice often want little more to do with these than the odd holiday. 
(The Belgrade marriage bureau, 2iva, apparently has great difficulty in 
finding girls willing to wed a rural boy, however wealthy, handsome and 
otherwise qualified. Oslobodenje 31.3.86) 
Particularly but not exclusively amongst young, second generation 
migrants there is a feeling of superiority in comparison with rural dwellers. 
Thus in Sarajevo the term -e1Jd*1seIJanka (m/f), meaning peasant or villager, 
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is generally one of mild derision. If one has relatives living in the 
countryside one says that they live na selo, "in the village", but not that 
they are seljacl, "villagers/peasants". The seljak in Sarajevo is that crude 
mouthed, rough-handed chap over there, gawping at the wonders of the city. 
The se1janka is that woman in the dowdy dimije (flowing, baggy trousers for 
women) and sturdy boots shouting at her country companions to come at a 
look at something in a shop. Sarajevans may criticise the dress and manners 
of their urban acquaintances as being those of a peasant. One muddy winter 
day I popped out to the shop (one minute away from the house In which I 
lived) in a pair of rubber galoshes. As I approached the bakery I heard a 
neighbour hailing me from a parked car. "What on earth are you doing? ", she 
asked, springing out of the dry and warm front seat. "Galoshes? Just like a 
peasant! " She told me, Jovially but firmly, never to go out like that again 
and later reported the incident to various other neighbours, all of whom 
found it amusing but were equally adamant that I should not wear the 
galoshes again. "This is SaraJevo", they explained. 
Another revealing incident was sparked off by a row between a 23 year 
old girl, Samira, and her mother's brother's son's new wife. Samira had lived 
most of her life in Sarajevo and considered herself a Sarajevan. Her cousin, 
the young husband, had been brought up in the country but sent to school in 
Sarajevo and his wife had lived all her life, until marriage, in a Bosnian 
village. The substance of the dispute is not relevant here but the way in 
which Samira argued her case Is interesting. She vented her indignation 
partly by stressing that the wife was new to the family but more Importantly 
by stressing that she was new to Sarajevo. "We've been here for ages and she 
just arrived yesterday! ", she fumed. Later I accompanied her on her mission 
to confront this newcomer. The same point was raised again and again. "We've 
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lived In Sarajevo for years and we know how to behave. No-one's ever said a 
word against us here. I came here as a baby and I went to school here, 
you've Just arrived and you have to learn what's what. You'll see how it is 
here and how to behave. " 
The rules of Sarajevo are deemed by Sarajevans (whether native or 
migrant) to be different from, and better than, those of the country. Whilst 
Sarajevans of rural background are not exactly ashamed of their origins, they 
do like to make it clear that they are only origins, and that they themselves 
have become true Sarajevans. Those of pure Sarajevan origin are by no means 
ashamed to state this loudly and clearly. I once inadvisedly Joked to a group 
of friends that I had hoped to come to Sarajevo to learn about Sarajevan 
Muslim customs but had found myself surrounded by Sand2aklians (many of the 
Muslim migrants to Sarajevo are of Sand2ak origin). The only person who 
found this amusing was a girl who had been born in Sarajevo and whose 
mother was from an old and well-known Sarajevo Muslim family. The others did 
no t. 
The depth of a family's history as dwellers in Sarajevo effects its 
status. So too does its wealth. The word "class" is not used, those who have 
learnt it at school think of it as a Western phenomenon, but it is clear to 
all that some families are "stara, bogata", old and rich, whilst others are 
not. During my fieldwork I came into contact with two unusually wealthy, old 
families. On both occasions I had been taken to meet them by a bula (female 
religious functionary) who was performing a ritual for them. One family 
owned a huge farm and lovely house just outside Sarajevo, several cars and a 
smaller house In the town itself. They were said to live like the 
Carrington's in "Dynasty" (Dynasty, Love Boat and other American television 
programmes were popular in 1986). The other family owned homes in Sarajevo 
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and two nearby towns, ran a successful business and had been on Hajj twice. 
The woman through whom I met them was herself of an old Sarajevo family but 
a less wealthy one. Several members of her family had been hodjas, bulas or 
dervishes, her own children were studying to earn high status jobs in 
engineering and computers. This woman belonged to what might be called the 
middle class, a class of professionals and, at least in the past, religious 
functionaries. Many of my other informants were people who had moved into 
Sarajevo from the country within the past 30 years. The middle-aged men 
tended to be involved in labour, skilled or unskilled, or trades such as 
plumbing and electrical work. For their children they often aspired to 
something of higher status and lucrativeness. 
Sarajevo may be described as having two main residential areas divided 
by an area of shops, businesses, university faculties and governmental 
buildings. The latter includes, at one end the ear-sfja (Turkish; merchant's 
quarter) with its shops, cafes and some of the largest and oldest mosques 
which are used by the Muslim establishment for important Islamic festivals. 
It also contains Austro-Hungarian and some post-war buildings and a central 
street inaccessible to traffic and used in summer for a sort of korzo. At 
the south-west end of this area begins Novo Sarajevo, New Sarajevo, a vast 
and growing expanse of apartment blocks built in the post-war period. The 
blocks are built by firms, companies and workers organisations and 
apartments are available only to employees of the building company. 
Occupants pay a small rent but have permanent tenure and the right to pass 
the apartment on to descendants. Every company employee has the right to put 
his or her name on the firm's housing list, if it has one, but the waiting 
period may last for many years. The size of a worker's family or the 
standard of their current accomodation is not taken into account; flats are 
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allocated in order according to the list (or, I was told by some informants, 
in order according to the veze, connections, one has). Because of Sarajevo's 
serious housing shortage these flats are in great demand and even in days of 
high unemployment people may not apply for jobs in firms which, whilst 
otherwise suitable, are not building new apartment blocks. 
The second residential area lies at the north-east end of town on the 
two steep slopes rising up from the Miljaýka river. Most of Its 
neighbourhoods are purely Muslim and it was in one of these, on the northern 
bank of the river, that I lived and carried out much of my research. In 
Ottoman times the area was officially divided into named mahalas, each with 
Its own local mosque, and whilst these are no longer administratively 
recognised units, the term mahala is still commonly used to refer to them. 
Most of the mahalas still have their own local mosque although these may 
function only during the month of Ramazan. The area is a mass of steep, 
winding streets, many of them cobbled and inaccessible to traffic. The 
houses, some old but many newly renovated or rebuilt, are situated within 
gardens or courtyards, their front doors hidden from the street by a high 
fence and gate. 
The Household 
The residential form most commonly associated with Yugoslavia in 
anthropological literature is the zadruga " -'. The zadruga was a corporate, 
legally recognised agricultural collectivity including anything from 10 to 
100 members, although the incidence of the larger zadrugas was rare. 
Zadrugas were based on a patrilineage (ideally including a man, his wife, his 
unmarried daughters, his sons, daughters-in-law and son's children) but 
unrelated individuals could join the zadruga by means of a contract. Land was 
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owned and worked Jointly by all members of the collectivity but the discrete 
existence of seperate elementary families was reccgriised both in proverbs 
and by the fact that each elementary section had its own sleeping room. 
The zadrugas began to dissappear in the nineteenth century, fragmented 
through division along elementary family lines. This division was legally 
recognised and resulted in truly separate households which did not, like the 
segments of African lineages, join together in the face of other lineages. It 
was certainly encouraged by urbanisation and the consequent movement of 
individual men with their elementary families into towns. Alternatively, 
division might be the result of resentments and ill-feeling between nuclear 
families whose varying stages in the domestic life cycle entailed varying 
contributions to the upkeep of the property and livestock. Again, division 
might be the result of a zadruga's owning an area of land too vast to be 
efficiently worked by members all resident in one place (see Barit 1967 for 
a discussion of the disappearance of the zadruga). 
Whilst the zadruga is the Institution that springs immediately to mind 
when Yugoslavia is mentioned, there are reasons for thinking that the 
Muslims of Bosnia were always far less associated with it than were their 
Christian neighbours. Even before the nineteenth century the elementary 
family household had been common in urban areas and since Muslims formed 
"Zadruga" Is not a folk term, having been coined by the ethnographer and 
linguistic reformer Vuk Karad2ic in his Serbian language dictionary in 
1818. It was later incorporated into legal codes, adopted by 
anthropologists and, after the second world war, applied to marketing co- 
operatives. No-one whom I questioned knew what a zadruga was, though 
many suggested that it must be some sort of shop/ f irm/organ isa t ion. 
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the bulk of the urban population many of them would have lived in such 
households. 
Even in rural Bosnia it Is doubtful that the zadruga was widespread 
amongst Muslims. In his study of the Muslim village of Planinica in Western 
Bosnia in the mid 1960's, Lockwood suggests that 18 of the 39 village 
households are zadrugas of some sort. The suggestion is made on the grounds 
that the 18 huseholds in question contain members of more than one nuclear 
family (Lockwood 1975). Barid (op cit. ) has, however, pointed out the 
necessity of distinguishing the zadruga and the veliks ku(fa (literally; "big 
house"). The latter was composed of one segment of a patrilineage, for 
example, a man, his wife one son, daughter-in-law and unmarried 
grandchildren. The velika ku(fa was then likely to have fewer members than 
the zadruga, but Barid stresses that the Important difference between the 
two was not that of size, but that of the criteria of membership and the 
concept of property ownership. The zadruga could be Joined, by means of a 
contract, by individuals who were neither kin nor affines. Its members owned 
land and livestock collectively. The veliks kuea could not be Joined by 
contract and was jurally exogamous. Its property was not collectively owned 
by the members. 
Had2ijahid (1982) notes that the zadruga was rare amongst Bosnian 
Muslims, both rural and urban, the majority of whom lived either in 
elementary family households (common in the urban environment) or in limited 
patrilaterally extended households. He suggests that the reason for this was 
the incompatibility of Shari'& inheritance laws (legally valid before the 
second world war) and collective ownership of land. Land and livestock within 
the Muslim extended household was the property of the head of household. On 
death this property was distributed according to Shari'a law, the widow, sons 
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and daughters each taking their share. In practice a daughter often 
relinquished her share in favour of her brother (this still happens in 
contemporary Bosnia), sometimes receiving a cash payment, depending on the 
relative wealth or need of her marital nuclear family. One woman whom I knew 
told me that she and her three sisters had let their brother keep all the 
property (rural land and livestock) and sought no payments since all four 
women were well married with adequate homes and finances of their own and 
the brother had lived on the land with his parents till the day they died. 
The important point is that property was conceived as belonging to 
individuals, first to the head of household and later to his descendants. It 
was not thought of as collective property. 
This patrilaterally extended household without collective ownership of 
property sounds very much like Barid's velika Au(fa and may well correspond 
to the "zadruga" which Lockwood has in mind. (Lockwood defines zadrugas as 
"extended-family households, each producing and consuming the means of its 
livelihood communally" and thus ignores the question of property ownership. ) 
It Is certainly the sort of household described to me by elderly informants 
of rural origin, most of whom had lived In households including a husband, 
wife, one son and his wife and children. The death of the head of household 
lead to division of the property. 
The ideal of contemporary Sarajevan Muslims is the elementary family 
household. Their ideal of the elementary family is a husband, a wife and two 
children (the average household size in urban Bosnia-Hercegovina in 1981 was 
3.4, somewhat above the national urban average of 3.2). Many of those who 
espouse this ideal themselves come from rural families in which they were 
one of six to twelve siblings. As one middle-aged woman explained to me: 
"You needed them there. One to watch the sheep, one to look af ter the cows, 
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one to clean the house... " Today, Muslims tend to eschew the freely avai'Lable 
artificial contraceptive methods, thinking them unhealthy, but limit their 
families with naturally contraceptive practices or with the more drastic 
method of abortion which is available on request up to the tenth week of 
pregnancy. One woman was rumoured in my neighbourhood to have had ten 
abortions, others themselves admitted to having had one. Of the thirteen 
housewives in the neighbourhood, one had had no children (for which she was 
pitied), one had had one (but was still young), nine had had two, one had had 
three and one, a rural woman of about 87 years, had had five. 
HOUSEHOLD. H. W. CHILDREN OTHERS 
1 1 1 1 2 (weekdays, children 
of daughter) 
2 1 1 2 
3 dead 1 
4 2 
5 2 1 (husband's mother) 
6 
7 dead 1 
8 1 1 1 - 
9 1 1 2 1 (husband's father) 
10 dead 1 - 
11 1 1 1 3 (dead son's wife 
and 2 children) 
12 in Iraq 1 2 - 
13 1 1 2 
Table 1: Household composition In a Sarajevo neighbourhood 
As can be seen in table 1, most of the thirteen households were of 
the 
ideal elementary family type. Three, however, (5,9 and 11) 
included 
combinations of a daughter-in-law (snaha) and her mother-in-law 
(svekrva) or 
father-in-law (svekar). This was not a recommended arrangement since 
snahalsvekrva, and to a lesser extent snahalsvekar relations are 
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traditionally tense or even hostile. (The relationship between son-in-law, zet, 
and mother-in-law, punica, is also supposed to be a difficult one, but to a 
lesser degree. ) Many folk songs are based on the theme of the cruel svekrva and 
women always told me to be careful when I married not to live with my in-laws. 
(Although to turn away an elderly and feeble svekrva, as one woman had done, was 
universally deemed to be a bad thing. ) Nevertheless, as a result of housing 
difficulties it is not uncommon for a newly-married couple to live with a set of 
parents, although it is hoped that such arrangements will be temporary. It is 
more common for a young couple to live with the husband's family than with the 
wife's, but if the latter are wealthier or have more space then they will house 
the young people. The eldest daughter of family 1 had lived with her parents for 
two years after her marriage until she and her husband obtained their own 
apartment in New Sarajevo. After the move her two children spent the weekdays in 
household 1 because both she and her husband were working. In this case then, a 
grandmother had assumed responsibility for the weekday care of her grandchildren. 
Not all potential grandmothers were so obliging; many told me that they would 
neither expect their daughters-in-law to live with and work for them, nor to be 
saddled with the care of their children's children. 
Households 1 to 4 were patrilaterally related and all lived in one 
courtyard, though in separate apartments. The same is true of households 5 and 6. 
Households 7 and 8 were that of a mother and her married daughter. 
Related or not, all households in the neighbourhood are autonomous and 
attempt to keep their internal disputes, arrangements and organisation secret 
from that of other households. During most of mY fieldwork 
I lived with one 
elementary family the mother/grandmother of which lived in a separate 
establishment on the other side of the courtyard. I never owned a 
front door key, 
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it was scarcely necessary since the housewife of the family was always either at 
home or very nearby, however, on one occasion a problem arose, over the 
possession of a key. My suggested solution Involved giving a key, for safe- 
keeping, to the mother/granmother for half an hour. This was not regarded by the 
family as being a solution at all. They replied that they had never left their 
key with the old woman and never would. 
Household members regularly lie or conceal truths from other households and 
people who I'mora sve da zna", who have to know everything, are roundly condemned. 
On their departure visiting neighbours were sometimes accused by their hosts of 
having come only to snoop, to estimate the value of the new curtains or to see 
what the family members were up to. The importance of keeping household secrets 
(how much things cost, who was going on holiday where, who prayed and how 
regularly they did so) sV-r9Vwas Impressed on me very early and I learned to be 
guarded in my speech and evasive when directly questioned by outsiders, as 
frequently was. 
Households are thus autonomous and tend to present a united and secretive 
front to other households., Yet even within a single household Individuals are 
autonomous and secretive in certain respects, most notably the financial- and the 
social. Thus the husband who asks his wife how much money she has is likely to 
be told to mind his own business. Such a response may well provoke a slanging 
Inatch but no husband, or wife for that matter, feels It is their right to know 
the state of their partner's personal finances. The slanging does not then have 
as its aim the discovery of the relevant sum of money, but rapidly takes the 
form of criticisms of III manners and bad temper. The parent who seeks to learn 
with whom a child has spent the evening, or whom the child has been 
telephoning, may well receive a similar rebuke about the impropriety of nosiness. 
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It is necessary but difficult to say something about household economics In 
contemporary Muslim Sarajevo. The difficulty arises from the fact that people are 
extremely unwilling to divulge the details of their financial situation. From the 
outside the survival of many households seems almost an impossibility. For 
example, a household may contain a single employed member, the husband, and a 
wife and two children. In 1986 a not atypical salary for a skilled worker was 
65,000 dinars a month (approximately f110) and this sum alone could never be 
adequate for food, clothing, furniture, heating, bills, television licence, paying 
back loans for the building of a house and so on. It is hard to see how such 
families manage, yet there are a number of factors which help. A low income 
household may have close kin, usually married sons or daughters, whose relative 
wealth allows them to offer parents some aid. At the same time many households 
have offspring working abroad, in Switzerland, Germany, Sweden, Iraq, Libya or 
other countries, and these gastarbeiter bring back precious foreign currency and 
goods. Workers with particular skills - electricians, plumbers, mechanics - may 
earn extra money through moonlighting. Unemployed women may bring in money 
through making and vending items such as rugs and socks (selling either to the 
tourist shops or, more frequently to acquaintances) or by selling fresh produce 
such as eggs within the neighbourhood. Many households have their own vegetable 
gardens which provide a certain amount of food. In these ways a household's basic 
income may be supplemented. 
Kinship and Marriage 
The formal kinship system of the Bosnian Muslims is almost identical to 
that of Bosnian Christians. Its terminology includes terms for mother, father, 
grandmother, grandfather, son, daughter, grandson, grand-daughter, brotýier and 
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sister. A single term is used for the FZ and MZ whereas the FB and MB are 
linguistically distinguished. Immediate affines (fathers, mothers, brothers, 
sisters, sons and daughters-in-law) have specific names as do some of the 
immediate affines of one's spouse (for example ego's spouse's sibling's spouse, 
but not ego's offspring's spouse's parents). All other affines are simply 
"prijatelji", the basic meaning of which is "friends". 
The sole variation between Muslims and Christians is that the former do not 
distinguish linguistically between the children of the FB, MB, FZ or MZ; all are 
rodak (male) or rodica (female). Christians, on the other hand, have separate 
terms for the children of FB, MB and F or MZ. 
The system is thus largely the same for Muslims and Christians but the 
words used to describe particular kin or affines sometimes vary. for example, 
Christians call the FB stric, the FBW strins, the MB ujak and the MBW ujna, 
whereas Muslims use the Turkish terms amfd2a, amfd2ica, dajdfa and dajd2ics. 
Christians refer to their grandmothers as baba whilst Muslims use the term nana. 
The familiar term used by Christians for father is tata whilst that used by 
Muslims is baba. 
However, the emphasis placed by Bosnian Muslims on kinship relations 
contrasts both with that of Bosnian Christians and with that of Middle Eastern 
Muslims. Halpern (1967 p. 156) tells of a Serbian villager who traced his 
genealogy back to the late eighteenth century, Identifying over 500 members of 
his kin group. Milovan Djilas, the Montenegrin who rose to high rank in the 
Communist Party before his expulsion in 1956, wrote in his autobiography: 
"My forebears were drummed into my head from my earliest childhood, as was 
the case with all my kinsmen. I can recite ten generations without knowing 
anything in particular about them. " (Djilas 1958). 
Such feats are not paralleled by Sarajevan Muslims, few of whom have 
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genealogical memories stretching back further than their own grandparents (in 
some cases not even this far). Lockwood notes the same lack of interest in 
genealogies in rural Bosnia. 
In contrast to the Middle Eastern pattern, the kin group is not seen as the 
ideal source of spouses. First cousin marriage is illegal in Yugoslavia but 
Muslims (and Christians) prohibit marriage with more distant kin aswell. Filipovid 
was told by a Muslim villager that one could not marry even one's ninth cousin 
and that if a young couple should discover that they are even distantly related 
a marriage could not take place (Filipovid 1982 p. 152). He notes that cousin 
marriage was practised in the past only occasionally and within beg and aga 
families when no non-related spouse of the same social class could be found. In 
other cases: 
"The attitude is that anyone who does this does so from greed for property. 
'Such a person would marry his own first cousin' is an oft used expression 
of disapproval. " (op cit. p. 152). 
In my own experience, surprise and distaste are the usual Muslim reactions 
on learning of the possibility of cousin marriage in other parts of the world, 
including the Middle East. 
Muslims' lesser emphasis on genealogies presumably results in a higher 
incidence of inter-kin group marriages than is found among Christians. Lockwood 
further suggests that Muslims are less consciously fastidious in prohibiting 
marriages within the kin group. In the village of Planinica the view was that if 
no direct relationship could be traced between a couple bearing the same surname 
and belonging to the same agnatic "collateral" groupt they were allowed to marry. 
In Sarajevo I knew a young woman who went to visit friends in another town. On 
the korzo she met an attractive young man about whom she was sufficiently 
excited to mention the matter to her sister. On hearing the boy's name, the 
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sister decided that it was a familiar one and that the boy might be a relative. 
The girl's mother was applied to and set her mind to work to discover whether 
any relationship existed. After long deliberation the mother decided that the 
young man was indeed a distant cousin and that, consequently, the relationship 
had no future. The young woman grumbled a bit: '13ut it's so distant. What if you 
hadn't been able to work out the connection? What if no-one had? " Her mother 
replied that that would be a different case but since she had, she had. The 
relationship went no further. 
Sarajevan Muslims neither marry their kin nor place emphasis on genealogies. 
Furthermore, the kin group is not for them the field of important social, ritual 
or material interaction. One would not seek a loan from one's non-immediate kin 
(parents, children and siblings), nor does one visit them very often (the 
occasions of Kurban Bajram and Ramazanski BajraffAre exceptions). Non-immmediate 
kin are not people whose tevhfd women are likely to feel a moral obligation to 
attend. 
In this regard, Bosnian Muslim practice corresponds closely to the legal 
duties of the Yugoslav citizen. Yugoslav law makes it both a right and a duty to 
materially support all lineal ascendants and descendants, brothers and sisters, 
who are unable, through age, ill health or unemployment, to provide for 
themselves. The law thus covers only an individual's closest kin, excluding 
individuals such as the FB, MB, FZ and MZ or their children. These are the only 
kin with whom Sarajevan Muslims are likely to have much Interaction anyway. 
Two exceptions should, however, be noted. The f irst concerns the case of kin 
ties between rural and urban dwellers. As Barid (op cit. ) points out, rural and 
urban kin tend to offer each other mutual aid, the latter accomodating rural kin 
who come to town or he lp ing them to f ind work in the ci ty, and the rura I 
- 59 - 
dwellers providing country produce to their urban kin. These seem to be cases in 
which a kin tie Is activated in order to obtain a specific good. Kin living within 
Sarajevo are likely to have only infrequent social interaction and to give each 
other no material and little ritual assistance. 
The second exception concerns kin who live close to each other, usually 
because two related elementary families have agreed to build a house together 
and each inhabits one section of the building. In these cases there is social and 
ritual interaction between the two related families because the kin have been 
made into neighbours, the people with whom social interaction is most important. 
If kinship is relatively little stressed by Bosnian Muslims as a social tie, 
the same can be said of fictive kinship. Serbian Aumstvo is a form of fictive 
kinship which creates strong social bonds (Hammel 1968, Pitt-Rivers 1976). 
Bosnian Muslims traditionally practised two forms of fictive kinship but the ties 
created by them were far weaker than those created through kumstvo amongst 
Serbs. The first of these two forms is ebstvo, a tie formed at the cutting of 
the umbilical cord (see Lockwood 1975 p. 74). Ebstvo seems to have died out in 
Sarajevo with the increase of hospital births. The second form, sx'hýano kumstvo, Is 
still practised. Lockwood notes that it is often used either to re-inforce 
existing ties or to form ties with non-Muslims or Muslims of a socially superior 
class, outsiders (op cit. p. 75). At around the age of one a child's parents choose 
a kum for it. The kum clips a bit of the child's hair and gives it a gift 
(clothes, jewellry), the parents give the kum a gift either of clothing or of 
money. The child is supposed to grow up like his or her kum (although Muslims 
take this idea with a grain of salt) and should therefore, Ideally, have desirable 
qualities such as successfulness, physical attraction and moral integrity. After 
the creation of the kujnstvo the child, parents and kum are supposed to rtmaln on 
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amicable terms but It is not believed that there is any spiritual tie between 
them, nor is it expected that they will see each other often or assist each other 
materially. 
These points are illustrated by my own, and sole, experience of ghgano 
kumstvo. A friend of mine had a child who was about nine months old when the 
subject of a possible kum arose. The child's grandmother suggested that I might 
be the kum. Misapprehending the institution of kumstvo I protested on the 
grounds that I had no idea when I'd be able to return to Bosnia and would be 
unable to offer help or advice to the child. Nobody seemed to think this 
mattered. Months passed and the child was assigned no kum. My friend, who 
thought of me as an impoverished student, decided that It would be too expensive 
for me to be the kum. By the time I left Sarajevo the child was over 18 months 
old and still had no kum although the favourite for the post was her young aunt, 
my friend's sister. This aunt was already the kum of the child's elder sister. 
She, like myself, was an impoverished student but the proposed solution was that 
my friend would give her the money to buy the necessary piece of gold. 
My only other experience of fictive kinship was the casual suggestion of a 
good friend that we should become sisters po krv, by blood, something which she 
had heard of from an older relative. The idea was given up as unsavoury when we 
learned that we'd have to cut our fingers with a knife and rub the wounds 
together. Fictive kinship just wasn't as important as all that. 
The mode age of marriage for Bosnia-Hercegovina as a whole is 20 -24 (see 
table 2). Hadzijahid (1982) suggests that in the pre-socialist period Muslim girls 
maried much earlier than their Christian neighbours, the norm for women being 14 
- 20, for men 20 -26. It is the popular opinion of Muslims themselves that in 
the past they married younger. However, I once heard this disputed by a middle- 
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aged woman of rural origin who pointed out that she had married at 22, her 
sisters around 25, her mother-in-law at 27 or 28 and her mother-in-law's sister- 
in-law at over 30. It seems possible that In the past, urban women married 
younger than their rural counterparts. 
AGE MALE FEMALE 
15 - 19 1,470 11,495 
20 - 24 17,536 16,591 
25 - 29 11,348 5,082 
Table 2: Marriages in Bosnia-Herce3zovina in 1981 
Source: StatfstiLki Godlffnjak Jug-oslavije 1984 
Divorce appears to have been relatively uncommon in Ottoman times and 
Ba! teskija's chronicle suggests that it may have been viewed in a dim light. Thus 
he notes that a woman committed suicide out of shame when her husband divorced 
her and in 1784/85 that a man who divorced his wife gave her not only the mehr 
(deferred dowry) which was legally due to her, but also the marital home. After 
the arrival of the Austro-Hungarians divorce became steadily more common. In 
1885 it stood at 3%, in 1898 at 8.28%, in 1909 at 11.2% and in 1938 at 17.45% 
"' and Had2ijahid (op cit. ) states that today, Muslims are more likely to divorce 
than members of any other nationality. Yet the figures do not, in my experience, 
reflect the moral light in which Muslims view the dissolution of marriage. 
(2) The same author suggests that the increasing frequency of divorce relates 
to the economic decline of Bosnian Muslims during the POSt-Ottoman period, 
noting that Hercegovinan Muslims, whose economic status presumably declined 
less, experienced no such increase. The mechanics of this decline/ increase 
are not, however, clarified. 
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Speaking of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, Had2ijahid notes 
that most Muslim divorces were of newly-married, childless couples. During my 
time in Sarajevo two young women of my acquaintance separated from their 
husbands within within weeks of marriage. One had been emotionally battered by a 
spouse who spent most of his time with other women whilst the other had been 
physically assaulted, and this in spite of her pregnancy (later terminated). Both 
returned to their natal families and both wanted divorce. Neighbours were 
sympathetic and hoped that the women would come to forget their sorrows and 
their husbands in time. A very different attitude was apparent in the case of a 
man whom I knew as the husband of a neighbourhood woman and father of two 
children. It was some time before I learnt, through whispering and gossip, that 
this man had previously had another wife and child. His desertion and divorce 
were widely viewed as rather shameful episodes in his life. At the same time an 
unhappy wife with two small children contemplated divorcing a husband who spent 
his whole time out drinking, but was strongly advised against it by her family. 
The attitude is thus that whilst there is nothing inherently wrong with the 
break up of a couple, the break up of a nuclear family must be avoided. This is 
partly due to the perceived interests of the children, and of the wife whose 
motherhood will make it hard for her to re-marry. At the same time, however, it 
reflects the high importance of the nuclear family as a unit which is autonomous, 
cohesive and trustworthy in a way that the wider kin network is not. 
The Islamic permission of polygamy is a fact of which not all Bosnian 
Muslims are fully aware. As in the case of cousin marriage it is something that, 
even during the Ottoman period, was practised only rarely, by begs and agas, and 
then usually in the case of a first marriage's failure to produce children. 
Polygamy is illegal in contemporary Yugoslavia. I met no Muslim who was 
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unreservedly in favour of it, however, different individuals did express different 
attitudes. The first and most common was that of those Muslims who, like the 
villagers studied by Lockwood (1975 p. 64), found the notion rather odd and even 
humorous. The second type of response implied no value judgement but was phrased 
simply as "we don't do that here". The third response was that of some young and 
enthusiastic Muslim believers who stressed that many women liked having co-wives 
and that a man couldn't take a second wife without the consent of the first. 
These three response patterns do not relate to levels of piety or religious 
observance; those who found polygamy a topic of humour were often devout and 
practising Muslims. What they do relate to is different levels of conceptual 
association of Bosnian Islam with the wider Muslim world. The young apologists of 
polygamy moved in circles which placed high value on learning Arabic and reading 
the translated works of Arab and Persian writers, (this social milieu will be 
discussed in chapter five) whilst those who found polygamy humorous were Muslims 
who had less knowledge of or interest in the non-Bosnian Muslim world. 
Muslims do not marry kin but the category of prija teljf', distant af f ines, 
was traditionally considered a source of acceptable spouses. (The primary meaning 
of the word prijatelji is "friends". ) Lockwood's Planinican informants said that 
such prijatelji marriages were very common and that often a single marriage 
between two groups of mutual prijate1ji led to further marriages between the 
same two groups. I once visited an old village woman who felt that It was high 
time for her two sons, aged 28 and 35, to wed. Since neither had yet found a 
girlfriend she asked my opinion about two girls whom she had never met, her 
husband's brother's son's wife's brother's daughters. The girls were her 
prijatelji, which was the reason she gave for thinking of them as. suitable 
potential daughters- in-law. 
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However, prijate]JI marriages are uncommon in contemporary Sarajevo where 
most young people find their own spouse at the place of work, at college or 
school or through mutual friends. Most, but not all, state that love Is a large 
factor in their choice of spouse, but other attributes are also looked for. Most 
important of these are being from a respectable family ("who has s/he got? ") and 
having a job and a flat ("what has s/he got? "). Courtships are secretive affairs 
and parents are supposed to have no knowledge of them until the wedding is 
imminent. Parents who question their children as to their girlfriends or 
boyfriends are often told not to be nosy, a criticism which they accept. Ideally, 
a young man or woman should give no hint of their involvement until a few weeks 
before the wedding. Two cases in which this ideal was ignored gave rise to 
disapproval and gossip within the neighbourhood. The first was that of a girl who 
brought her boyfriend home before any proposal of marriage had been made and 
was consequently deemed to be lacking in propriety. The second was that of a 
girl who in September announced her intention of marrying in January. The gap 
was felt by parents and neighbours to be indecently long and the wedding was 
rescheduled for November. 
The f inding of one's own spouse and the secrecy of courtship are not 
innovations in Bosnian Muslim society. A. 11kovenje, from the Turkish word for 
lover, was a traditional custom whereby a young woman sat in the wooden slatted 
veranda of her home and was visited by young men. The couple could talk freely 
although there was no touching and the woman's face could not be clearly seen. 
Affikovanje sometimes led to formally arranged marriages about which both sets of 
parents were consulted. In other cases it led to ukrasti, stealing. Ukrasti 
marriages were those in which the girl simply climbed out of her window late one 
night and rode off with her young man to his family home where wedding 
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celebrations were held for several days. Later the newly-married couple came to 
visit the bride's parents na m1r, in peace. They brought gifts of coffee and 
sugar. If these were accepted, as they usually were, the couple were forgiven. If 
not, they tried again later. (Hangi 1908. ) Lockwood notes that 90% of marriages 
in Planinica were by ukrastl and I was aware of a small number of such weddings 
in Sarajevo. Even in cases of non-ukrastf marriage the bride leaves her home and 
goes to her wedding without her parents. 
Parents do not then have direct influence over their children's choice of 
spouse. If they object to the prospective spouse (and they are more likely to 
object to potential sons-in-law than daughters-in-law) they may threaten to 
disown the couple. I knew of one such case where a young woman wanted to marry 
a man some ten years her senior. The man was both a divorcee and the father of 
an eight year old son, and the girl's parents threatened to disown her if she 
married him. In spite of the threat she eloped with him and within a few weeks 
the parents had forgiven the couple. This reunion was closely followed by the 
groom's expulsion of the bride from his home. Her family took her back and 
encouraged her to forget all about him. One night, not long afterwards, the woman 
slipped out of her house and rejoined her husband. This time her family swore 
that they'd never take the girl back, she must lie in the bed she'd made for 
herself. Nevertheless, when the groom ejected his wife for the second time, the 
family did take her in. 
The Kom?. 'iluk 
The thirteen households shown in table I form one kom., tiluk (Turkish; 
neighbourhood). Whereas the term mahala is today used loosely to designate a 
district without official boundaries, the boundaries of the kom-tfluk are clear. 
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One knows who ones kom---ije I. neighbours) are. The story is -, old of how Abu-Bakr, 
father-in-law of the Prophet, sold a house worth amount X for the sum of X 
multiplied by two. When asked why he had done so his answer was that the extra 
value derived from the quality of the neighbours. The telling of this tale 
underlines the importance of the neighbourhood group for Saraievan Muslims, an 
importance which pertains in spite of the need for household autonomy and 
secrecy. Households may accuse each other of an excess of curiosity, or indeed of 
downright spying, but nevertheless the social, economic and ritual interactions 
between them are frequent and important. 
Neighbours lend each other household items and tools and exchange small 
amounts of food, both cooked and uncooked. Neighbours help each other with tasks 
such as wood chopping, sewing and coffee roasting. It is from neighbours that one 
can seek a loan in times of necessity. 
They are also important in the ritual sphere. Thus the annual festival of 
Kurban Bajram is seen principally as a neighbourhood affair and the maJority of 
the meat from the sacrificed sheep is distributed within it. Neighbours are 
important in death rituals, principally in the tevhfd which will be discussed in 
chapter six but also in the process of halal'ing, mutual forgiveness at the death 
bed. Customs surrounding the birth of children may also be noted. A newly born 
infant must be kept In the house for forty days but at the end of this period 
the baby Is taken to visit neighbours who sprinkle it with sugar to make it 
sweet (sladsk, which also means beautiful) and with flour to make it white Ue. 
beautiful). 
Neighbours are thus important both economically and ritually. For married 
women they are also the main source of social life. 
This seems to be as true of rural as of urban areas. Lockwood (1975 p. 65) 
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notes that in the Muslim village the cohesiveness of the kom-ýIlluk-, 
"is readily apparent upon examination of co-operative work patterns, 
visiting patterns, who helps whom entertain a guest, who make the trip to 
market together, who lends to and borrows from whom... " 
In the village of Planinica he also found a tendency towards neighbourhood 
exogamy. (This, however, was not confirmed by information gathered from ex-rural 
Muslims in Sarajevo. ) In Planinica neighbours are often at the same time 
patrilineal kin but Lockwood states that: "exceptions... make plain that the 
organizing principle of both larger and smaller neighbourhood groups is 
residence, not kinship. " For the Serbian village of Oraý, ac, on the other hand, 
Halpern makes almost the opposite observation. Whilst Serbian neighbours give 
mutual aid and interact socially: 
"There is a greater degree of visiting and exchanging of labour among 
relatives living in the same area than among neighbours ... underlying the 
reciprocal relations between neighbours is the idea of mutual help. When 
this concept becomes less important... the degree of neighbourliness also 
begins to diminish correspondingly. This is not the case when clansmen are 
neighbours. " (Halpern 1967 p. 160) 
It is clear that for Muslims the komfffluk group is an important one, two 
further points must be made about it. The first is that it is principally the 
realm of women. Men are employed in firms, factories and other urban jobs. 
Married women with children are almost invariably employed only in the home 
where their tasks include cooking, cleaning (although this will be done by 
daughters if there are any), gardening (a task which may be shared by the men), 
child care, roasting coffee, chopping wood (this may also be done by men) and all 
the other responsibilities of running a house which lacks many of the 
conveniences of the Western European home. Women also do most of the shopping 
which generally involves a weekly visit to the market in town and several trips 
to the local shop. Whilst the husband has a veto on important decisions of 
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household economy (for example, whether to buy a new cooker or couch that year) 
it Is the housewife who is responsible for the day-to-day running of the house. 
Thus, in both of the houses in which I stayed it was the housewife who, without 
reference to her husband, profferred the invitation. As has been said, some women 
earn money by selling produce - rugs, socks, eggs. Unmarried daughters tend 
either to work or study in the town. 
In the sphere of social relationships and friendships the picture is similar. 
Men spend much of their free time in the cafes or bars of the town. They are 
neither expected nor desired to hang around the house themselves and do not 
invite their friends home. The only male visitors to the home are the occasional 
relative or worker (electrician, plumber). The latter are often family connections 
called on to do repairs informally and rewarded with money but also with coffee, 
food and, very often, alcohol. The social life of married women is conducted 
almost entirely within the komffiluk and they may spend up to three hours a day 
visiting their neighbours or being visited by them. This is not to suggest that 
they are confined to the neighbourhood - women go, without their husbands, to 
the market, the central mosques or, occasionally, to visit relatives on the other 
side of town but should not "hoda" - "walk"Pgo gadding about". Unmarried girls 
are involved in the komfffluk visiting network but also conduct their social life 
in the town where they meet friends, male and female, to go to the cinema, to a 
cafe or simply to stroll. 
The world of men and the world of (married) women should not be seen as 
the "public" and the "private" or "domestic" worlds. Women are not confined to 
the ir homes and preven ted f rom see ing any bu t the ir c loses tk in and aff ines. On 
the contrary, they are the links of the very public world of the neighbourhood. 
The distinction is rather between the local, purely Muslim community of the 
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komgiluk and the wider, mixed society of Sarajevo. 
This brings us to the second point to be made about the kofn., tfluk: it is 
felt to be a world apart from that of the town. Different styles of dress, 
behaviour and even speech are appropriate to the two worlds. In the town one 
uses the standard Serbo-Croatian greetings Tobar Dan! " (Good-day), "Do Videnja! " 
(Good-bye). In the neighbourhood one uses the Arabic "Merhaba! " and "Alahemane-t! ". 
Young people never bring their girlfriends and boyfriends home - romantic 
relationships are for the town, not the neighbourhood. 
People have two types of clothes; those for "going out" are not worn at 
home or in the mahala because "they would be ruined". Thus leaving the 
neighbourhood involves a purposeful change of clothes and Image, the point of 
which is to look more attractive. Looking good is highly valued by both men and 
women, care is taken that outdoor clothes are always clean and pressed, certain 
items are reserved only for the most important occasions and visits to the 
mosque require the donning of fine garments. This was one of my problems in 
Sarajevo for, having arrived with only my economy fare twenty kilos of luggage, I 
never had enough clothing to cut a consistently fine figure. 
In the neighbourhood men wear an older and more comfortable version of 
their normal trousers, shirt, Jumper and jacket (depending on the weather). With 
women the dress code is more complicated and varies with the age and marital 
status of the individual. The oldest women wear dimije (flowing, baggy trousers) 
and a headscarf concealing all but the face. They rarely leave the neighbourhood 
but when having their photo taken (a form of publicity) always insist that the 
photographer waits while they readjust their scarves so that no stray locks of 
hair are showing. Middle-aged women tend to do the opposite. In the 
neighbourhood they wear dImfje or a long skirt and often have a scarf loosely 
- 70 - 
tied over their hair. When going out they don a kneelength skirt, remove the 
scarf, arrange their hair and may also apply lipstick. To walk about the town in 
dimije is, as has been said, to be a peasant. Unmarried girls may wear track 
suits, house robes or slightly old or outmoded skirts and dresses at home. When 
going out they take infinite pains over their hair, makeup and costume. 
Islam in the Komtiluk 
The kom.: 91luk is purely Muslim whilst the town is not. Yet the town contains 
the oldest and largest mosques, those which Sarajevan Muslims feel to be part of 
their history and those on which the Muslim establishment, the Islamska Zajednica 
(see chapter four), focuses much of Its attention. These central mosques house 
rituals such as the burial service (d±enaza), Quranic recitation during Ramazan 
(mukabela), the ritual and prayer for new haf'iz (hafiz dova) and the celebration 
of Lejletul-Kadr. Whilst the central mosques are packed for the friday service of 
d2uma, the neighbourhood mosques, those that function outside of Ramazan and 
other Islamic festivals, are unlikely to be full of friday worshippers. 
Yet the kom9fluk Is not a mere secular, residential area from which the 
Inhabitants sally forth to perform their Islamic duties in the town. Kurban 
Bajram and the tevhfd death ritual are both religious occasions celebrated in the 
neighbourhood. Neighbours also attend each others mevIud rituals which are held 
in private homes to mark the building of a new house or the return of a son 
from military service or the anniversaries of a relative's death. The month of 
Ramazan is a time at which neighbours Join together for religious observance. 
Although the breakfast meal, ifter, is not shared with neighbours, after it they 
will go together, often to the local neighburhood mosque, to pray teravija. 
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As Ide f rom these spec if ic ri tua ls, everyday 1 if e in the ne Ighbourhood is 
felt to be specifically Muslim in a way that life in the town outside is not. 
Of course families and individuals living within the neighbourhood vary .: -, 
the degree of their religious observance. In my existence within the 
komtiluks, as opposed to my contact with various academics and authorities, 
never met any Muslim who denied the existence of God (although there must 
be some such). The spectrum runs from those families or individuals who 
strictly observe all five "pillars" of the faith and more, and ends with 
those who whilst professing a belief in it, neither pray, fast, give alms or 
aspire to make the pilgrimage to Mecca. Many lie somewhere in the middle of 
this range and, whilst not performing their daily prayers regularly, make 
special efforts during the month of Ramazan to pray teravija, to give alms 
and to fast for at least some of the days. 
Lack of outward observance should not be taken as a sign that these 
individuals are not real Muslims. As Akiner puts it: 
"no religion, and least of all Islam, is an army whose strength can be 
Judged by the number of men on active service... In fact, the only way in 
which a Muslim can sever himself from his community is by a conscious 
and voluntary rejection of Islam. " (Akiner 1983 p-2). 
This is certainly the attitude of most Sarajevan Muslims; if one is born 
into a family who think of themselves as Muslims then one is oneself a 
Muslim unless one positively rejects the faith, for example by insisting on 
one's Identity as a firmly atheist Communist. 
I was initially surprised at the number of people I met who, as well as 
professing a belief in Islam or even being strict observers of its 
obligations, were at the same time card-carrying members of the Communist 
Party. Official state policy about dual affiliation to the Party and to a 
religious community is interesting. Whilst the Ideologies of Communism and of 
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religion are seen as contradictory, practising believers are tolerated within 
the Party so long as they do not emphasise their faith too publicly. The 
reason for this toleration seems to be associated with the problem of 
maintaining inter-regional and inter-nationality equality. Some areas of the 
country contain more atheists than others; according to figures in Veternje 
Novine (The Evening News) 9.6.86 Montenegro contains the lowest percentage 
of believers, 12.8%, and Kosovo the highest, 47.3%. Thus excluding non- 
atheists from the Party would result in whole areas of the country, and 
whole nationalities, being under- represented within it, a situation which the 
federal government would rather avoid 111. The following extracts, written by 
Party member well-known for his insistence that religious leaders 
collaborated with fascists and monarchists during the Second World War and 
for his opposition to the idea of the state financing religious communities, 
Illustrate the point: 
"The criterion of the League of Communists is quite clear but it must be 
creatively applied-We must have organisations of the League of 
Communists everywhere because they are the ones whose obligation and 
duty it is to fight for socialist transformation ... wouldn't we be 
following stereotypes if we failed to take a somewhat more elastic 
approach ... Here and there believers should be tolerated and given the 
possibility of remaining in the League. " (Kurtovid 1977) 
In Sarajevo believers do just that. Some have joined the party simply in 
the hope of furthering job prospects and gaining promotion. Others join for 
more positive reasons and of these some suggest, when asked, that Islam and 
Communism are not incompatible; both instruct one not to steal, cheat, Ae, 
(3) The problem, however, remains. Thus in 1982 Montenegrins formed 2.6% of 
the Yugoslav population and 5.4% of the LCY membership whilst at the 
other end of the scale Albanians formed 7.7% of the population but only 
3.8% of the LCY. Muslims were represented in more fitting proportion - 
8.9% of the population and 8% of LCY membership. 
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mul-dar, t'L c. ---S- - PE-ct Other people and =o on. Yet It is clear to everyone that, 
from the state's point of view, the two are not logically compatible. For the 
young, this is made clear in state education with its obligatory lessons in 
Marxism. One biology teacher singled out the son of a hodja to impress on 
him the impossibilty of a spider, such as the one in the school laboratory, 
spinning an enormous web within a matter of minutes. (The Prophet is said to 
have been concealed from the enemies who pursued him by a spider who span 
such an instant web. ) All are aware that it is inadvisable to discuss 
religious matters too conspicuously in public places, and particular events 
such as the occasional imprisonment of religious functionaries bring the 
question of compatibility to the fore 111. However, in daily life the abstract 
question of the compatibility of the two ideologies does not often arise; 
Islam and Communism are two facts of life and people's complaints about the 
system generally focus on inflation, unemployment and the poor quality of 
goods rather than on religious matters. The point to be made here is simply 
that whilst religious believers may tend to avoid Party membership, such 
membership is no guarantee of atheism or even of negligence in fulfilling 
religious duties. 
It has been said that the komffiluk is a place of social, ritual and 
economic interaction and a place where gossip and secrecy abound. It is 
Important that a household present a good face to the neighbours and that 
its reputation stands high. In seeking to present such an image it is quite 
(4) One such event occured in 1986 when a hodja was imprisoned for stating 
in his friday sermon that a Muslim should marry another Muslim Qe. 
rather than a Christian). This was taken as being contrary to the 
principle of the equality of all nationalities within Yugoslavia. 
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acceptable to state one's virtues plainly in the course of conversation: 
"We/I would never do X, Y, Z ... We/I always try to help others ... We/I don't like 
to gossip... ". The reply to such assertions is: "You're quite right, We/I also 
never do X, Y, Z... " Such exchanges are not considered to show a want of 
modesty. 
The image that a family wants to present is, in short, that it is a 
dobra porodics (good family) whose members are fini (nice, good, beautiful). 
The terms are Serbo-Croatian and of wide reference; a film may be dobar, a 
dress may be fina. Praise and criticism of families and individuals rarely 
involves overt references to Islamic standards. People do not suggest that a 
neighbour's negligence of an elderly parent is haram (Arabic; strictly 
forbidden by Allah), or even that it is gr-ehota (Serbo-Croatian; a sin) but 
simply that the behaviour ne vaIja - is not good - in the same way that 
soup without salt may be said to ne vaIja. Comments specifically about other 
people's level of religious merit tend to be made only across social divides. 
One family I knew included a mother from a well-know Sarajevo family, and 
two children who were on course to obtain high status jobs in engineering 
and computers. This family was strictly observant of the Islamic duties of 
prayer and fasting. They often criticised their neighbours, beginning with 
comments that the children wern't properly brought up, that the adults were 
crude and peasant-like in their manners, that the houses were disorderly, and 
ending with the explanatory remark that the neighbours were not properly 
observant of their religious duties and (this was tentatively suggested) 
were not good Muslims. The neighbours, many of them of working class ex- 
peasant origin, retaliated with their own criticism of this family's 
organisation and manners, noting that whilst they were religiously observant 
one could never know who was the true Muslim, only God knows what's in a 
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person's heart. 
Whilst such overt comparisons of people's behaviour with Islamic 
standards are rarely made, a less direct connection between being a good 
household and being a good Muslim household is perceived. A good household 
should have a certain appearance and be run in a certain manner which is 
associated with the values of Islam. Perhaps the three most important 
aspects of the good (Muslim) household are that it is well-appointed, that it 
is hospitable and that it is clean and tidy. 
Islam is not a religion in which the meek shall be rewarded only in the 
hereafter; God bestows his blessings on the good Muslim in the here and now. 
A poor household is often seen as a slightly less reputable one unless the 
inhabitants redeem themselves with unusual religious piety: the category of 
the pious poor to whom zekat may be given is an important one in Islam. On 
the other hand, the unusually wealthy are not always esteemed the most 
deserving. Wry comments about so-and-so's many gold bracelets have a faintly 
critical tone. When I asked how one particularly wealthy family came to be so 
rich the reply, from a friend of theirs who was proud of being the only one 
in her neighbourhood to know them, was that they did things for God so God 
gave to them. Others gave more material answers: they own a shop, they own 
land. Whilst unusual wealth can cause mixed reactions, to be comfortably off 
Is taken by all as a sign of a good family. Wealth should be displayed in 
the home and householders are always quick to show visiting neighbours the 
new curtains, cake dishes, sofa or other items. Families that are rumoured to 
have money but do not furnish and decorate their homes accordingly are 
branded as mean. 
In order to keep possessions in pristine state they are sometimes not 
used at all. One family invested in a new electric cooker which they proudly 
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enthroned. in the kitchen and showed to all the neighbours. For practical 
purposes, however, they continued to use the old cooker so that the new one 
would not get brown and dirty. The sharp knife I once gave a housewife was 
similarly "saved". 
Details of decoration and furnishing display the fact that a household is 
Muslim. Every Muslim home contains an Arabic Quran with page-by-page Serbo- 
Croatian translation. Often this is one of only three or four books in the 
house, one of the others frequently being a large illustrated life of Tito. 
Other objects may also bear witness to the faith and identity of the 
inhabitants; embroidered pictures of Mecca or the f irst chapter of the Quran 
(the fatiha), woven prayer mats or sheepskins from the annual sacrifice of 
Kurban Bajram. All Bosnians drink Turkish coffee but whilst Christians tend 
to drink from tiny cups (9-o1je), no Muslim home is complete without a set of 
fild2anf, small drinking bowls without handles. Occasionally, when I made a 
first visit to a home the hostess would offer all other (Muslim) guests 
present a fild2an and myself a ffoIja. 
Some wealthier families keep one room of the house entirely furnished in 
the starinski (old, with the sense of traditional) style. The room is carpeted 
with many woven rugs and the walls fitted with padded benches, also covered 
in rugs. Wooden chests are used for the storage of clothes and linen, and 
when visitors call they eat at a large, round, metal tray (sofra) placd on a 
low stool in the centre of the room. 
Whilst most people admire this style and many have certain starfnski 
items of which they are proud (rugs, embroidered cloths), the majority of 
families themselves aspire to a more modern style. The most important room 
in the home, the one towards which most effort is directed, is the sitting 
room which is used by the family and for the reception of guests. Ideally a 
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family hopes to have it furnished with modern chairs and couches and a 
factory made carpet, long net curtains, a table and a regal, a set of wooden 
cupboards with shelves for linen, a wardrobe, drawers, display cupboards for 
items of glassware (usually wedding gifts) and a space for the television. 
Depending on the size of the family and the amount of available space this 
room may also serve as a kitchen (in which case the cooking facilities may 
be hidden behind a curtain) or as a sleeping area (in which case couch-beds 
are folded up and hidden during the day). 
The sitting room is important because it is the place in which outsiders 
are received and the virtue of hospitality displayed. In the neighbourhoods 
of Sarajevo, offering hospitality in the appropriate way is a large part of 
being a good household. Most visitors arrive unannounced since to forewarn a 
prospective host of one's arrival would impel them to prepare special 
refreshments (if the visitor is an infrequent guest the housewife will 
anyway produce a plate of cheese, pickled peppers and some sort of meat, 
followed by cake or biscuits). The essential aspect of any visit, whether 
between women who see each other every day or between those who see each 
other only rarely, is the drinking of coffee. One woman whom I visited 
several times offered me only tea which she liked herself and believed to be 
the favourite drink of the English. Her failure to produce coffee was deemed 
shocking by the neighbours (some of whom had questioned me minutely as to 
the details of my visit). A friend of mine visited a young woman in the 
neighbourhood and came back reporting that her hostess had said she had no 
coffee in the house, her implication being that the woman was lying, and an 
inhospitable cheapskate to boot. 
Visits follow a pattern. The guest arrives and is seated. The hostess 
remains standing and converses for a minute or two before beginning to grind 
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the coffee and heat the water. If it must be brewed in a seperate room then 
another family member must be found to sit with the guest who can neither 
be left alone for a minute nor follow the hostess from room to room. 
Fild2anf, the coffee pot and the sugar bowl are arranged on a tray. With a 
long spoon the hostess places a little of the coffee foam into each fild2an, 
then pours the coffee itself. Some cake or biscuit Is placed on a dish in 
front of the guest who insists that she couldn't eat a bite. Cigarettes are 
lighted, conversation begins and the coffee is drunk. Those who drink coffee 
must sit nicely (Fino); even if the guest lives next door and visits every 
other day, even If there are many people present, it is uncouth of the 
householders to get up or leave the room to make phone calls, fetch things 
or see to any business of their own. 
At some point the hostess notices that her guest has not touched the 
cake: 
- "Eat! Try it! " 
- "I can't, really" 
- "Yes you can. Eat! ". 
The logic behind the cake dispute is said to be that a guest is certain 
to be shy/ashamed (stiditi se) and must be encouraged to eat. The guest may 
eat some of her cake or she may really not be able to in which case when 
she rises to leave the combatative exchange is resumed in addition to the 
standard debate over her departure: 
- "rry the cake" 
- "I can't. I'm off" 
- "Where are you going? Sit down. " 
- "I can't, I have to go" 
Q give these exchanges in abbreviated form in the interests of space. ) 
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Finally the guest leaves, followed, but never shown to the door by the 
householders who exhort her to come again. The guest says she will and 
insists that they also visit her. 
Slavic hospitality and the way in which it preserves a distance beween 
host and guest has been noted by many scholars (Rheubottom 1985). In 
Sarajevo's Muslim neighbourhoods where households attempt to maintain a 
certain level of secrecy over their internal workings, hospitality has this 
effect. The formalised nature of the coffee visit helps to ensure that a 
visitor sees the host household only at its best, as it would like to be 
seen. 
In the Muslim context, hospitality has another significance; it is taken 
as a peculiarly Islamic virtue. The housewife of the first home in which I 
stayed (in a smaller town outside Sarajevo) told me that she had invited me 
because Muslims should help and be hospitable to strangers and then God 
would help them. 
One of the most striking things about Muslim homes is that they are 
spotlessly clean and tidy. This was something I learned from a Serbian friend 
even before I set foot in a Muslim household; my informant told me to expect 
the Muslim house I was to visit to be spick and span and to remember to 
take my shoes off at the front door because "Muslims don't allow a speck of 
dirt in the house. " In fact the removal of ones shoes before entering the 
home is also characteristic of Christian households but is more strictly 
observed amongst Muslims who find the wearing of shoes in the home almost 
as unthinkable as the wearing of shoes in the mosque. Only once did I 
witness a guest who entered a house in the new high-heeled shoes of which 
she was obviously inordinately proud. The requirements of hospitality 
prevented the hosts from speaking out (as would ofcourse have happened in a 
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mosque) but they shook their heads and raised their eyebrows meaningfully 
behind her back and launched into a full scale character assassination the 
moment the guest had left. 
For women who live in unrenovated old houses, some of which have no 
indoor running water, life can be a constant struggle against dirt and damp. 
Things are somewhat easier in modern apartments but endless pains are still 
taken to ensure cleanliness and order. These are always important but 
receive their strongest affirmation as values in spring. Spring-cleaning can 
take up to one month and becomes the major topic of conversation between 
neighbourhood women during this time. Walls are whitewashed, carpets lifted 
and hand washed in the garden, floors scrubbed, all cutlery and crockery Is 
washed and shelves and cupboards cleaned and re-lined with paper. The wood 
and coal burning winter stove must be removed for the summer and replaced 
with the electric cooker, winter net curtains must be replaced with summer 
ones. In 1986 Ramazan began on the 10th of May and ended on the 8th of 
June. Women were anxious to have their cleaning done before Ramazan since to 
do such heavy work during the month of fast "ne valja", but the house had to 
be clean for the Bajram celebrations at the end of it. 
A hadith attributes the idea that "cleanliness is half the faith" to the 
Prophet, Muhammed. Whilst many Sarajevan Muslims do not know this hadith 
(and many do not even know what a hadith is) the feeling that to be clean is 
an Islamic virtue is universal. Most do not know the hadith that says that 
an angel will not enter a house in which dogs are allowed to live, but all 
agree that dogs are dirty and that it Is not "good" to keep them indoors. 
Few know why a woman should not have long nails, but all agree that po 
Islamu (according to Islam) she shouldn't. 
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In the realm of personal as opposed to household hygiene Islamic 
standards are more frequently referred to overtly. Many Muslims note as a 
major difference between Islam and Christianity that adherents of the former 
are always clean when they go to prayer whereas adherents of the latter are 
not. Apart from ritual washing for prayer (abdest) by those who do pray 
regularly, the day begins and ends with the washing of hands, face, probably 
feet and teeth, and 'down there'. Bathing and showering present a problem for 
whilst it is important to be clean, it can be dangerous to indulge in such a 
full scale wash. I was often told off for over-washing, particularly for 
washing my hair when the weather was not absolutely fine. I was told that 
I'd catch cold, that my face would skew to the side and remain there, even 
that a person could die from the shock to the system of an all over wash. 
Washing during menstruation is considered particularly risky and likely to 
prolong the period (washing after it is, on the other hand, essential). Young 
people tend to bathe about once a week (depending on the weather), the 
middle-aged perhaps less frequently and the elderly not at all since their 
health is more delicate. However, personal cleanliness is seen as vital and 
as something that sets Muslims apart from non-Muslims. Christian use of 
toilet paper is compared unfavourably with the Muslim practice of washing 
and Christians are in general deemed to be less clean than Muslims. 
The evaluation of a household's worth does not involve the notions of 
honour and shame as these are typically conceived in Muslim societies of the 
Middle East and North Africa. Educational books published by the Muslim 
establishment instruct children that Muslims have the duty: "To preserve 
their (neighbours') (fast (honour/virtue), family and property" and that wives 
have the duty "to preserve [the husband's] (fast and property" (Ts'limul - 
Islam pp. 140,143). However, the word "ifast" was not one that I ever heard 
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applied either to families or to individuals in conversation. 
The literal meaning of "obra2' is "cheek". Erlich notes the high 
significance of the term, used to mean "face" or honour, in the Montenegrin 
context: "Obraz is the highest value, for obraz one may perish (or kill). " 
(Erlich 1971 p. 373) She quotes the eighteenth century writer Nenadovid 
"Montenegrin obraz, that's the Montenegrin constitutional system ... f or 
each of one's actions one must consider what the guslar will say" (The 
guslar sang ballads and oral epics on the one-stringed gusle). 
Whereas amongst Muslims: "It's not so important what others will 
think... 'what the guslar will say. "' (op cit. p. 367. ) 
I never heard the term "obra2' used in Sarajevo although its converse, 
the term "bezobraznd' (literally; "without cheek"), is a frequent criticism. 
However, its implication is not that the individual lacks honour or face, but 
simply that they are impudent and brazen. Thus a naughty child or a 
shopkeeper who overcharges is bezobrazna. To be without cheek in Sarajevo Is 
thus similar to, though more reprehensible than, "having one's cheek" in 
Eng land. 
Sramota (disgrace /shame) is a more serious matter. The concept differs 
in two respects from that associated with Middle Eastern societies. Firstly, 
female family members are not more likely than males to be the route 
through which sramota enters a family. The young woman who eloped with an 
unsuitable man, returned, stole back to the husband and finally came back to 
her parents (see p. 66) was said to have shamed or disgraced her family. 
However, the homosexual son of a different family and the alcoholic husband 
of another were equally the cause of sramota for their families. (Attitudes 
to occasional drunkeness will be discussed in chapter three. It is important 
to note that the man in question here was publicly blind drunk and unable to 
walk on several occasions. ) 
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Secondly, sramota differs from Middle Eastern concepts of shame because 
it Is not linked to a notion of honour but to ideas of morality. A family may 
be dobra and fina but there Is no elaborated notion of it having honour. 
Because there is no honour to defend, a family can not be put into a state 
of shame or dishonour by the actions of outsiders. Bourdieu tells the tale of 
a peasant who was robbed by his share-cropper and, after threats and 
complaints had failed, took the matter before the assembly. The peasant was 
a victim of elbahadla, the action of bahdel meaning: "to cast someone into 
shame, dishonour him" (Bourdieu 1979 p. 96). In the Sarajevan context an act 
of theft would cause Sramota, but the sramots would fall on the head of the 
perpetrator, not on that of the victim. One can only bring sramota on oneself 
and one's family, it cannot be cast onto others. 
In certain respects then, Bosnian Muslim society differs strikingly both 
from that of Bosnian Christians and from that of much of the Muslim Middle 
East. It lacks, for example, certain particular institutions and values 
characteristic of them. Thus, as compared with Bosnian Christian society, 
little weight is placed on fictive kinship and, in contrast to the Middle 
East, elaborated notions of honour and shame are absent, women are not 
closeted in a "private" or "domestic" world and polygamy is disowned. 
The principle difference lies, however, in the relative lack of importance 
of kinship ties. Bosnian Muslims take little pride in their genealogies and 
do not see the kin group as a source of potential spouses. Neither do they 
treat It as the most important arena of social, economic and ritual 
interaction. It is the neighbourhood rather than the kinship network within 
which individual nuclear families interact most intensively. 
The life of the Muslim neighbourhood is conceived of as separate and 
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distinct from the life of the town outside and it is within the 
neighbourhood that the expression of collective Muslim identity is most 
consistent and pervasive. In this context safe and separate from that of the 
town, the Serbs, Catholics and secular authorities, values seen as Islamic are 
uniformly extolled and preserved and Muslims confidently affirm their 
identity as members of the worldwide religious community of Islam but also, 
more importantly, as a community distinct from that of non-Muslim Bosnians. 
It is because the neighbourhood is a social network which is both 
exclusively Muslim and highly interactive that it is particularly associated 
with the assertion of Bosnian Muslim identity as distinct from that of Serbs 
and Catholics. 
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3. RELIGIOUS ACTION 
In studies of Muslim society a comparison between "Orthodox" and "Popular" 
Islam is frequently drawn. On the first side of this anthropologist's polarity are 
placed practices such as daily prayer and Quranic recitation. On the other lies 
all that does not fit into the first, an assortment of dervish rituals, tomb 
cults, evil eye beliefs and much else. I arrived in Sarajevo with this two part 
classification in mind and hoped to be able to see Muslim society through its 
lens, to pronounce Bosnian Islam basically "Orthodox" or basically "Popular", or to 
find Orthodox and Popular elements in heated conflict with each other. In this 
frame of mind It was not hard to identify Orthodoxy - ezan (the call to prayer) 
could be heard five times a day from my bedroom window, many Muslims had the 
aspiration to make the pilgrimage to Mecca, and whether or not they performed 
the actions all knew that one should pray five times daily and fast during 
Ramazan. 
I was more disappointed in my efforts to discern Popular Islam. There was 
one tomb site in Sarajevo, that of the "seven brothers", at which passing Muslims 
sometimes prayed a fatiha (the first chapter of the Quran and the most 
frequently recited prayer) and dropped a few coins into the boxes provided for 
that purpose. However, there was no real cult around the seven tombs; prayer and 
offering was something to be given in passing rather than something for which 
one might make an express journey. The recitation of the ratiha was said to 
benefit the souls of the dead and was, in some unspecified way, a good thing to 
do, but prayer and offering could not cure one's ills or cause one's wishes to be 
granted. There were no evil eye beliefs and I searched in vain for a widespread 
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c, --, ncept of 
baraka. In North Africa baraka is a sort of power or grace essocia teý 
with walls (Arabic; saints) and their tombs. Contact with such a saint or tomb 
allows baraka to be passed to the contacting individual. In Sarajevo my questions 
as to baraka tended to provoke blank faces although a few people suggested that 
I must mean bereket. This apparently meant: "When you sit down to dine at a 
full table you say. - 'What bereket we have' or 'God grant us always such 
bereket"'. It thus appeared to denote a direct blessing from God rather than a 
grace or power transferable between mortals, whether saints or no. It was not, 
however, a term that I ever heard used in normal conversation; it had been 
recalled by my informants only to oblige me. It was, moreover, always associated 
by informants specifically and exclusively with sitting down to dine and never, 
for example, with the blessing of a well-furnished home, of wealthy and 
successful offspring or of any other good. My highest hopes of finding Popular 
Islam lay with the dervishes. Did they whirl or drink alcohol in the tekija 
(Turkish; dervish lodge)? No, they did not. Did they ignore the Ramazan fast and 
obligatory prayer? On the contrary, they were meticulous in observing these 
rites. 
I concluded that Sarajevan Islam was extremely Orthodox and, with the 
anthropological polarity fixed firmly in my mind, felt that it would be 
impertinent and offensive to pose questions about, or to suggest even remotely, 
the existence of Popular religious practices and beliefs in the town. It was for 
this reason that I raised the subject of walfs and miracles with a friend (who 
was a strict observer of her religious duties) in the following manner. I told 
her, as was the case, that I had read an article about the Albanian dervishes of 
Kosovo who, as well as ignoring the fast and drinking alcohol, believe in the 
supernatural powers of certain individuals and the healing power of their tombs. 
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Knowing the typically ambivalent sentiments of (Bosnian) Muslims towards 
Albanians I thought this approach an acceptable one and fully expected the 
remark to provoke a firmly-worded comparison of the heretical and superstitious 
ways of the Albanians with the Godly customs of Bosnia. The friend, however, 
merely encouraged me on with an interrogative "Yes? ", so I put the question more 
clearly, and more leadingly. 
"Well, why do they have such beliefs in Kosovo and not here? " 
"But we have that here aswell. EvIiJe, they're called eviije - people who can 
read your thoughts and have special powers. " 
My devout friend went on to astonish me with the fact that there are some 
evlije in Sarajevo today and that an extremely well-known female evIiJa had died 
quite recently. As I recovered from this surprise she dealt me another. She was a 
university student in the middle of taking some examinations and from a cupboard 
produced her means of ensuring good luck in the undertaking. It was a large 
paper loop printed with symbols and inscriptions through which she passed her 
body and her books three times before sallying forth to be examined. It had come 
from Turkey, was called a tvrctava (Serbo-Croatian; fortress) and the designs on 
it were " Is lam ic". 
I was later to learn more about evIije and to realise that the belief in 
them is particularly associated a new mystical tendency in religious life (see 
chapter five). I was also to learn that many Muslims possess or carry on their 
persons protective amulets, usually in the form of tiny copies of the Quran. At 
the time I was simply perplexed. This friend of mine prayed, fasted, gave alms, 
studied the Quran and generally appeared the epitome of Orthodoxy, yet here she 
was stepping through a paper hoop that seemed to be a manifestation of the most 
Popular and un-Orthodox variety of Islam. Yet she saw no contradiction in this. 
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What then is the status and value of the Orthodox/Popular distinction? 
Firstly, it is one that may be recognised within the society itself, it may be an 
emic as well as an etic classification. At a minor level this is almost Inevitable 
for certain people at certain times will always criticise the actions of others 
as un-Orthodox, and compare them unfavourably with their own supposed Orthodoxy. 
Sometimes this becomes a matter not simply of individual opinions but one of 
generally accepted views. Thus there are situations in which a strong urban 
ulema pronounces Itself the epitome of Orthodoxy and condemns the rural practice 
of Islam as un-Orthodox, and the rural population for its part accepts this 
character isat ion without wanting to do anything to alter its validity. Thus of 
the Berber tribesmen of the Atlas, Gellner notes: "They recognise standards of 
purity in terms of which their own society fails, yet at the same time wish to 
remain as they are, indefinitely" (Gellner 1972). 
This brings us to the second importance of the analytical polarity, that it 
can offer the anthropologist a way of thinking and talking about social divides. 
Thus Gellner's distinction of the "Scripturalist" Islam of urban, and the 
"Sufistic" Islam of tribal society draws a contrast not only between religious 
styles but also between two social groups (Gellner 1981). Some people (urbanites) 
belong to one category and other people (tribals) to another. It is people and 
forms of social organisation, not only rites and beliefs, that are categorised 
here. 
In the Sarajevan context, however, no such social divide can be located and 
linked to a religious divide between the Orthodox and the Popular. This is a 
purely urban society, not a combination of tribal and urban or of landowners and 
peasants. Furthermore, the Muslim establishment, the Islamska Zajednica, is not a 
strong ulema which can succeed in having an exclusive claim to knowledge of what 
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is Orthodox widely recognised. It can and has criticised the dervish orders for 
practices and beliefs contrary to the spirit of true monotheism and consequently 
un-Orthodox, but the dervishes deny the charge, emphasing that their philosophy 
is based on the holy word of the Quran and that (although some may lack 
sufficient spirituality to recognise the fact) it is therefore perfectly Orthodox. 
Within the general public there are mixed and unformed views on the question. 
Whilst the Orthodox/un-Orthodox framework is then used in debate, there is little 
general agreement as to who and what is and is not Orthodox. 
What the Orthodox/Popular distinction can not offer the anthropologist is a 
reliable way of distinguishing and classifying particular rituals and practices as 
such. Certain rituals are simply unamenable to such classification. One such is 
the mevlud (Arabic; mawlid) which is performed in many parts of the Muslim world 
in honour of the Prophet. Nowhere is it prescribed in the Quran and the texts of 
the Mevlud poems are not Quranic. However, the ritual itself may Include Quranic 
prayers as well as the recitation of the meviud poem and although it is contrary 
to Quranic teaching to honour any being as highly as the Godhead, Muhammed, the 
Seal of the Prophets, is worthy of love and reverence. Is the ritual then 
Orthodox or Popular? 
Beyond the problem of placing particular rituals on one side of the polarity 
is that created by the fact that the Popular category seems to subsume too many 
and various phenomena - evil eye beliefs, saint cults, Islamic medicine, many 
women's rituals, fortune telling practices, amulets and charms. These are not all 
regarded by the actor's themselves as belonging to a single category; the friend 
who used the tvrdava for good luck was at the same time strongly opposed to the 
practice of fortune telling. Grouping them all together under a single "Popular" 
banner need not necessarily be theoretically Invalid, but neither will It yield 
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much insight into the ways in which actors perceive the varieties of religious 
practice. 
It is with the ordinary perception of religious practice that this chapter 
is concerned. Some common practices are of course stigmatised by some Sarajevan 
Muslims as un-Orthodox: and unIslamic so that the notion of Orthodoxy versus non 
Orthodoxy does have relevance for the actors. in general, however, religious 
practices are seen as located along a sliding scale of merit rather than as 
members of polarised classes of action. The idea of a scale of religious 
acceptability is in fact one propounded by the Hanafi school of Islamic 
Jurisprudence to which Bosnian Muslims belong. According to the formal Hanafi 
classification (as expounded in ra'llmu]-Islam, an educational book published by 
the Bosnian Muslim establishment) there are seven types of action: 
I) Farz. For example, daily prayer. God has commanded these practices. He who 
doesn't believe in them is no Muslim and he who neglects them will be 
punished. 
Vad2lb. For example, the annual sacrifice of a sheep. God has commanded 
these practices but less strongly than those which are farz. He who does 
not believe in them does not cease to be a Muslim but he who neglects them 
will be punished by God. 
Sunnet. For example the call to prayer (ezan) and washing one's hands before 
and after meals. These are practices which were followed and recommended by 
the Prophet. 
4) Mustehab. For example, drying oneself with a towel after ritual washing. 
These practices are considered worthy ones since they were followed by the 
Prophet. They were not, however, directly recommended by him. 
5) Mubah. Practices which are religiously neutral; neither good nor bad. For 
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example, sleeping or strolling in one's spare time. 
6) MeAruh. Actions which are not in accord with Sunnet practice, for example, 
neglecting to wash hands before and after meals. He whose actions are 
mekruh runs the risk of losing the Prophet's good word on the Judgement 
Day - 
7) Haram. For example, murder, disobedience to parents, eating pork. God has 
trictly prohibited these actions and punishes those who pursue them. He who 
does not believe this is no Muslim. 
The formal classification is, however, scarcely known in Sarajevo except to 
those who have received higher education at religious establishments. It is never 
invoked by ordinary Muslims with the exceptions of the two terms at opposite 
ends of the scale - farz and haram. Even these two are used very infrequently; 
as has been seen in chapter two, an action is more likely to be labelled simply 
gone vaIJ&I (Serbo-Croatian; not good) than har-am. Similarly, the Serbo-Croatian 
word "obaveznct', meaning duty or obligationt is usually substituted for the term 
farz. The term far-z tended to be employed only by particularly well educated 
informants who were trying to explain to me, not the whole Hanafi classificatory 
system, but the status of different specific rituals and sections of rituals. Thus 
certain sections of the five daily prayer rituals were said to be farz and 
certain sunnet. The term was thus used only by those with a high level of 
Islamic education and in the context of a technical explanation of the details of 
a particular rite. 
The majority of Sarajevan Muslims are not then aware of the formal Hanafi 
classification. Their own folk classification is, however, also based on a sliding 
scale. It must be emphasised that this classification is not one overtly 
propounded by Muslims and that In using the word "classification" I do not mean 
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to suggest that ordinary Muslims strictly categorise religious actions In the way 
that they classify birds or animals. Neveretheless, the steps of the scale are 
implicitly recognised In comments and attitudes. In the folk classificatory system 
of Sarajevan Muslims there are practices which: 
a) Should be followed. For example, daily prayer and circumcision for males. 
b) Are meritor-lous, desirable or "beautiful" but not necessary. For example, 
learning the Quran by heart, making the pilgrimage to Mecca. The concept of 
sevap is often involved in such practices. 
C) Are neither obligatory, prohibited, desirable nor frowned upon. For example, 
the possession of amulets. 
d) Are condemned by some and felt, even by their practitioners, to be dubious. 
For example, fortune telling. Such practices are often followed with some 
secrecy. 
e) Should not be followed. For example, eating pork. 
The folk classification applies to actions, not to beliefs. According to the 
scriptures one must hold six true beliefs in order to be a Muslim: the 
existence, uniqueness and oneness of God; his all-powerful nature and the fact 
that all that happens is according to his will; the existence of heaven, hell and 
the Judgement Day; the existence of angels (melekf); the Prophets (not only 
Muhammed but also Adam, Abraham, Moses, Solomon, Jesus and others); and the holy 
books Qltabf) of which there are 104 including the Quran. 
The importance of these six beliefs is far less widely known and emphasised 
in Sarajevo than is that of the actions of prayer, fasting, Quranic recitation and 
so on. It is assumed in a general way that anyone who professes to be a Muslim 
must automatically hold the six beliefs, even if they are not conscious of them. 
A person thus knows that he or she is a Muslim and accepts any necessary beliefs 
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whether they know their content or not. Many Muslims do not know that they 
should, according to scripture, believe in holy books other than the Quran, and 
certainly not that there are 104 of them altogether. However, this ignorance and 
consequent lack of conscious belief is not deemed to make the person any less a 
Muslim. On the question of heaven and hell there is often confusion and diversity 
of opinion. Bosnian Musims speak of the Quranic d2enet (heaven) and d2ehenna 
(hell). Bosnian Christians, both Serb and Catholic, use the Serbo-Croation terms 
raj (heaven) and pakao (hell). One informant told me that only the good Muslim, 
and possibly a good non-Muslim who lived in some remote tribe and had never 
heard of Islam, could get to dffenet. Another said that only good Muslims went to 
d-fenet, the good Christian, Jew or Hindu would go to d2ehenna, although to a more 
temperate zone in that fiery furnace. A third said that any good person, Muslim 
or no, might get to d2fenet. Others suggested that the good Muslim goes to dfenet 
and the bad to d2lehenna, whilst the good Christian goes to r-aj and the bad to 
pakao. All of these views were given in response to my questions rather than 
offered spontaneously. The respondents themselves were less Interested in what a 
Muslim should believe than in how a Muslim should act. I do not mean to suggest 
that it is deemed adequate simply to go through the motions of prayer without 
believing in the faith that lies behind the ritual. Belief is not dispensable; 
thus, as seen in chapter two, individuals who perform all the necessary religious 
actions may still be criticised for not being true Muslims at heart. It is simply 
that a person's beliefs and good intentions are usually assumed to exist and are 
not a focus of much interest. The same is not true of actions. 
It Is for this reason that I myself, although known to be a non-Muslim, was 
able to gain approval for following religious practices. on the first few 
occasions on which I accompanied friends to the mosque for daily prayer I 
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attempted to make myself as small and inconspicuous as possible in a corner and 
to witness the ritual without disturbing the worshippers. It was embarrassing to 
be such an obvious non-participant but I felt that it would seem blasphemous for 
me to join in the prayers. I was soon told that this was not the case and 
encouraged to join the ranks of worshippers, to watch caarefully and to imitate 
their actions. Having mastered the physical actions I began to learn some of the 
Arabic prayers and was then able to pray more or less properly, although I never 
learnt all of the necessary words. At the same time I learnt to participate in 
the mevIud and tevhfd rituals and when Ramazan came round I fasted for ten of 
its thirty days. For all of these actions I received wide praise and approval. 
Only once during my stay did someone (a young man who spent most of his time 
working as a chef in Switzerland) suggest to me that: "You can't put your bottom 
on two chairs"; you can't act both as an Protestant and as a Muslim at the same 
time. Those of his friends who heard him express this opinion did not support it 
and it was certainly not in accordance with anyone else's view. Sometimes praise 
of my conduct was directed as criticism or encouragement towards others: "If 
she, a non-Muslim who hasn't been brought up to it, can fast, why can't so-and- 
so? ", "If she can learn Arabic prayers, you see that it wouldn't be difficult for 
you to do the same". However, my actions were not only transformed into sticks 
and carrots for others, but really deemed to reflect great credit on myself. My 
prayer and fasting made me "find' (nice, good, beautiful). 
Actions Which Should Be Done. 
It is important to note that not all of the practices considered as 
belonging within this category are obligatory according to the scriptures. Male 
circumcision and the Ramazan prayer service of teravija are not farz. Sarajevan 
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Muslims do, however, con-sider them pr, &ctjce, _= which should be followed by Muslims, 
This is not to say that all Muslims in fact follow all of the practices which 
fall within this category since individuals vary in their level of religious 
observance. 
One of the actions that should be done is that of daily prayer made at five 
specific times. Muslims may be scathing of Christians who are said to pray 
haphazardly or only when they want something particular from God. The exact 
times of these daily prayers depend upon the precise position of the sun in the 
sky and consequently vary day by day. The correct times may be ascertained by 
listening for ezan (either live or tape recorded) from the mosque or by the 
annual purchase of a calendar in which the times have been calculated for the 
whole of the year in advance. They are based on the position of the sun as seen 
from Sarajevo; Muslims in other Bosnian towns must add or subtract stipulated 
numbers of seconds or minutes to these times. (The calendar also contains the 
dates of Islamic, State, Serbian and Catholic holidays. ) 
To perform prayer before the appropriate time is unacceptable under any 
circumstances. To perform It later than the appropriate time is deemed less 
efficacious and pleasing to God than prayer on the dot, however, individuals vary 
as to the extent to which they f ind late prayer acceptable. During the summer 
months the first prayer of the day may be timed as early as 5.00 am. but many 
Muslims will not rise specifically for it, instead performing the ritual upon 
waking at the normal time. Those who find themselves unavoidably in some public 
place (train, place of employment, school) at the time of prayer will wait to pray 
later, although some may perform a sort of temporary prayer, saying the words 
only Internally and omitting the physical actions so as not to attract attention. 
knew one young man who, during his military service, had prayed every night in 
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bed. Religious observance is not allowed in the barracks so he lay flat in the 
dark, surreptitiously making the actions and mouthing the words of prayer. The 
importance of hospitality is such that the arrival of guests at prayer time, if 
these guests are not themselves inclined to pray, will be sufficient to postpone 
the ritual. 
Each of the five prayer rituals or namaz is formally composed of a section 
that is farz and a section (or sections) that is sunnet Oe. a section the 
performance of which God has commanded and a section the performance of which 
the Prophet has recommended). The order in which these types of prayer are made 
at any one namaz depends on which of the five namaz it is. The words and actions 
of farz and sunnet prayer do not differ. However, when namaz Is made communally 
in the mosque the farz section will be vocally led by the mosque's imamlhodja. 
The distinction between farz and sunnet sections of namaz is not known to 
all Muslims and those who do know it tend to treat the two sections as equally 
necessary. The sunnet section will be omitted only in exceptional circumstances. 
No prayer may be performed without abdest, ritual purity through washing. The 
place of prayer must itself be clean and Muslims praying at home may spread a 
prayer mat, sheepskin or even a cardigan on the floor in front of them. (Men are 
more likely than women to pray in the mosque but women are not prohibited from 
this and men do also pray at home. ) In those households in which only some 
members pray, these worshippers will find a place as far away as possible from 
distracting televisions, radios and chatter. Fascinated toddlers sometimes become 
over-enthusiastic about the interesting prayer game being played by an adult and 
themselves feel the need to pray - right in the middle of the adult's prayer 
space. Juvenile interest is tolerated to quite an extent since it is supposed to 
acclimatise the child to the idea of prayer as a standard, everyday pursuit, but 
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children are not allowed to disrupt worship. 
Those who do not pray regularly remain respectful of the prayer habits of 
otherst do not suggest that they themselves have no need to pray and, if they 
offer any Justification at all for their own omission, it will be to remark that 
in modern times so many people ignore the duty of prayer. Some f ind, the subject 
of their own negligence an embarrassing one and turn the conversation to the 
fact that some close relative (mother, father, grandmother, grandfather) does pray 
regularly, or subtly express a hope that God will understand and forgive. 
For such people the month of Ramazan may be a period of compensation for 
eleven months of omission. Some will fast for the whole month and many make the 
effort to fast for the first day or two and on the 27th, the festival of 
Lejletul-Kadr. At the end of each Ramazan day the lamps of Sarajevo's minarets 
are illuminated in signal that it is time for iftar, the breakfast. The meal, an 
especially delicious one, will have been prepared In advance and the minaret 
lights provoke instant response and rapid consumption of its many courses. Iftar 
is a family rather than a neighbourhood affair, but after it, neighbours often 
gather together to go to the mosque (either a local or a central one) for the 
prayer service of ter-avija. They may then attend mukabela, all night Quranic 
recitation, at the town's largest central mosque. 
The final days of Ramazan are the occasion for the payment of zekst and 
sadekatul-fitr "I ý' (Islamic alms) which will be discussed in the 
following chapter. Members of a household who fast and attend teravija are 
Sadekatul-fltr is distinct from sadaka, the alms which may be given to the 
poor (often to Muslim gypsies at the gates of the mosque) on any occasion. 
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likely to make these payments not only on their own behalf but on that of other, 
less observant members of their household. 
Ramazan is followed by the three day festival of Ramazanski Bajram, an 
occasion on which Muslims pay visits to kin and neighbours. Such visits begin 
with the traditional Turkish/Arabic congratulatory greeting: 
Visitor: "Bajram Mubared Ola! " (Happy Bajram to you! ) 
Hos t: "Alah Razula" (As God wills It) 
The inevitable coffee is served along with sweet, heavy Turkish pastries 
prepared for the occassion - baklava, kadaifa or ru2ica. Both visits and cakes are 
made even by those who have not fasted and prayed. 
About two months after Ramazanski Bajram falls the festival of Kurban 
Bajram at which sheep are ritually sacrificed. For the week or so before this 
occasion the hill at the north-east end of town is alive with animals which have 
been driven into Sarajevo by shepherds from the surrounding countryside. Here 
they graze and are prodded, appraised and bargained over by potential purchasers. 
Once vendor and purchaser have shaken hands on a deal, the latter must somehow 
get the unwilling beast home and there feed and shelter it until the day of 
slaughter. The presence of so many sheep in so many neighbourhood gardens 
provokes much discussion of and, because of the pervasive spirit of inter- 
household competition, deception about, the relative size, quality and price paid 
for various sheep. 
A butcher is invited to kill the animal. Its throat is slit, it expires 
through loss of blood and is f leeced and quartered. The butcher's work is now 
done and the carcass is left to its owners who chop It into smaller pieces. Of 
these, some, including the head and internal organs, are retained for household 
consumption. Others are given to kin living within Sarajevo. The majority is 
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distributed to neighbours with the formula: 
Distributor: "Bajram Mubared Ola! " ("Happy Bajram to you! ") 
Receiver: "Alah RazuIa. Kabulosum. 11 ("As God wills it. May God 
witness/accept this good act of yours". Ie. the gift of 
mea t. ) 
Distributor: "Ha la losumll ("My forgiveness on you". Halalitl 
= to forgive. 
A single street or neighbourhood area will be crisscrossed all day long by 
the bearers of these small parcels. The meat is said to be given to the male 
head of household but it is women (or young girls) who make the actual door-to- 
door deliveries. Thus, as in everyday life it is the economic and social 
interaction of women which unites the neighbourhood, at Kur-ban Bajram it is their 
ritual interaction which does so. 
The sacrifice is an expensive business - in 1986 an average sized sheep 
cost the equivalent of f 100 which for some households was most of a month's 
income. For this reason many households sacrifice only one sheep rather than one 
for each adult as is the practice of wealthier families. Other households do not 
sacrifice at all, stating that they are not obliged to since they can't afford it. 
Yet even those who do not sacrifice receive meat, exchange the Kurban Bajram 
greeting and participate in the pre-sacrifical excitement and conversations. Thus 
the "should" of Kur-ban Bajram seems to be located not in the need for households 
to sacrif Ice but in the need for the neighbourhood to be united in the ritual 
festivities. 
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Actions Which Are Meritorious. Desirable Or Beautiful 
The majority of religiously inspired practices fall within this category. I 
lost count of the number of times I was told that to do X, Y or Z "is beautiful" 
(Iijepo). To say a fatiha when passing a grave, to fast the ten days of Muharem 
(Islamic New Year) and many other actions are considered beautiful ones. One 
extremely important action that falls within this category is the making of the 
pilgrimage, or Hajj, to Mecca. The Hajj is one of the five "pillars" of Islam and, 
according to scripture, is obligatory for all Muslims who are able to perform it. 
Yet in Sarajevo it is treated more as a desirable than as an obligatory act. To 
go on pilgrimage is so expensive and so far out of the reach of most Sarajevans 
that there is scarcely occasion to begin to think of it as a necessity. Yet many 
have the desire, however unrealistic, to perform the Hajj. Returned pilgrims speak 
of the experience with great feeling, describing the Joy and tears of the moment 
of arrival in Mecca in moving terms. The title of Had, 41 is pre-fixed to their 
names, or they may simply be addressed as Had2lja. They become objects of great 
respect, their hands are kissed by others on the occasions of the two Bajram and 
their opinions sought and valued on all religious matters. Both men and women 
may go on Hajj, however, a married woman is unlikely to go without her husband, 
thus gaining a status which he lacks. Hence the joke: 
"What do you call the wife of a Had2i? " 
"Had2inica" (an honorific title) 
"What do you call the husband of a Had2i? " 
"An ass! " 
Knowledge of the Quran is desirable. The Quran is God's final and perfect 
message to mankind. The Prophet was not "inspired" with it but taught each and 
every one of its words precisely by the angel D2ibrail (Gabriel). Although he did 
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not himself transcribe these words he was bidden by the angel to learn to read 
and write and the Quran places great value on literacy - the slave who teaches 
ten Muslims to read and write gains his freedom. The Quranic words as revealed 
to Muhammed were transcribed after the Prophet's death by his followers. 
Sarajevan Muslims revere not only the message contained in the Holy Book 
but the very form of the book itself and each of its phrases in spoken or 
written form. In Ottoman times the art of calligraphy was highly prized and 
contemporary mosques, and sometimes homes, are adorned with pictures of 
particular Quranic words, notably "Allah", "Muhammed" and "Hu" (one of the 99 
names of God). Although contemporary Qurans include a page-by-page Serbo- 
Croatian translation (or interpretation, since the divine word can never be 
adequately translated), they do not omit the original Arabic. 
It is for this reason that Sarajevan Muslims do not simply read the Quran 
(eftatf Kuran), they speak it aloud (u(fitl Kuran), thus reproducing each word in 
its revered verbal form. In standard Serbo-Croatian the verb uelti means to teach 
or learn. With regard to the Holy Book It means to speak or recite it. I was 
sometimes asked whether I had read the Quran in English by those who wanted 
reassurance that I was a sincere scholar and had an idea of the book's contents. 
However, the fact that I had did not reflect any special religious merit on me - 
reading the Quran in English (or Serbo-Croatian) has none of the value of 
speaking it in Arabic. 
The person who completes one act of speaking the whole Quran is said to 
have completed one hatma. At the mekteb (Islamic school for children) pupils 
learn the Arabic alphabet in order to be able to say hatme. The completion of a 
child's first hatma is a time of celebration for that child and its family. The 
Ramazan service of teravija is based on the completion of a hatma: for each of 
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the thirty nights teravija prayers include the recitation of a section of the 
Quran so that by the end of the month the entire book has been recited. Ramazan 
is also a time at which individual Muslims may say hatme for their dead 
relatives. 
These acts (individual completion of hatme and participation In the hatma 
of the teravlja services) bestow sevap on the performer. Sevap (Arabic; tawab) 
may be roughly translated as a sort of religious credit which God may take into 
account on the day of judgement. Some actions are sevapnije than others. 
(Sevapnije: an adjective formed in the typical Serbo-Croatian manner and meaning 
"more full of sevap. ) During the tevh1d ritual (see chapter six) it is said to be 
sevapnije to sit close to those who recite the Quran than to sit more distantly. 
After a teravija service one woman I knew remarked on how hot and stuffy the 
mosque had been that night. The much respected Sheikh of the Kadiri tekija told 
her Jovially: "Oh well, it's sevapnije for us". 
Sevap is incurred only by non-obligatory but desirable religious actions. 
Thus the giving of alms or the fasting of Ramazan do not bestow sevap on the 
performers. It is not the defining characteristic of desirable actions since, for 
example, making the pilgrimage does not incur sevap. (It does, however, clean the 
pilgrim of all previous sins. ) 
Speaking the Quran, or sections of it, is meritorious, but the ability to 
recite the Quran from memory is yet more highly valued. The person who has 
memorised the entire book is known as a hafiz. The process of studying hlfz 
(memorisation and the ability to recite the Quran) may take one to three years, 
largely depending on the age of the student. The Quran is learnt section by 
section, at the foot of one who is already hafiz. As each new section is acquired 
the student must continue to practise those sections which have alre8dy been 
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committed to memory. It is clear that learning h1fz is hard work. Muslims say 
that no other book of its length could be so learnt; the Quran can be acquired 
only by virtue of the help given by God to the sincere student. One hafiz 
explained to me that the Quran has its own mudisa or miracle. Just as each of 
the Prophets had a mudisa (for example, Jesus could bring the dead to life) so 
the Holy Book has the mudisa of enabling the sincere and strong willed to learn 
it. 
The student of hifz must satisfy his or her own master before being 
examined by a Sarajevo committee of hafizi. Success is followed by the 
performance of a prayer service known as hafiz dova in the town's largest central 
mosque. The student is now pronounced a hafiz and the title prefixed to his or 
her name. From 1878 to 1978,186 Muslims have become hafiz in Sarajevo. Of 
these, a growing percentage have, in recent years, been female. It is during 
Ramazan that the hafizi are most publicly on view, leading the special Ramazan 
prayer service of teravija and performing mukabela, all night Quranic recitation. 
Many hafizi are at the same time hodjas or bulas (male and female religious 
functionaries whose role will be discussed in chapter four) but the respect and 
admiration with which they are regarded springs not from this fact but from 
their ability to reproduce the holy words from memory. 
The meviud ritual seems to fall withn the category of desirable actions. 
Certainly it is a ritual from which participants can draw sevap. The earliest 
documentation on mevluds dates from 1531 when the founder of the town's largest 
mosque, Gazi Husrevbeg, stipulated that a mevlud should be said annually within 
the mosque and provided funds for the purpose. Today some mosques and tekije 
(dervish lodges) hold annual mevluds. A mosque may also host a mevlud in 
celebration of its renovation or refurbishment. Mevluds are also held by 
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individual households in celebration of a wedding, the building of a new house, 
the circumcision of a young son, the return from military service of an older son 
and for many other occasions. Mensur Brdar estimates that 10,000 mevluds are 
held annually in Bosnia-Hercegovina (Brdar, Islamska Misao October 1986). 
These household mevluds are conducted by specialist women known as bulas, 
and attended only by women. The central part of the ritual is the bulas' 
recitation of mevlud poems describing the birth, life and deeds of the Prophet. 
These are interspersed with Quranic prayers said by the whole company. In former 
times the mevlud poems were in the Turkish language and of Turkish provenance. 
Since the last quarter of the nineteenth century mevlud poems have been written 
in Serbo-Croatian (sometimes in the Arabic or "Turkish" script, as it is often 
called). Today, many mevlud rituals will commence with a section of a Turkish 
poem and continue with sections of various Serbo-Croatian ones. The skill of the 
bulas lies in their adroitness in combining verses from different poems to form 
a whole in which there is no repetition of episodes of the Prophet's story. 
Actions Which Are Neither Obligatory, Prohibited. Desirable Nor Frowned Upon 
Not surprisingly perhaps, there is less to be said about actions of this 
type than about others since Muslims themselves do not feel particularly 
strongly about them. They include the use of charms such as the Nrctave and 
protective amulets. The owners of such items brought them to my attention only 
in an offhand fashion and had little more to say about them than that they 
existed. In a village outside Sarajevo there was said to be an Islamic doctor who 
said Quranic words over his patients or wrote them out on pieces of paper to be 
worn close to the afflicted part of the body. No-one I met had actually visited 
this doctor and none spoke out either for or against his practice. 
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The practice of sprinkling a forty day old baby with flour and sugar (see 
p. 70) falls in this category, as does the tradition of sfsano kumstvo (a type of 
fictive kinship) which is not deemed to be of any great spiritual importance. 
Also to be noted is the telling of certain stories involving religious 
elements. Hangi notes such a tale as told in turn-of-the-century Bosnia (Hangi 
1900). A poor but pious girl had the God-given ability to see whether, at the 
moment of their deaths, certain people had God's mercy or not. This girl had two 
brothers, one bad but successful, the other good. As the bad brother lay dying 
the girl saw how an ugly and frightening figure, with sharp black teeth, removed 
something black and smelly from his body with a knife and flung it out the door. 
To the amazement of those gathered round the deathbed she cried for her 
brothers soul. Later she saw the good brother die amidst flowers, shining angels 
and the beauty of God. This time she smiled, again to the amazement of the 
company who could see nothing but a dying man. 
A similar tale was related to me in 1986 as I sat drinking coffee with a 
woman (the hostess on this occasion), her mother-in-law, her HFBW and her HFBWSD. 
The latter told us the tale which again concerned a poor but Godly woman who 
was granted, this time by the angel Asrail, the ability to see how others died. 
She saw the hodja's deathbed surrounded by pigs and his soul drawn out with a 
nail by Asrail who then wiped his hands. The next day she saw Asrail preside 
over the death of a humble old woman whose soul he drew out with af lower. 
This tale was said by the teller to be "2fva istfna", the living truth. Its 
audience listened with the sort of attention and interest often accorded to ghost 
stories and other tales of the supernatural in Britain. It was a good story, well 
told, and those who heard it tutted and shook their heads for some moments 
before turning their attention to matters closer to home. 
- 106- 
Actions Which Are Frowned qpon 
Most common of these are fortune telling practices. Some Muslims believe 
fortune telling to be "unIslamic" and a "sin". One muezzin told me that he who 
believed in the predictive power of such practices was no Muslim and that the 
prayers of those who indulge in them simply for fun, and without believing, would 
not be accepted for forty days. Those who practise them do so covertly, although 
the extent of this covertness varies with different fortune telling techniques. In 
general, the fortune teller is not deemed to possess any special power; anyone 
can tell fortunes although some are said to "know" fortune telling better than 
others. One exception to this rule, associated to a non-traditional form of 
fortune telling, will be noted. 
Fortune telling is done by and for women, principally for young women. Most 
of its predictions concern love and marriage, although they also deal with 
matters of employment, finance and health. One practice, followed only by 
unmarried girls and in the spirit of fun, involves hanging a golden ring on a 
piece of thread held over a glass of water. The number of times it sways back 
and forth indicates the age at which the woman will marry. The ring is then 
suspended over the pulse of the woman's wrist, its subsequent movements 
indicating the number of sons and daughters she will bear. This simple method of 
prediction requires no elaborate preparation or skill and is pursued more in the 
spirit of a parlour game than in that of serious prophecy. 
The most common technique is certainly that of reading the fortune in the 
coffee cup. On any occassion when women who know each other well are gathered 
together to drink coffee, they may read fortunes in the cups. However, the 
presence of a relative stranger or of one who is known or felt likely to 
disapprove, will inhibit the fortune telling. Certain times and places, those of 
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religious significance, are inappropriate ones for fortune telling which will 
consequently be avoided or accomplished in great secrecy. I once attended a 
tevhid death ritual at which one of the women present was rumoured to have 
great knowledge of fortune telling. Along with the tevhfd hostess's young niece, I 
had my fortune told by this woman, very discreetly and behind locked doors. That 
she told our fortunes at all was unusual in this context and the lack of respect 
it showed for the occasion seemed to be due to the fact that the tevhld holder 
was poor and the ritual itself rather slipshod and unimpressive. 
After the coffee has been drunk the dregs are allowed to settle in the cup 
which is then inverted onto a saucer or tray and left to stand. When these dregs 
have dried to a stain inside the cup, fortunes may be read therein. One side of 
the cup is the male side, one the female. On these two sides the teller searches 
for certain symbols - dark men and blond men, dark women and blond women, the 
bird which means one will receive a message, the horse for strength, the rabbit 
for speed, the question mark for some unforeseeable but important event or for a 
hint of doubt. All of these symbols are standard and thus anyone may learn to 
read fortunes. On one occasion I sat drinking coffee with two women I knew well. 
I asked if one of them would read my fortune but the f irst said she wasn't In 
the mood and the second claimed not to "know". She had had her own fortune told 
countless times and was familiar with all the symbols but was squeamish about 
reading fortunes herself since the practice is considered a dubious one. Instead 
she told me to read my own fortune. I protested that I didn't "know" it either 
but she told me: "You've heard it all before, bird, horse, rabbit... You just have 
to look for it. " 
Yet whilst anyone can read a fortune in some manner or other, certain 
individuals are said to be better at It than others. Their superior knowledge Is 
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judged by their ability not only to discern the relevant symbols in the coffee 
stain but to weave them all into a coherent picture. Thus, anyone who is so 
inclined can see that: 
"You have a message-and there's a horse here, that's some sort of 
strength ... a number three, maybe you'll get three messages... " 
But only those who know fortune telling well will tell one things along the 
lines of: 
"There's a blond man in your life, he's far away but he's trying very hard 
to send some message. He's hindered by a dark woman who's jealous and likely to 
cause problems in some devious way 11 
Those who have the reputation of really "knowing" fortune telling usually 
meet the request for a reading with at least a brief display of reticence before 
complying. There is no question of offerring payment to the teller, one is not 
even supposed to thank them for their pains. Such thanks ne valja. 
Coffee reading is performed by Christians as well as Muslims but other 
techniques belong exclusively to particular national/religious groups. Palm 
reading and prediction through the cards are practised only by Gypsies. Others 
may have their fortunes read in this way by Gypsies but do not themselves 
employ the technique. I was sometimes asked about English fortune telling 
practices and suggested the method of peeling an apple, throwing the peel over 
one's shoulder and taking the shape it formed on the ground as the initial of 
one's future husband. This went down well with the unmarried but, like the gold 
ring practice, was taken more as a game than as a predictive technique. 
One fortune telling practice is said to be an exclusively Muslim one in that 
it is not practised by Serbs, Catholics or others. Further, it is said to have an 
Islamic religious basis and thus to be the truest of all techniques. This 
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practice is fortune telling with beans which is said to have been done by the 
Prophet's daughter, Fatima, and thus to come "from God". (Some Muslims denounce 
this as a mistaken belief but it is a widely held one. ) Fortune telling with 
beans is carried out in secrecy and talked of in whispers. The fortune teller 
holds forty dried, white navy beans in her hands and murmurs a Quranic verse 
into them. They are then thrown onto a cloth and arranged into three columns of 
small bean clusters. As in the coffee cup, one side is the male, the other the 
female. The beans are thrown and arranged three times and the fortune told from 
them. After the third arrangement the subject of the fortune leaves the room 
with a bean in each hand and one in her mouth. The f irst word she then hears is 
interpreted by the teller as having a certain significance for the future. In 
contrast to the coffee reading technique which I witnessed numerous times and 
was able to learn the details of, I witnessed the bean reading only twice and 
found it difficult to learn the details of the process from the teller who 
treated it with some secrecy. As in other traditional techniques, the teller Is 
not deemed to possess any particular power although she may have greater or 
lesser ability or "knowledge". 
Mention must be made of a non-traditional method of fortune telling which 
some Muslims took seriously. I was told of it by a friend, an unmarried woman, in 
great secrecy and behind locked doors. This friend had dialled a number in Kosovo 
- the number of a fortune teller. She was asked her name and that of her mother 
and had her fortune told over the phone. its most noteworthy point was that the 
woman would be married within six months. Two young married friends of hers also 
phoned. One was told to drink a certain tea to induce pregnancy, the other to 
stop worrying about her husband who was faithful and committed. All three were 
asked to send donations (not payment) to a certain address in Kosovo. (This is 
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illegal, a fact which increased the need for secrecy felt by my friend. ) Since the 
fortune teller used no known technique of divination, the three women considered 
that, if the predictions turned out to be true, it would be the result of some 
peculiar and incomprehensible knowledge of the fortune teller's. Such an idea is, 
as has been seen, not generally associated with the ability to read fortunes and 
others who had heard of the existence of this telephonic fortune teller dismissed 
her as a probable charlatan. 
Practices designed to predict the future are then considered somewhat 
dubious. So also are practices which seek to influence it in any way more 
specific than the procuring of general good luck and health through the 
possession of charms and amulets. One such was that of speaking a particular 
Quranic passage seven times over a sweet, cake or flower. This item is then 
given either to an enemy, in which case the enemy will not harm the giver, or to 
a person of the opposite sex, in which case that person will fall in love with 
the giver. The manner in which I learnt, of this practice is interesting. I had 
gone to visit a middle-aged woman with a high level of Islamic education and 
antipathy for fortune telling which she considered unIslamic. I was accompanied 
on this visit by a young woman interested in all forms of fortune telling. For a 
variety of reasons there was animosity between the younger and the older woman. 
Our hostess showed us many books, pamphlets and handwritten documents on 
religious topics. Amongst these was a copy of the above mentioned Quranic 
passage. The hostess said that this had been given to her by someone else and 
treated it in a light hearted fashion, as if to show that she herself did not 
believe In such nonsense. Nevertheless, perhaps somewhat spitefully, she 
Suggested that the younger woman might try saying the Quranic spell In order to 
get a boyfriend. 
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Later I asked the young woman about the incident but she wordlessly urged 
me to silence, gesturing at the people in the corridor outside the room in which 
we sat. I asked her in more private circumstances later but again she felt it 
ill-advised to talk. Finally, on an occasion when the whole house was empty but 
for we two who sat in a room with doors and windows shut, I succeeded in 
extracting a response. The woman said that she had not wanted to speak before 
because if anyone overheard her, even her mother or father, they might think that 
she herself engaged in such practices. This, she said, she would never do. She 
of f ered three reasons. 
Firstly, even if a man fell in love with you from taking the sweet, cake or 
flower, you would never know whether it was a true love or an artiflicially 
created one. 
Secondly, such an action would eventually and inevitably "turn back on you 
in the worst possible way". 
Finally, this practice, and others which seek to manipulate events 
unnaturally "ne valjd'. I asked her if she meant that the practice was haram. She 
considered for a while, said that it probably was, and then continued to stress 
its ne valja and dangerous character. 
Both women, in their different ways, thus denied the possibility that they 
themselves would perform such an action whilst implying that the other might do 
SO. 
Actions Whlrh _c; hould 
Not Be Done 
Of the actions which should be avoided, one is most decidedly the 
consumption of pork. Not only do Muslims not eat it but they are convinced that 
It Is of all foods the most loathsomely fatty, unhealthy and nauseating. The full 
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strength of this opinion was brought home to me one evening when I visited a 
family whose small son was ill with a fever. Another visitor, a neighbouring 
woman, said that she had a remedy to be rubbed onto the sufferer's chest and 
that she would go and fetch it from her own home. Since it was dark she asked 
me to accompany her. I went and, from a cupboard, the woman produced a small pot 
of some white paste. She pulled off the lid to reveal the smooth goo of pure 
lard. "Pig's fat, " she said, waving it under my nose, "You Christians eat that". 
She seemed as certain that this revolting mess was a Christian delicacy as she 
was that she herself would never pollute her body with the stuff. 
The consumption of alcohol seems to be another member of this category 
although a rather ambiguous one. It is likely that male and female attitudes to 
alcohol differ, however, I have less insight into the former since my fieldwork 
did not include, and could not possibly have included, frequenting the all-male 
bars of the town. It is unusual for women to drink although some of the younger 
generation may take the occasional glass, secretly from their families and in the 
homes of close friends on special occasions such as birthday gatherings or New 
Year. Unmarried women who frequent the young people's bars Qafiiff) of Sarajevo 
order only soft drinks in these public places. Their male companions may, on the 
other hand, be drinking alcohol and indeed, excepting those men who reject it 
completely on religious grounds, male consumption of alcohol seems to be quite 
common. 
The general female attitude to male drinking is that it is wrong but only 
to be expected from men (although note that the complete alcoholic is the cause 
Of sramota, shame, for his family. See p. 83) Thus when a workman who is also a 
f&tnily connection is requested to fix the household's electricity or boiler, he is 
likely to be offerred either beer or rakfja by the housewife, although that same 
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housewife does not like her own son or husband to drink. The woman whose 
husband comes home drunk may maintain a superior silence, make wry Jokes about 
his pathetic state or become irritated and critical. The husband tends jovially to 
accept his wife's criticism, to turn his attention to the children, newspaper or 
television in order to avoid it, and to express defiance only through a vague 
implication that it is not really her business whether he drinks or not. This may 
seem to be simply a clever technique to quench a spouse's disapproval, and one 
that might be successfully applied the world over. In Sarajevo, however, it is an 
unusual one. In general, criticism between spouses, siblings or parent and child, 
whether overt or implied, provokes heated argument, powerful scorn and shouted 
counter accusations, The frequency of such high-pitched but Short-lived family 
quarrels unnerved and embarrassed me before I grew accustomed to it. In 
contrast, the drunken husband's response to a critical wife is a relatively 
tolerant one which suggests that even men feel the consumption of alcohol to be 
something which should not be done. 
Fluidity 
The five categories, whilst not overtly recognised or referred to, are 
distinguished by the attitudes of Muslims towards them. Those who fail to 
perform actions in the first category offer no justifications for what is felt to 
be an ommission. Those who perform actions in category two tend are especially 
respected and admired and may earn sevap. Actions of the third category provoke 
little reaction of any type, those of the fourth tend to be performed secretly or 
criticised and those of the fifth are widely condemned. However. it is clear that 
the classificatory boundaries are more fluid than those involved in the formal 
distinction of Farz .... Haram. In some cases different 
individuals place different 
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actions in different categories. Thus, whilst the consumption of alcohol was, in 
my experience, treated as an action which should not be performed, it seems 
possible that a different attitude prevails in the context of an all-male bar. 
Most Muslims treat fortune telling merely as a dubious pursuit but some 
consider it an action which should definitely not be performed. 
One particularly disputed question in contemporary Sarajevo is that of 
suitable clothing for women. The veil was made illegal in 1952 and is not worn, 
or considered necessary, by anyone today. In the pre-socialist period it had been 
common in towns whereas rural women tended to veil only when they came into 
contact with non-Muslims, for example, when going to market in town. Female 
veiling as an identity marker rather than as an aspect of sexual segregation is 
also noted by Pillsbury for Chinese Muslim society (Pillsbury 1978). 
Sarajevo's elderly women keep their heads, arms and legs covered at all 
times whereas many young women are happy to wear tight fitting jeans and 
sleeveless blouses and to look as "Western" as possible. Whilst their elders may 
not take warmly to the extremes of such a style, neither do they feel that their 
daughters and grandaughters should cover their heads (except, ofcourse, during 
religious rituals). The value placed upon looking attractive is high and above all 
others it is the young who should look well. The wearing of a headscarf is not 
(in general) taken, by young or old, as attractive. 
There Is, however, a section of the younger generation which feels 
differently (see chapter five). Amongst the young and enthusiastically devout 
some women have, in recent years, taken to dressing in long skirts, long sleeved 
blouses and headscarves covering all but the face. This, they say, is in obedience 
tO a Quranic imperative. Other young women of this religiously active social 
circle admire their scarved peers but believe such covering to be an Islamically 
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recommended rather than an obligatory practice. Young men who move in these 
circles often support such covering as Islamically prescribed, in spite of the 
fact that their own girlfriends or wives may not cover their heads. 
There is thus disagreement as to whether or not women should be so 
dressed. There is further disagreement as to the contexts in which women should 
be covered. Most feel it to be appropriate only in the prescence of non-related 
men. Some support the practice of covering even in front of non-Muslim women and 
thus see it as a marker both of sexual and of national/religious boundaries. One 
young man even suggested that it was necessary for women to be covered in the 
presence of non-related Muslim women in order to inhibit the possibility of 
lesbianism. His companions, both male and female, thought this was going a little 
too far. 
The sharp contrast between Orthodox and un-Orthodox is one that is 
occasionally drawn by Sarajevan Muslims, usually in the context of criticism of 
someone else's behaviour. In general, however, actions are seen not as lying on 
one side of a deep moral chasm but as located somewhere along a scale of 
religious acceptability. Individuals may vary as to where they place particular 
practices on this scale, but the idea of the scale itself is implicit In attitudes 
and behav iour. 
The existence of the sort of loose emic classificatory sytem outlined above 
does not, of course, in itself invalidate the anthropologist's use of 
Orthodox/Popular terminology. Yet in Sarajevo such a polarisation seems redundant 
f or two reasons. The f irs t is tha t there are no grea t soc ia Ic lef ts (urban/ tr lba 1, 
landowner /peasant) which might correspond to any religious ones. The second is 
that no landmark for Orthodoxy, for example an ulema, can be identified. (Why the 
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Muslim establishment, the Islamska Zajednica, does not provide such a landmark 
will become clear in the following chapter. ) In this context no clues or 
principles point the way and, short of creating or adopting some theology (which 
is not the business of the social scientist), one cannot know where to begin 
dividing the Orthodox from the Popular. 
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4. RELIGIOUS BUREAUCRACY 
In many of the Muslim majority societies today a question is being posed. 
The question is this: What should be the relationship between Islamic law and 
state law? It had been there for the asking in the days of the Muslim empires 
and city states- but in the abscence of modern style police forces it was less 
pressing. Law was something which the citizen could appeal to, it was not 
something systematically enforced by people paid to do so. Twentieth century 
states must confront the question and have answered it in different ways, from 
Turkish secularism to the Iranian Islamic Republic. Some countries are riven by 
conflict over the issue, thus the Muslim Brotherhood of Egypt emphatically and 
sometimes violently denies the legitimacy of the existant state and legal code. 
Within the Muslim minority the scope of the realistically possible is 
small; India's Muslim minority recently succeeded in having a literary work 
(Rushdie's "Satanic Verses") officially banned, but cannot hope to transform the 
country into an Islamic Republic enforcing Islamic law. The question becomes 
restricted and Muslims do not ask "What should be the role of religion within 
the state? ", but "What should be the role of religion and of religious 
authorities in maintaining and developing our political identity as a minority 
within this state? " The question is cut down to the realm of the possible. 
Providing an answer is not simply a matter of theological interest since 
religion is the major, and in many cases the sole source of their discrete 
Identity and thus of any claims to political status; without its faith the 
Muslim minority would be a political nonentity. 
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Bosnia'-- Muslims are not only a minority but a minority within a state 
which makes comparatively strong attempts to regulate religious expression and 
organisation (although these attempts entail far less restriction than is the 
case in other socialist states; the Soviet Union and Albania, for example). This 
fact constricts the scope of the possible yet further. In this chapter I want to 
consider the response of the official Muslim establishment, the Islamska 
Zajednica, to the question of the role of religious authority in maintaining and 
developing Bosnian Muslim identity within Yugoslavia. This response is affected 
by changes in the political climate and thus is itself changeable. At the same 
time it must be said that the Zajednica is not a wholly monolithic and 
ideologically homogeneous authority but a complex bureaucracy containing various 
currents of opinion and for this reason it is not always easy to discern clear 
direction and motivation in its behaviour. Nevertheless, two general points may 
be made about it: 
I. The Zajednica sees itself as the only truly legitimate religious authority 
of Muslims. It attempts to present itself as such to the Muslim population, 
to obtain this population's allegiance, to monopolise the control of the 
practice of Islam and to combat rivalling religious leaders and 
orientations. The monopolising tendency of Muslim establishments is 
apparent in much of the world today and in Yugoslavia Is exacerbated by 
the fact that, in a socialist state, there is but a limited amount of 
religious authority to go round. The Zajednica wants as much of this as 
possible. 
2. Whilst the Zajednica is certain that it is the only legitimate Muslim 
religious authority it is uncertain and changeable on the question of how 
to represent the Bosnian Muslim population in the political context of 
federated Yugoslavia. There is evidence that until the late 1970s the 
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Muslim establishment quietly but consistently tried to advance Bosnian 
Muslim claims to higher status as a nationality within Yugoslavia. Action 
by the state in the late 70s and early 80s put a curb on these endeavours 
and the Zajednica now places more emphasis on Yugoslav socialist 
patriotism (see p-22). 
In all Its endeavours the Zajednica must avoid antagonising the secular 
authorities and this necessity is a two edged sword. If the Zajednica fails it 
may expect trouble from above, from the state. If it succeeds too obviously it 
may create trouble below, from Muslims who see it as hand in glove with the 
atheistic secular authorities. Before considering how the Zajednica attempts to 
walk this fine line it is necessary to look at its organisation and historical 
development. 
In Ottoman times the ultimate religious authority of the Bosnian Muslims 
was the Shaikh-al-Islam who was appointed by the Ottoman Sultan. The Sultan 
also appointed Bosnia's mufti (juriconsult) who was empowered to pronounce 
fetve, rulings concerning religious life in the province and based on Shari'a 
law. The mufti in turn appointed kadijas, Muslim judges who applied the law. The 
building and upkeep of mosques and medresas and the payment of those who ran 
them was largely funded by vakufi (Arabic sing; waqf). tax exempt endowments. 
The administrators of the vakufs were known as mutevlije. The mufti, kadijas and 
mutevIIje formed part of the ulema (group of learned Muslim scholars) the ranks 
of which also included medresa professors. Whilst Individual alim (members of 
the ulema) wielded specific powers, as a group the ulema did not have official 
membership or a strictly defined role. 
With the Austro-Hungarian occupation matters changed drastically and the 
Process of bureaucrat isat ion began. Bosnian Muslims were administatively cut off 
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from the Empire and the Sultan's role became that only of a spiritual 
figurehead. The occupiers wanted a Muslim establishment independent of Istanbul, 
its officials to be chosen and supervised by the Austrians themselves. The 
position of Refs-ul-Ulema, the leader of the whole Muslim community, was created 
by the Austro-Hungarians and still exists today. For the next thirty years 
Bosnian Muslims negotiated with, and occasionally revolted against, their 
Austrian rulers in an attempt to gain independence in the organisation of 
religious matters (see Donia 1981). In 1909 Emperor Franz Josef signed the 
Statute for Autonomous Rule of Islamic Religious and Vakuf matters In Bosnia- 
Herce8-ovina which granted Bosnian Muslims the right to organise their own 
religious establishment and to elect its officials. Bosnia-Hercegovina was 
divided into six muftihoods (one of them that of Sarajevo) under the authority 
of the Refs-ul-Ulema. 
The inter-war Kingdom saw the establishment of four separate Muslim 
bodies, those of Serbia, of Macedonia, of Montenegro and of Bosnia-Hercegovina 
with Croatia and Slovenia. In 1930 an all-Yugoslavia Muslim establishment, the 
Supreme Stare. 4instvo (Board of Elders) of the Islamic Religious Community, was 
created under the leadership of the Reis-ul-Ulema. Sarajevo and Skopje were the 
seats of two lesser authoritative bodies known as ulema-med2lis. 
During the Second World War many Muslims supported the Nazis and Ustashi 
rather than the Communist Partisans. It was not until 1943 that the first 
Muslim Partisan battalion was formed and this included no more than 240 
fighters whilst Muslim participation in Nazi and Ustashi units was, according to 
German records, in excess of 42,000 (see JIMMA 1986). During the war the 
Communist Party made no attacks on the Muslim establishment and attempted to 
Ikssure Muslims that their religion would not suffer under a Communist 
government (pamphlets about the liberal treatment of Muslims In the Soviet 
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Union were handed out. See Popovic 1986 p. 342). After the war the new regime 
launched a vigourous anti-religious campaign. In 1945 and 1946 the Muslim 
establishment had elected various strongly anti-Communist leaders. The 
government closed the Shari'a courts and the Sarajevo school of Shari'a law and 
prohibited the collection of voluntary donations to fund the medresas. The 
measures had their effect on the Muslim establihment which adopted a new 
statute ensuring that its leaders were more amenable to socialist ideology 
(Bartlett 1979 p. 59). In 1950 the veil was abolished (the Muslim leadership in 
fact agreed to this), and in 1952 the mektebs and the Sarajevo women's medresa 
were closed. In 1958 most vakuf property was nationalised. 
Although some of these measures were taken in the 1950s, Belgrade's 1948 
break with Moscow had seen the beginning of a tendency towards greater 
liberalism and tolerance of the Yugoslavian religious communities. In 1953 the 
Basic Law on the Legal Status of Religious Communities was passed, making the 
following provisions: 
Guarantees freedom of conscience and faith; makes religious worship a 
private concern; gives citizens the right to belong to any or no religious 
commun i ty. 
Gives citizens the right to found religious communities and gives 
equality to all religious communities. 
Allows the religious communities to publish and distribute religious 
printed matter in the context of the general laws on the press. 
Separates schools from the church and allows religious instruction In 
churches and other designated places; it also allows religious communities 
to found religious schools for the education of the clergy. 
Prohibits the abuse of religiouS functions etc. for political ends 
prohibits the hindering of religious gather ings... proh ib its anyone from 
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being either forced to or prevented from exercising his religious freedom 
in any way. 
Protects the rights of citizens from being infringed because of their 
religious convictions or activities; but no religious community or believer 
may ... be exempt from the general civil or military duties of the citizen. 
States that religious communities are legal persons; allows the clergy 
to found clerical associations. 
Gives the government (later altered to social-political communities) the 
possibility (but not the obligation) to give material assistance to the 
religious communities. 
Prohibits anyone from either forcing or preventing the giving of alms 
for religious purposes; allows alms to be collected in churches and other 
specif ied places. 
Allows baptism and circumcision at the demand of one parent or guardian; 
the consent of a child over ten years of age is also required. 
Allows a religious marriage ceremony only after civil marriage. 
(Quoted from Alexander 1979 p. 222) 
In drawing up this law the government sought the suggestions of religious 
leaders but rejected them on two particular matters: prisoners do not have the 
right to be visited by religious functionaries and men doing military service 
are not allowed to practise their faith. 
Each of Bosnia's three main religious groups, the Roman Catholic, the 
Serbian Orthodox and the Islamic, is headed by a state-authorised organisation. 
(For an account of the religious establishments of the two Christian churches 
see Alexander 1979. ) The state delegates authority in religious matters to the 
organistions which are answerable for their actions. It also provides health and 
other benefits for the clergy and partially finances the religious 
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establishments (see appendix C for details of the Islamska ZaJednica's income). 
Since the war the Islamska Zajednica has had three seperate constitutions, 
those of 1947,1957 and 1959. Today it is a complex bureaucratic organisation 
made up of various different national, regional and local bodies. 
At the local level, each town or group of small villages has its own 
Islamska Zajednica Committee (Odbor). These committees appoint hodjas, or imams 
as the Zajednica prefers to style them, to the mosques in their area. Depending 
on the size of the parish (dtemat), the hodja/imam's duties may include any or 
all of; leading prayers in the mosque, preaching the friday sermon, washing male 
corpses for burial, performing the d2enaza funeral service for the dead, giving 
Islamic instruction to the children of the parish. Some committees (including 
that of Sarajevo) also employ bulas, female religious functionaries whose duties 
may include; conducting tevh1d and meviud rituals, giving Islamic instruction to 
children, washing female corpses, preaching to women during Ramazan. Some 
committees, usually those more remote from urban areas and the Influence of 
Sarajevo, are reluctant to employ bulas officially, as will be seen below. 
At the regional level there are four Islamska Zajednica Synods. They are 
those of: 
I- Bosnia-Hercegovina, Croatia and Slovenia 
2. Serbia (including Kosovo and Vojvodina) 
3. Macedonia 
4. Montenegro 
Each of the Synods has its executive body, the regional Staretfnstvo. These 
regional authorities organise the Hajj, the collection of Islamic taxes and alms 
and other large scale religious matters within their territory. Members of the 
four Synods and Stareý. instvos are elected every four years. 
At the national level is the Supreme Synod, the members of which are 
elected from the regional Synods. Its executive body is the Supreme Stare! tinstvo 
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which has its seat in Sarajevo. This is headed by the Reis-ul-ulema and also 
includes his personal team of advisors and six members of the Supreme Synod, 
chosen by themselves. All of these members are Bosnian, a fact which underlines 
Popovic's point that "The Muslim community of Bosnia-Hercegovina is the largest 
and most Important Muslim community of Yugoslavia" (Popovic 1986 p. 360). 
Dfagram One: Organfsation of the Islamska Zajednica. 
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The Supreme Synod and Staretinstvo and the Reis-ul-ulema, control the 
Islamic Theological Faculty of Sarajevo and all of Yugoslavia's medresas. They 
are also responsible for liasing with the outside Muslim world. 
In 1950 employees of the Zajednica founded their own association, 11mija; 
"the most powerful organisation of its type in Yugoslavia" (Popovic op cit. 
P-348) 
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The organisation of the Islamska Zajednica is thus a complicated one which, 
like the country's secular political system, includes both regional and national 
authoritative bodies. Those Bosnian Muslims who are not themselves involved in 
the organisation do not distinguish between its different bodies and levels and 
speak simply of the "Islamska Zajednica" en masse. This usage will be followed 
here except in cases where greater clarity is neccessary. 
The scope of the realistically possible is limited for the Muslim minority 
but the extent of this limitation varies from case to case and a comparison may 
therefore be useful. In another part of the socialist world, the Soviet Union, 
the Prophet has been denounced as "a member of the feudal, trading classes of 
Mecca with the object of providing a religious pretext for the plundering 
expeditions organised by the Arab aristocracy" (quoted in Bennigsen & Lemercier- 
Quelquejay 1967). Only the highest Muslim dignitaries are permitted to make the 
Hajj and the working day cannot be interrupted for the purpose of prayer. 
Fasting is "a barbarous, degrading and reactionary custom which prevents the 
workers from taking an active part in the building of socialism" (op. cit p. 178). 
It is obvious that the Soviet Muslim establishment must have considerable 
obstacles to overcome if it is to keep Islam alive and well and to encourage 
Muslims to think of themselves as a community with its own Identity. Under 
these difficult circumstances Carr6re d'Encausse notes that it is., "facilitating 
the practice of Islam by adapting it to the needs of modern life" (Carr6re 
d'Encausse 1979 p. 231). Thus It has announced that, if necessary, Muslims may 
reduce their prayers to one a day or say them at any convenient time. Instead 
Of sacrificing a kurban sheep they may make a cash offering to the mosque. 
Instead of fasting the whole month of Ramazan they may fast a single token day 
or replace the fast with a special effort in their spiritual life or work. By 
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such means the Muslim leadership hopes to prevent the fracturing of the 
population into two separate groups - the believers and the non-believers. In 
order to maintain the unity of the Muslim population the leadership stresses 
the communal nature of various Islamic festivals. Thus fftar, the breakfast at 
the end of the Ramazan day, is not only for those who have fasted but for all 
Muslims, and the Kurban Bajram celebrations are not only for those who have 
sacrificed. 
The Bosnian secular authorities are far more liberal in their treatment of 
religion than the Soviet, and in the case of the Muslims an additional measure 
of protection is afforded as a result of Yugoslavia's membership of the non- 
alligned world - the state does not want to offend its many Arab allies by 
harsh treatment of Islam within Yugoslavia. Fasting is regarded with suspicion 
by the secular authorities but no official pronouncements have been made 
against the practice. Citizens are free to make the Hajj, just as they are free 
to spend their summer holidays in Greece or to be gastarbeiter in Germany. 
(Perhaps "free" is the wrong word in this context; to go on Hajj with the 1987 
Islamska Zajednica party cost the equivalent of E1,800, a phenomenal sum for 
most Bosnians. ) The Zajednica then has little need to permit Muslims not to 
fast, pray or sacrifice in the proper way, and does not do so. The problem it 
faces is less that of combatting the effects of religious negligence on the part 
of the Muslim population, than that of obtaining and retaining control of its 
religious practice, monopolising religious authority and combatting potential 
rivals for this authority. Such rivals must be subdued or incorporated into the 
Zajednica's own organisational structure. Thus the traditional tevhid death 
ritual performed by women (see chapter six) was in 1952 recognised by the 
Zajednica as a permissable customary rite and the specialist women who conduct 
the bulas, incorporated into the Zajednica. The dervish orders, as will be 
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seen in chapter f Ive, have also been subjected to the f irm control of the 
official Muslim establishment. 
At the same time the Zajednica seeks to exert an ever greater influence 
over religious practice in general. Three main areas may be identified: the 
Islamic educational system and its production of religious personnel; the 
"targeting" of women as a potentially increasingly active group of muslims; the 
control and sometimes centralisation of various rituals previously performed by 
individuals or families without the involvement of the Muslim establishment. The 
three are closely inter-related. Thus the targeting of women involves a stepping 
up of the level of education available to them and an increased control over 
their rituals (principally the tevhid), and educational institutions stress the 
need for certain rituals to be centrally controlled. 
Education and the Religious Cadre 
The majority of the Zajednica's income is poured into education and the 
Muslim Press concentrates much of its energy on directly educational material. 
By increasing the number of educational establishments, appointing the teachers, 
supervising the education given within them and selecting employees from them, 
the Islamska Zajednica promotes its own version of Islam and can hope to do so 
to the near exclusion of all other possible competing versions. 
The power of Islamic education as a tool in the struggle to propogate one 
specific version of Islam is connected to the general rise in educational 
standards during the socialist period. Pre-socialist Yugoslavia had no national 
system of compulsory education and in contemporary Sarajevo many elderly people 
and middle-aged women of rural background are illiterate. Such is not the case 
of the under-40's who were brought up in an age when education was officially 
COMpulsory. All Yugoslav children are supposed to attend eight years of primary 
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schooling during which they should become literate and study such subjects as 
history, geography and a foreign language. Rural children take buses into the 
nearest town to obtain an education "I ". All of the Sarajevan Muslim parents I 
met, literate or not, were keen that their own children should attend not only 
primary school but also four non-compulsory years of secondary schooling. 
Education is highly valued for its own sake (people were impressed and 
approving of my own level of education) and as a means to obtaining a good job 
in days of high unemployment. 
1953 1961 1971 1981 
without schooling 67.1% 51.3% 36.4% 25.1% 
or with 1 -3 years 
4 -7 years of 26.1% 37.4% 40.5% '24.3% 
primary schooling 
graduates of 2.4% 4.1% 10.5% 24.2% 
primary school 
secondary school 4.1% 6.3% 10.8% 21.7% 
higher education 0.3% 0.9% 1.8% 4.7% 
Table 3: Educational levels In Bosnia-Hercegovina. 
Source: Enciklopedija Ju8-oslavije 1982 
Religious instruction in Sarajevo begins in the mekteb. It was impossible 
to do a formal survey since Sarajevans are suspicious of such overt forms of 
information gathering, but it is my impression that a large number of Sarajevan 
In remote villages parents may be lax or even opposed to the idea of 
sending children, especially daughters, to school. Some rural children 
attend school officially but in fact rarely present themselves in the 
classroom and after eight years leave school as functional illiterates. 
However, such cases are becoming increasingly rare and are unheard of in 
Sarajevo except among the Gypsy population. 
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Muslim parents living in the old districts send their children to mekteb. Mekteb 
schools are held in neighbourhood mosques and taught by efendije (usually the 
Imam of the mosque) or by bulas, female religious functionaries. 
The educational techniques used in the mekteb in many ways mirror those 
of the state educational system. Even the vocabulary used to describe the 
education is similar - in both secular and Islamic education there are razredf 
(grades) and at regular intervals children are required to odg-ovoriti, to answer 
formal questions orally. Secular schooling begins at the age of seven or eight. 
School is taught in two shifts and each child spends alternate terms attending 
the morning or the afternoon session. There is no use of written examinations 
but each child is questioned orally at regular intervals. The answers a child 
gives are marked on a scale of one to five and the combined mark achieved over 
the course of the year determines whether the child will rise into the next 
grade " 2: ý'. 
Children usually begin their mekteb education at the same time as starting 
their secular schooling and attend a mekteb shift, morning or afternoon, which 
does not collide with the latter. The mekteb has a system of grades in the 
first of which one studies 11m1hal, the pillars of the faith, the words and 
actions of daily prayer and Islamic ethics. The teacher questions the children 
on this and, if satisfied at their achievement, passes them up into the next 
grade. This is the grade in which one learns how to read and write the Arabic 
(2) The similarity of religious and secular educational techniques in 
Yugoslavia is not unique to the Muslim community. Thus a Catholic priest 
from Dalmatia was prosecuted and fined for using "school methods"; keeping 
attendance registers and giving marks to the children. He appealed 
successfully on the grounds that this was not illegal under the terms of 
the 1953 Basic Law on the Legal Status of Religious Communities. See 
Alexander 1979 p. 224. 
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letters, although not the Arabic language itself. Letter by letter the alphabet 
is learned and, as at school, a mark of one to five given for each child's 
ability to write the letter in its various forms. Children are also questioned 
orally and must satisfy the teacher before moving up into the third grade. Here 
the pupil begins to "utiti Kuran", to read the Arabic Quran aloud (see chapter 
three). A child who has read the entire Quran aloud is said to have completed 
one hatma, the hatma being the complete recitation of the holy book. A child may 
continue to complete further hatme but it is the completion of the first which 
is is a time of family celebration. 
It has been said that children are not taught the Arabic language and 
indeed very few Bosnian Muslims know it either in its classical or modern form. 
Learning the Arabic alphabet and prayers does not entail that children 
understand what they are reading or praying, however, the contemporary Islamska 
Zajednica does stress the importance of comprehension to a greater degree than 
did its predecessors. 
Writing of the Ottoman period 6urid states that: "Of all places in Bosnia- 
Hercegovina Sarajevo had the most notable number of mektebs" turiit 1983). In 
1856 there were 35 which catered for 1,223 male pupils and 304 female. Six of 
the 35 were for girls only, four of them were mixed but pupils of different sex 
were seated seperately. The course offered was the same in structure as it is 
today, beginning with the study of the basic principles and beliefs of the faith 
and the memoristion of Arabic prayers, continuing with the acquisition of the 
Arabic alphabet and finally moving on to the completion of hatme. ýurid notes 
that the standard of education in Sarajevan mektebs tended to be higher than in 
those of other towns: 
"However, children learnt by heart-things that they didn't understand. They 
read the Arabic text of the Quran without comprehension and grew in the 
belief 'that scholarly learning was something incomprehensible, something 
that only a hodja could have, and that for the rest it was enough for 
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people to believe that that was the way things had to be. "' (op cit. p. 39) 
Educational primers were all written either in Arabic or in Turkish until 
1868 when the first primer in the "Bosnian language" appeared. This was written 
in the Arabic script and contained many Arabic and Turkish phrases but was 
nevertheless more comprehensible than it predecessors. 
Today religious primers are written in Serbo-Croatian using the Latin 
alphabet and are thus accessible to all schoolchildren. These textbooks are one 
arena in which the Zajednica can present its own version of Islam (see, for 
example, the quote from 11mihal p. 144 below). 
The words of prayers are given first in the original Arabic, then in Latin 
transliteration so that children may learn to pronounce them, and finally in 
Serbo-Croatian translation. The need to understand holy writ is thus given a 
greater importance in contemporary Sarajevo, however, mekteb children are still 
not tested on their comprehension of prayers but only on their ability to 
memorise and repeat them. Completing a first hatma is still seen as the most 
important stage in a child's mekteb career and does not require that the child 
understands what he or she is reading. In practice I found that few young 
people were any more knowledgeable than their parents about the meanings of 
certain prayers and Quranic passages. Everybody has some idea of the meaning of 
the fatibs, the first chapter of the Quran and the most frequently recited 
prayer. All know the meanings of certain of t-repeated phrases such as "La Mahe 
illa Is" (There is no God but God), "Bismillahir Rahmanir Rahim" (In the name of 
God, the merciful, the compassionate) and "Allahu Ekber" (God is the most great). 
Few, however, know more than th is. 
The majority of Muslims abandon their religious education after the mekteb 
but further education, at the secondary school level and undertaken as an 
alternative to secular secondary education, is offered at the Sarajevo male and 
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female medresas. A large number of medresa students are from rural backgrounds; 
Bartlett notes that the first year's intake at the girl's medresa in 1978 
included only ten young women of urban background, the remaining 22 being from 
the countryside Bartlett 1979). The preponderance of rural students was 
something that I noted myself and was told of in Sarajevo, although again it 
was impossible to do a formal survey. For rural youngsters medresa training in 
Sarajevo has obvious advantages over secular secondary education since the 
medresa offers free meals and accomodation and most of its students receive an 
Islamska Zajednica stipend. This sort of material aid is not available to rural 
students of secular secondary schools who must either travel into town every 
day or find acomodation with non-nuclear family urban kin, if they have any. 
Some rural families with several children may buy a house in town as a base for 
their children's secular education and as an eventual home for one or more of 
them when they find employment. This is, ofcourse, expensive. 
Having graduated from the medresa a student may move on to higher 
education in the Islamic Theological Faculty. In 1983 this had 60 full time 
students, nine of them female, and 37 part time students, three of them female. 
Two thirds of the full time students receive an Islamska Zajednica stipend and 
all receive free meals in the medresa canteen. 
However, most medresa graduates seek immediate employment with the 
Islamska Zajednica. Such employment may be far more lucrative than that to be 
expected after a secular secondary education. Men may be employed as imams and 
women as bulas. The imam is attached to a particular mosque and its parish 
(d2emat). His duties include the leading of prayers within the mosque, the 
preaching of a friday sermon, the burial of members of the parish, the marriage 
of that small number of parishioners who desire a religious ceremony, and, very 
often, the mekteb instruction of children of the parish and the washing of male 
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corpses for burial. The imam receives a salary from the Zajednica and a pension, 
of which 50% is contributed by the state, on retirement. The size of this 
pension depends on his level of religious education. Imams may also receive free 
accomodation in their parish and both imams and bulas receive informal payments 
from individuals for ritual services such as the performance of funeral services 
and weddings (imams), of meviud and tevhfd rituals (bulas). 
The bula is a religiously educated woman whose duties may include the 
conducting of tevhfd and mevIud rituals, the washing of female corpses for 
burial and, possibly, the mekteb instruction of children. Traditionally she was 
very often the wife of a hodja who found employment through family and 
neighbourhood connections. Today she has been integrated into the Islamska 
Zajednicals bureaucratic structure 
In spite of the strict control exercised over the education of religious 
personnel, it cannot be said that the religious cadre is uniformly in agreement 
with the aims and outlook of the Islamska Zajednica. In a 1986 speech to the 
Bosnian Synod the Reis-ul-ulema emphasised the need for highly educated and 
"capable" imams but added: "I have to admit here that we havn't fully 
succeeded". This lack of success is clearly a matter of concern to the Zajednica 
which, for example, in its annual report of 1984 threatened the dismissal of 
certain Macedonian imams accused of laziness and not having the Interests of 
the Zajednica at heart. 
One reason for it is simply that many imams and bulas are older people 
who have not been trained in the new Zajednica institutions. In the case of 
bulas it Is precisely these older women who perform the most highly respected 
and potentially influential roles. Older bulas perform meviud and tevhfd rituals 
whereas younger ones tend only to be mekteb teachers. 
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Of those young Imams and bulas who have been trained in the new Zajednica 
insitutions, some tend towards a brand of Islam more mystical and less socialist 
than that espoused by the Muslim establishment. This tendency will be discussed 
in chapter f Ive. 
A third obstacle in the ZaJednica's path is that Islam is not a faith which 
strongly stresses the heirarchy of the Church. There is no ordination of imams, 
as there is of priests, and indeed any man with enough knowledge of the Arabic 
can lead the congregation in prayer. In Sarajevo bulas and the imams are 
Islamska Zajednica employees but there are a number of other religious 
personalities who command the respect of believers, and who may not have been 
educated in Zajednica institutions. The hafizi and hajjis who have been 
discussed in chapter three are examples of this unofficial religious cadre. So 
too are the muezzins who announce ezan from the minaret at the time of prayer. 
Muezzins are not, in Sarajevo at least, employees of the Zajednica assigned to 
particular mosques. They are unofficially employed in mosques through their 
personal connections and are respected figures as a result of their pious 
devotion and the vocal skills which they use in the service of Islam. The 
existence of this unofficial religious cadre offsets the impact of the Zajednica 
trained religious personnel. 
Tarizetting Women 
Unlike her Albanian and Macedonian counterparts, the Bosnian Muslim woman 
has never been prohibited from mosque attendance except at the friday d2ums 
service, the time at which the weekly sermon is preached, and at the two Bajram 
prayer services. Many Sarajevan mosques have special galleries for the use of 
women. Traditionally, women have studied hifz and bulas have been responsible 
for the performance of the important tevhid death ritual and for that of mevIud. 
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Over the past ten years the Zajednica has made attempts to involve women in 
the official religious structure and in new forms of religious activity. In 1978 
the female medresa was re-opened and the Reis-ul-ulema declared: 
"The opening of the female section of the Gazi Husrevbeg medress in 
Sarajevo, and later, God willing, of the medresas in Prittina and Skopje, is 
evidence that the process of involving women in all the activities of 
religious life is underway. Before us stands the very important task of 
speeding up that process. This is an urgent duty because the role of the 
bula in the religious life of Muslims is very great. " (Qouted in Preporod 
15.4.86) 
The Zajednica renovated the mosque nearest to the medresa in order that 
students, who live a relatively cloistered life, could easily attend friday 
d2uma. Attendance of this weekly service is not, according to the Sharl's, an 
obligation for women as it is for men, and women have only started attending in 
Sarajevo over the last ten years. Their attendance is encouraged by the 
Zajednica authorities and they tend to go to the town's important central 
mosques rather than to its local neighbourhood ones which may be presided over 
by less progressively minded imams. Of the women who attend many (but not all) 
are young and there is a marked difference of opinion between the young and the 
old (both female and male) as to the propriety of female dluma participation. 
When I mentioned that I had been to d2uma eyebrows were raised amongst the 
older generations who viewed this with some suspicion, nodding their heads and 
remarking that "women don't go to d2umal'. The subject was to come up several 
times. On one occasion it caused a dispute between a young woman and her 
mother. On hearing of my attendance at the friday service the mother shook her 
head sadly and made the usual negative remarks. There was a pause before her 
daughter, who also went to dffuma broke out: "What do you know? In the time of 
the Prophet women went to d2uma, they're allowed to go". The older woman was 
not convinced. 
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The Bosnian Synod and Staretinstvo want educated women to be employed as 
bulas by Islamska Zajednica committees throughout Bosnia. Before graduation, 
third and fourth year students may be employed "in the field" during Ramazan to 
preach to women in mosques. Some local Zajednica committees, however, are 
unwilling to accept this innovation. A small number of graduates go on to study 
at the Theological Faculty and a few others to further education in the Islamic 
institutions of the ouside Muslim world. Most hope to gain jobs as bulas within 
Bosnia. Again, however, some local committees, particularly those of rural areas, 
are reluctant to employ them. They continue to see the bula's role as an 
unofficial one. 
Such reluctance is not characterisitic of Sarajevo although, as has been 
said, some older Muslims are unhappy about women's involvement in an area of 
religious life previously restricted to men, that of d2uma. The young welcome 
these changes, stressing both that they are necessary in the modern world, and 
at the same time, that they are not innovations without basis in Islamic 
teaching. 
Women are the most obvious group to have been targetted by the Zajednica, 
but they are not the only one. It has been said that a large number of medresa 
students are of rural background and this represents another innovative act on 
the part of the Zajednica and one designed to enlarge its sphere of influence. 
Controlling Religious Ritual 
Traditionally the Hajj, the giving of zekat and sadekatul-fitr, the Ramazan 
fast and the sacrifice of Kurban Bajram were all individiual, family or 
neighbourhood matters accomplished without the intervention of any Muslim 
establishment. This is a state of affairs which the Zajednica seeks to alter. 
The Hajj is now organised by the Zajednica which is sharply critical of those 
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Muslims who attempt to make the the pilgrimage privately. (The Zajednica's 
annual report for 1984 notes that 120 Macedonian Muslims went on pilgrimage to 
Mecca but regrets that many of these did not travel with the official Zajednica 
party and thus forfeited the benefits of good organisation and sanitary 
facilities. The implication is that the pilgrimage made by these Muslims was a 
dirty, disorganised an unGodly affair. ) Zekat and sadekatul-fitr are centrally 
collected by the Islamska Zajednica in the mosques during Ramazan (the same 
report deplores the fact that the collection of zekat and sadekatul-fitr in 
Montenegro yielded only 20% of the possible total income, and hopes that the 
Montenegrins will do better next year). The Zajednica publishes the appropriate 
sums to be given in the Muslim Press. Collectors receive some payment for this 
work and donators are issued with guaranteed non-forgeable receipts. All of the 
money thus collected in Bosnia-Hercegovina is poured into the medresas and the 
Theological Faculty. The introduction of this system was accompanied by a spate 
of articles in the Muslim Press stressing two main points: that centralised tax 
and alms giving dates back to the days of the Prophet and the first two Caliphs 
whereas the non-centralised system is a decadent, later innovation; and that 
Islamic educational institutions are permissable recipients of tax and alms. 
Husein Dozo, president of the Sarajevo Zajednica committee in the mid 1970s 
thus wrote in Glasnik: 
"It is quite indisputable, as far as Islamic ordinances are concerned, that 
the collection of zekat, the organisation and regulation of the manner of 
this collection and the organisation of the whole activity fall exclusively 
within the authority of the Islamic organs ... The Quran itself tells us 
this. " (Glasnik 1975) 
A second Glasnlk contributor notes that the question of centralised 
collection: 
"Is in fact nothing to do with any innovation (blda [Arabic]) ... but 
exclusively to do with the amending of a mistaken practice which began in 
an era of decadence... " (ibid. ) 
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Dozo notes that, according to the Quran, zekat may be given for eight 
purposes, among them the relief of the poor, the freeing of slaves, the paying 
of debts and others. Having discounted seven of the eight for various reasons 
(the state now helps the poor, there are no slaves ... ) he suggests that all 
money be given to the category "fl sebllillaY', literally meaning "on God's path" 
but translatable as "the general good". The author remarks that road building 
and railways might also be for the general good but that the education of the 
religious cadre Is more important and thus that it is appropriate that all zekat 
be given to the medresas and the Theological Faculty. Sadekatul-fitr raises a 
more difficult question and in fact some members of 11mija, the Zajednica 
employees association, did object to the new system of its collection and 
distribution on the grounds that it should only be given to the poor and always 
directly by individuals. Those at the higher levels of the Zajednica disputed 
this, again suggesting the influence of a decadent tradition and claiming that 
there are few paupers today. The outcome is that zekat and sadekatul-fitr are 
included together on a single non-forgeable coupon obtainable in the mosques on 
the last days of Ramazan. 
Some Muslims continue to give either tax or alms or both, directly to 
members of the deserving (pious and practising) poor but the majority have 
fallen in with the new Zajednica centralised system, possibly because of the 
difficulty of finding deserving poor willing to accept donations. (One elderly 
woman in my neighbourhood lived alone, was worse off than her neighbours and 
extremely devout. She, however, refused to accept zekat) 
The case of Kurban Bajram is different. The Islamska Zajednica has made 
attempts to centralise this by encouraging Muslims to bring their sheep for 
sacrifice, for storage in the medresa freezers and for eventual consumption by 
the medresa students. Some Muslims do respond, particularly, I was told, those 
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who live in the apartment blocks of New Sarajevo and have no garden in which to 
kill and butcher the sheep. Many, however, continue to have the animal 
slaughtered privately by a local butcher and to distribute its meat around the 
neighbourhood. 
The traditional mevIud has been mentioned in chapter three. Under the 
influence of the medresas a new phenomenon, the "mevludski progrant' (mevIud 
programme) has arisen. These are held in mosques and performed by groups of 
medresa students and other interested young people sitting in a circle near the 
front of the mosque. The performers encourage the participation of their 
audience at certain points but are not always successful since many older 
people do not know the words appropriate to this modern style mevlud. Instead 
of combining bits of different known mevlud poems, whether Serbo-Croatian or 
Turkish, the mevludski progr-am is a mixture of many diffferent elements. Its 
basis is the interspersal of Arabic chants and Serbo-Croatian prose readings 
about the life of the Prophet and/or, depending on the time of year, Islamic 
festivals, principles and ethics. The latter may be accompanied by the quiet 
chanting of a phrase such as "La illahe illa I&I. Serbo-Croatian hymns of recent 
date are also sung - "Daj mi snaga" (Give me strength), 'Tutuji vjerniY' (Travel 
on, believer) - but these are unlikely to be known to those who have not had a 
recent mekteb or medresa education so that the older generations find it 
impossible to join in. 
These mevIud programmes are self-consciously modern. Their aspect is less 
that of a ritual than is that of the traditional meviud. Thus while one is said 
to obtain sevap by attending the traditional mevIud, I never heard such a thing 
said of the mevludski prog-ram. Although the congregation attending the latter 
are encouraged to join in at certain points the mevIudskI program is essentially 
an event involving performers and an audience whereas the traditional mevIud is 
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a communal ritual involving conductors and conducted. Thus those who recite the 
mevIud poem. or poemas at a ti-aditional mevIud ritual may be congratulated on 
their achievement but the event is also Judged as a whole - "lots of people 
came", "it was well organised", "the mevlud was f1d'. The performers of a 
meviudski program, on the other hand, are always congratulated by their 
audience and their achievement seen as the most important part of the event. 
The creativity involved in the meviud programme is of a less spontaneous 
type than is that of the traditional mevIud. The latter is never rehearsed 
beforehand, its details being worked out during the actual recitation either by 
intuition or by whispered conversations between the conductors (bulas). The 
creativity lies in Judiciously combining sections of different mevIud poems to 
compose a whole ritual recitation. Performers of a mevlud programme are not 
constrained to the use only of pre-existing poems but may use any prose 
passages, whether from printed texts or of their own composition. The programme 
itself will have been worked out in detail and rehearsed in advance, and will be 
performed in exactly the same way on several occasions. It is thus didactic and 
controlled in a way that the traditional mevIud is not. 
The Zalednica and Bosnian Muslim Identity 
The Islamska Zajednica then attempts to spread its influence over new 
aspects of the religious life. In some respects (for example the centralisation 
of zekat and sadekatul-fftr) it is successful, in others (for example, the 
centralisation of kurban), it is less so. Some innovations succeed more with 
certain sections of the Muslim population than with others. Thus the Zajednica's 
policy on women is more welcomed by the young and urban than by the elderly 
and the rural. Yet acceptance of particular innovations need not imply 
acceptance of the Zajednica's vision of Islam or of Bosnian Muslim identity. In 
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the pages to follow I will outline what this vision consists of and its 
reception by Muslims. 
The ZaJednica's stance on the place of Islam and the Bosnian Muslims 
within Yugoslav society appears to vary over time according to the political 
climate of the moment. It contains two elements each of which is more or less 
strongly promoted at different times. The first, which is currently in high 
profile, is the strong assertion that Islam and Yugoslav socialism are wholly 
compatible and that Muslims must be loyal and happy members of the federation. 
The second element, apparent in the 1970s and early 80s but currently in 
abeyance, is an attempt to promote the political interests and elevate the 
status of the Bosnian Muslim nationality vis-a-vis the other nationalities of 
Yugoslavia. 
During the 1970s there flourished side by side in Bosnia what Popovic 
terms "laic Islamic radicalism" and "religious Islamic radicalism", two forms of 
Muslim nationalism (mild forms in comparison with that of the Albanians or 
Serbs in 1988). As the author points out, the two could not be wholly 
distinguished since each relied on and supported the other (Popovic 1986 pp. 
360-364). In the early 1970s there were calls for the establishment of Muslim 
cultural institutions comparable to the Croatian Matica Hr-vatska and the Serbian 
Matica Srpska (organisations intended to promote Croatian and Serbian arts and 
literature). Some Zajednica leaders supported these and Preporod ("Renewal", the 
fortnightly newspaper published by the Bosnian Stareý', instvo) complained that: 
"Neither as Muslims in the ethnic sense nor as Muslims in the religious 
sense do we have any specific institutions through which we might develop 
our Islamic and Muslim activity, other than the existing organs of the 
[Islamska Zajednical" (Preporod 15.6.70 quoted in Ramet op cit. p. 154) 
This complaint is interesting in that it suggests the willingness of the 
Zajednica at this time to countenance the existence of Islamic/Muslim 
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organisations other than itself, and this willingness seems to contradict its 
fierce monopolising tendencies. 1n part this may be explained by the fact that 
in the early 70s, after the state's recognition of the Muslims as a narod, some 
further elevation of the Muslim political unit seemed a possibility. In a context 
of increased political strength, the existence of other organisations may not 
have appeared such a threat to the Zajednica's own authority. If there was to be 
more authority to go round in general, the Zajednica had less to fear. Beyond 
this it must be pointed out that the cultural organisations which the Zajednica 
had in mind would not have been true rivals. The Croatian and Serbian Matica's 
promote literature and the arts, they do not attempt to take over or provide 
alternatives to Catholic and Orthodox religious worship and practice. A Muslim 
Matice would not have attempted to collect zekat, to educate a religious cadre 
or to offer alternative religious services and would therefore not have 
infringed on the Zajednica's sphere of influence. In any event, calls for a 
Muslim cultural organisation were thwarted by the Communist Party which saw 
them as a dangerous step towards a divisive brand of nationalism. 
At the same time as supporting the cultural development of Muslims on a 
par with Serbs and Croats, some Zajednica leaders attempted to claim a political 
role for the Muslim religious establishment. As Ramet says: 
"Certain of the Bosnian ulema have tried to draw a line between 'positive 
political activity' and 'negative political activity' on the part of 
religious organizations and thus to claim for (the Islamska Zajednical a 
legitimate role in the political constellation" (Ramet op cit. p. 155) 
This atmosphere was a cause of concern to the state and in 1983 matters 
came to a head when the secular authorities prosecuted eleven Bosnian Muslims 
(two of them imam/hodjas and all actively religious) for "counter-revolutionary 
activities of Muslim nationalist inspiration". All were sentenced to prison terms 
ranging from five to fifteen years. This proved a shock both to the Muslim 
- 143 - 
population at large and to the Islamska Zajednica which has since this time 
concentrated more on the promotion of a rapprochement of Islam and Yugoslav 
socialism than on the overt support of Muslim claims to higher status or 
political power. 
"We greatly value [our] position ... in our self-managing socialist 
society ... and want to f ight for the socialist revolution of our narodi and 
narodhosti - brotherhood and unity of all nationalities who live in our 
country without regard to their national and religious affiliation. " 
This statement was made, not by a fervent workers or youth organisation, 
but by the Islamska Zajednica in its annual report of 1984 - "four years since 
the death of that great son of our people, Marshall Josip Broz Tito". Such 
assertions of loyalty and the ability of Islam and socialism to co-exist are 
commonplace today; similar speeches are often the preface to large religious 
gatherings organised by the Zajednica. Furthermore, Islamic educational primers 
for children all contain a section on duties towards one's homeland. Thus: 
"It is an Islamic and also a civic duty of all Muslims to love their people 
(narod) and their homeland. A Muslim must be ready to sacrifice everything, 
if necessary even his life, for the good and happiness of his 
homeland ... defending it from enemies, respecting its laws ... It is especially 
important that all citizens participate in safeguarding and spreading 
brotherhood and unity, regardless of religious and national affiliation... " 
(Ilmfhal p. 146) 
If the Zajecinica loudly professes its loyalty to Yugoslavia it is at the 
same time adept at using the law of the land to defend itself from criticism 
and to counter-accuse the critics of illegality. One illustration of this 
loyaler- than- thou technique dates from the summer of 1986. It is an interesting 
case because it also illustrates the Zajednica's attempt to attract religious 
allegiance through education and to court female religious activitY. Preporod 
reprinted an article from the secular press concerning the Albanian dominated 
town of Kumanovo in Eastern Macedonia. Traditionally, Albanian women do not 
attend mosque but in May, at the beginning of Ramazan, 300 of them arrived at 
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the mosque to participate in the prayer service. When the town council heard of 
this it decided to ban women from mosque attendance. The council's president 
sa id: 
"What interested me and the whole socio-political structure in Kumanovo 
was the question of what's behind all this. It is a precedent. Never until 
now have Albanian women in KUmanovo entered the mosque. " (Vjesnik 8.7.86) 
What the council thought was behind it all was an insidious growth of 
Islamic Influence in the region. There had already been fears about the growing 
number of mosques in the area; the secretary of the Macedonian presidential 
council told the newspaper: "I can tell You there were fewer [of them] even 
during the days of the Ottoman Empire". It was believed that these mosques were 
being used principally for the religious education of schoolboys rather than for 
the performance of religious ritual. Apparently one boy had contradicted his 
geography teach4, r, assuring him that rain came from God, not simply from the 
clouds. Women going to mosque was the last straw, particularly since the 
president of the town's Islamska Zajednica committee admitted that this action 
had been inspired by the teachings of the Skopje medresa. As the secretary of 
the Macedonian presidential council put it: 
"I'm saying that some forms of today's Islam are ideologies of the most 
aggressive and militant type and so the religious instruction of boys, and 
now even of women, presents a great danger. " 
Alongside this article Preporod printed its own indignant and scornful 
comment pointing out that every citizen has the legal right to learn about and 
practise his or her faith and that using the mosque as a place of religious 
instruction is not illegal. 
"We assume that if the representatives of the Socialist League of 
Macedonia had even once read the statute passed by their own republic 
concerning the legal position of the religious communities, they would not 
let their absurd attitudes and declarations collide with its regulations... " 
The claim that the religious instruction of boys and women was "a great 
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danger" was denounced by Preporod as "unacceptable and unfounded" and it was 
noted that: 
"Such an opinion is in our view not only prejudiced but also tendentious 
and contrary to the law, and it is incomprehensible that a much 
read ... [newspaper] ... gives it such widespread publicity and thus indirectly 
contributes to the dispersal and popularising of twisted attitudes which 
our socialist society neither has nor can have. " (Preporocrs italics) 
The Zajednica does then attempt to expand its influence over the Muslim 
population but in doing so sticks firmly to the letter of the law which it then 
uses to silence Its critics. 
Beyond the statements that a Muslim can and should live loyally and 
happily in Yugoslavia there is the suggestion that Islam and socialism share the 
same basic goals. In Islam all men are equals and brothers just as in Yugoslavia 
all nationalities are such. Islam is a religion of justice and equality and isn't 
zekat a form of wealth redistribution such as socialism now promotes? 
Superficially it seems that such sentiments must be only too welcome to the 
secular authorities, and indeed it is true that they are more welcome than calls 
for Muslim cultural institutions and a political role for the religious 
establishment. Yet they are of potential concern to the state in as much as 
they subtly promote the idea that socialism is somehow a spin-off or by-product 
of Islam. This proposition is not unique to the Zajednica but characteristic also 
of the Soviet Muslim establishment. Thus Soviet Muslim dignitaries are wont to 
make such statements as that: 
"Soviet leaders who believe neither in God nor his Prophet... nevertheless 
apply laws that were dictated by God and expounded by his Prophet... (We) 
admire the genius of the Prophet who preached the social principles of 
socialism. (We are) pleased that a great number of socialist principles 
implement the orders of Muhammed. " (Carr6re d'Encausse 1979 p-239) 
In this picture socialism appears as the poor cousin of Islam, and the 
same is true of the picture painted by the Zajednica. Whilst the mode of life 
prescribed by the two ideologies is said to be largely the same, Islam is 
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presented as scoring a point over socialism for having had the ideas first and 
for posessing a spiritualism which socialism lacks. For this reason the 
conversion to Islam of the French Marxist, Roger Garaudy, was especially welcome 
to the Muslim press which is always keen on the conversions of Western 
personalities such as Jacques Cousteau, Cat Stevens, Anthony Quinn and Boney M. 
Garaudy, who arrived at Islam via both Christianity and Judaism, is a man after 
the Zajednica's own heart. He continues to believe in Marxist principles but is 
at the same time a Muslim. Freporod (15-9.86) reprinted an article on the 
intellectual convert from the secular press (Danas 26.8.86). As one might expect, 
this article was not entirely favourable to its subject but the editors of 
Preporod felt no need to add their own comment; it was clear to them and to 
their readers what message should be drawn from Garaudy's conversion. 
The Zajednica then hints at the spiritual and chronological superiority of 
Islam over socialism whilst at the same time professing the fundamental 
similarity of the two ideologies. Yet it does not, at present, seek to promote 
the political interests of Muslims vis-a-vis those of Serbs, Croats and other 
nationalities. Rather it supports Yugoslav Socialist Patriotism, the love of all 
Muslims for Yugoslavia and its self-managing socialist system. What is the 
reception of this view on the part of the Muslim public? We have seen that 
Muslims accept some of the innovative policies of the Islamska Zajednica, the 
centralisation of zekat and ssdekatuI-f'ftr, for example. Yet this acceptance does 
not, in the Bosnian context, imply wholesale acceptance of the views propounded 
by the policy making body. This fact Is an indirect result of the extreme 
bureaucrat isat ion of the Zajednica and its consequent perceived functional 
similarity to the secular authorities. 
All Bosnians have learnt to understand and cope with the various highly 
complicated bureaucratic procedures surrounding the systems of education, 
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employment, taxation and health benefits in socialist Yugoslavia. Even the 
elderly seem to have a good grasp of these matters, People know what they must 
put Into the system, for example military service for men, and they know what 
can be got out of it, for example medical care. The state and its various 
agencies are taken as outside forces to be reckoned with in a number of ways. 
The Islamska. Zajednica is a bureaucratic establishment the internal 
organisation, election procedures and employment policies of which appear to the 
general public every bit as complicated as those of the state. Indeed, it is 
treated by Muslims very much as they treat secular authorities. Thus when one 
asks what the Islamska Zajednica is or what it does, no-one suggests that it 
provides guidance in matters of faith, that it protects or represents Islam in 
Bosnia or that its members are the wisest and best of Muslims. Instead, answers 
are likely to be along the lines of: "It organises the payment of zekat and 
sadeka tul- fi ti", "When someone dies you can arrange a funeral and tevhid through 
the Zajednica", "You can buy special plastic bags for wrapping kifla at the 
Zajednica shop" (Kifla is a type of bread handed out at the tevh1d). Like the 
secular authorities the Islamska Zajednica is seen as a body to be contributed 
to, benefited from and otherwise dealt with; it is not taken as the spiritual or 
social centre of religious life, just as the secular authorities are not taken as 
embodying the political will of the people. Acceptance of the duties imposed 
from above, whether those of military service or of the payment of alms, does 
not therefore entail acceptance of the philosophy of the authoritative body. 
Yet it is the case that some Muslims make statements similar to those of 
the Zajednica which suggest a rapprochment between Islam and socialism. Thus I 
have been told by individuals that the socialist system of redistribution of 
wealth is based on the same principles as Islamic alms-giving. In a recent 
article, Richard Tapper and Nancy Tapper discuss the rapprochement, or indeed 
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the merging, of secular and religious ideologies in the Turkish town of Egridir 
(Tapper R& Tapper N 1987) and this example provides an interesting comparison 
to the Bosnian case. 
Egridir is a small, prosperous and homogeneous town. Almost all of its 
inhabitants are Turks who consider themselves to be middle class and who are 
linked through a "dense and continuous network of kinship and marriage". The 
townspeople are staunch republican nationalists. They are also staunch Muslims. 
In this context the authors suggest that: 
"ideas about Turkey as a nation state and ideas about Islam are mutually 
reinforcing ..... republican and Islamic values and forms are Juxtaposed in 
complex ways such that they can best be understood as parts of a single 
ideological structure. -This ideology... is fundamentalist in character" 
It Is not possible here to outline fully the argument for considering this 
ideology to be fundamentalist. One important point must, however, be noted. The 
ideology is said to be fundamentalist partly because of its oppositional 
character. Oppositional ideologies tend to emphasise the existence of, and threat 
posed by, those who do not share the ideology. In Egridir the small local 
population of supposedly transient Kurdish labourers is taken as precisely such 
a threat. Supporters both of the mystical religious sects and of the political 
for right and left Oe. those who dissent from the unitary centralising value 
system) are felt by townspeople to be extremists and fanatics. "Dissidents of 
left and right who created the terror of the late 1970s were seen as agents of 
outside [non-Turkish) powers. " 
Republican nationalism and Islam are drawn together through a number of 
"accomodat ions". One example cited is the suggestion frequently made by 
townspeople that certain republican institutions, for example the payment of 
taxes towards hospitals and schools, function in exactly the same way as did 
Islamic ones, for example, Islamic alms and tithes given to the poor and for 
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education. 
Another is the rationalisation of religious practices through an appeal to 
modern secular values. Thus the Ramazan fast is said to be an extremely healthy 
purge f or the bodY - 
Both types of statement are also made in Bosnia. I have mentioned the 
parallels drawn between socialist redistribution and zekat. Both articles in the 
Muslim Press and individuals use modern, secular arguments to rationalise 
Islamic practice; it is said that the fast has been scientifically proved to be 
healthy, pork has been scientifically proved to be unhealthy, homosexuality has 
been proved to be wrong by the arrival of AIDS. 
Yet in Bosnia the import of such statements is different from that which 
they have in Egridir. In the Turkish town the authors noted a tendency for 
people to apologise for religious allegiance by emphasising that it is possible 
to be both a good Turk and a good Muslim. In Bosnia the emphasis is the other 
way round. Thus Communist Party members may Justify their membership by 
suggesting similarities between socialist and Islamic ideology. 
Statements of the first type noted by the authors (ie. parallels drawn 
between Islamic and modern secular institutions) are made in Bosnia but are not 
popular opinion as they seem to be in Egridir. Furthermore, this type of 
statement always includes an implication that whilst Socialism has the right 
Ideas, it got them several hundred years later than Islam. 
Statements which rationalise Islam by means of modern science are very 
much more common, if not universal. Yet here we must ask the question of what 
is being accomodated with what. In Egridir all that is modern, science and 
medicine included, tends to be associated with the Republican period of history: 
"In effect, the notion of republicanism has expanded, and Is often treated 
as more or less synonymous with anything and everything that is thought 
new and different. " 
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In this context, suggestions that the fast is scientifically proved to be 
healthy may be said to be accomodations not only of Islam with modernity but 
also of Islam with republicanism. 
Such is not the case in Bosnia. Whilst everyone feels that socialist 
Yugoslavia is "modern" in comparison with pre-war Yugoslavia, the socialist 
period is hardly taken as synonymous with modernity, for which there are other 
yardsticks. Western Europe is, for example, seen to be "modern" in comparison 
with Yugoslavia. Modernity is highly valued and I was surprised at the number 
of contexts in which the term was used. People like to wear "modern" clothes, a 
bula praised a particular mevlud poem as being the most "modern", young Muslims 
suggest approvingly that it is now "modern" to be devout. Suggestions that the 
eternal truths of Islam have now been proved by modern science therefore 
"accomodate" Islam with the general value of "modernity", rather than with 
contemporary, modern Yugoslav socialism. 
If it is the case that Bosnian Muslims cannot strongly espouse a 
rapprochement of Islam and Yugoslav socialism whilst the Muslims of Egridir can 
and do espouse a rapprochement of Islam and Turkish republican nationalism, why 
is this so? The atheistic element of socialism provides a partial answer; it is 
unsurprising that a religious and an atheistic ideology will not mix well. Yet 
this cannot be the whole solution for it is clear both that Islam and socialism 
can be combined, as in Libya and in the Muslim National Communist Movement of 
the USSR in the 1920s (see Bennigsen & Wimbush 1979), and that socialist states 
do not have a monopoly on repressive antagonism towards religion. In secular 
but non-socialist Turkey the veil was abolished, private religious gatherings 
forbidden and even the sporting of a beard tziiken as a sign of lz-lafflic- 
subversive tendencies. Nevertheless, Tapper and Tapper suggest that Islam and 
republican nationalism co-exist harmoniously in the hearts and minis of 
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Egricilrians and that, "Turkish Islam and Turkish republican/nationalism today ýre 
both expressions of a single underlying ideology of social control". 
The additional explanation lies in the heterogeneity of Yugoslav society as 
compared to the basically homogeneous character of Turkey. Whilst the people of 
Egridir are Turks living in a Turkish nation state, the Muslims of Bosnia are 
but one of several nationalities living within a multi-national, federated state. 
In this context the state ideology purports to represent many peoples or 
nationalities, not just the Muslims. For these Muslims their identity cannot but 
be bound up with the Islamic faith and thus the rapprochement of Islam and 
Yugoslav socialism would be a rapprochement of an ideology A, allegiance to 
which makes one a Muslim rather than a Serb, Albanian, Slovene or other, and an 
ideology B, which specifically seeks to include these Serbs, Albanians, Slovenes 
and others. Such a rapprochment would create a sort of identity crisis. 
This is not because most Bosnian Muslims hate and resent their non-Muslim 
fellow citizens or feel no identification whatever with the Yugoslav community. 
Naturally this is not the case. But all that is feasible in the Yugoslav context 
is that Muslims identify with their national group and, separately and 
simultaneously (and in practice less strongly), with Yugoslavia as a whole. What 
is not feasible is the merging or rapprochement of the Islamic ideology from 
whence springs the Muslims' specific identity with the multi-national ideology 
of the state. In the same way no Croat, however well-disposed towards non- 
Croats or content to exist within Yugoslavia, can actually merge an 
identification with Croatian tradition and an identification with Yugoslav 
soc ie ty. 
Officials at the higher levels of the Zajednica tend to promote a 
rapprochement of Islam and Yugoslav socialism and for this they may be 
criticised, in semi-jocular manner in the company of close friends. Thus one 
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answer I received to the question of who was in the Zajednica, was that one had 
to be a Party member to land the job. This witticism was received with much 
mirth by the company. On enquiring further I was told that whilst a Zajednica 
official did not actually have to be a Party member, he had to be "morally and 
ideologically sound", a common euphemism in Bosnia (3". 
Hand in hand with the implication that Zajednica officials are too closely 
associated with Communism goes the criticism that they lack piety and Islamic 
learning. One eccentric, a man of about forty who habitually dressed in the 
Ottoman style baggy black trousers and sported a great black handlebar 
moustache, was unusually forthright about this. I met him early one morning 
during Ramazan on my way home from mukabela (all night Quranic recitation) and 
dawn prayer at the mosque. We were introduced by a mutual acquaintance, he 
asked me what I was doing in Sarajevo and I told him I was studying "Muslim 
culture". His reply was simply: "There's none of that here, they closed it down 
in 1945". 1 asked what he thought of the mukabela we had just attended and he 
told me that that was nothing to what had happened in the old days, that Islam 
in Bosnia was a pale shadow of its former self and that the Zajednica had no 
idea of the way things should be done. At the same time there is a feeling 
amongst some Muslims that religious functionaries are too concerned with their 
(3) Anti-clerical feeling as a result of the perceived over-eagerness of 
religious establishments to co-operate with secular authorities is not 
confined to the Muslim community. In the 1950s Catholic and Orthodox 
Bosnian bishops became subjects of violent demonstrations. Some were 
forced to leave their dioceses and one was nearly lynched. (See Alexander 
1979 p. 251). The relative mildness of Muslim anti-clericalism is perhaps 
related to the fact that Islamic religious functionaries play a less 
crucial role in the religious life than do their Christian counterparts. 
They lead prayers and give sermons but do not offer absolution of sins or 
the cleansing body and blood of God. 
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own well-being and the joke that: 
Tod2e i popovi su najve(fiji lopovill 
"Hodjas and priests are the biggest thieves" 
was one I heard more than once. 
Various criticisms were made about particular well known Zajednica 
personalities. The Reis-ul-ulema himself was laughed at for having an attendant 
to look after his shoes during prayer - something which, it was pointed out to 
me, the Prophet never had. He was also censured for having suggested that 
Bosnians are better Muslims than Arabs since, on a visit to Saudi Arabia, he had 
noticed a copy of the Quran laid carelessly on the floor. His daughter, a 
teacher at the women's medresa, was criticised for saying that, whilst the 
Prophet ate only with his right hand, it was more civilised to use the fork in 
one's left. (This is, in fact, normal practice when both knife and fork are used 
but people objected to the overt suggestion that "bon ton" was more important 
than following the Prophet's example. ) The president of the Bosnian Starel. instvo 
was berated for his general ignorance of Islam and, his name being Seta, he was 
nicknamed ýteta, meaning "What a pity! ". 
The Islamska Zajednica is then a bureaucratic organisation which, whilst 
relatively successful in its attempt to monopolise control of religious practice, 
is not widely held by Muslims to have a monopoly on religious knowledge. Whilst 
the view it presents of Islam as a modern faith finds general acceptance with 
the Muslim population, its (currently) relentless promotion of Yugoslav Soci8list 
Patriotism and its alliance of socialist and Islamic ideology is less popular. 
That this is the case is partly due to Yugoslav socialism's hostility to 
religion, but also due to the fact that it is the ideology of a multi-national, 
federated state. 
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5. RIVALLING RELIGIOUS ORIENTATIONS 
DERVISHES AND MYSTICS 
Where the authority and philosophy of the offical Muslim establishment are 
riot wholly palatable to the Muslim population it is unsurprising that rival 
religious authorities and outlooks should find a role and a following. In view 
of the pattern typical of the Muslim world, past and present, the mcst promising 
directions in which to search for such rivals must be that of sufi mysticism 
and of Islamic fundamentalism. In the present chapter I will consider one 
potential and one actual rival to the Zajednica; on the one hand the dervish 
orders and on the other a new brand of mysticism which is at the same time 
strongly scripturalist in flavour. Whilst the former is in some respects the 
obvious source of opposition to the Muslim establishment (not least in that the 
dervish orders have been established in Bosnia since the very beginning of the 
Ottoman era) it is in fact the latter which provides a dynamic alternative to 
the Zajednica's authority and philosophy. This, I will suggest, is because the 
latter seeks to associate Bosnian Muslims with the worldwide Umma, thus 
providing them with a coherent identity as members of a vast religious 
community not bounded by Bosnia, whilst the former Is seen as a compliant 
subject of the Zajednica. 
The Dervish Orders 
The mutual hostility of Muslim establishments and dervish brotherhoods is 
well known. In the modern world, with the rise of nation states and political 
centralisation, the scripturalistic establishments have tended to gain the upper 
hand and the dervishes to be forced to moderate their positon. Yet Gellner 
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notes: 
"It Is interesting that Balkan Muslims constitute one of the fairly rare 
cases in which the spokesman of the 'cult-of -personal ity-and-med ia t ion, 
type of Islam dares to polemicise vigourously with the representatives of 
'Reform... (Gellner 1981 p. 59) 
This is certainly the case of the Albanian Muslims of Kosovo. Historically, 
Albanian Islam has been dominated by the Bektashi order of dervishes. Today, 
Kosovo is the region of Yugoslavia with the highest number of dervish orders 
and tekijas (lodges). In 1973 the Albanian dervishes set up their own 
organisation, ZIDRA (Zajednica IslamsAlh Dervigkfh Redovi Alije: Community of the 
Islamic Dervish Orders of Ali), which openly flouts the authority of the Islamska 
Zajednica. Gellner continues: 
"The explanation of the Balkan idiosyncrasy is easy: these Muslims were in 
any case minorities within their national communities, whether they were 
Sufi or scripturalists; hence the puritans could not intimidate their 
opponents by the implicit or overt threat of branding them as national 
traitors. " (op cit p. 59) 
Muslims are not a minority amongst Yuqoslav Albanians; in 1953 (the last 
occasion on which religious affiliation was a census question) 95.6% of Yugoslav 
Albanians were found to be Muslims by faith. They are, however, a minority 
within the overall population of Albanians (including those of the state of 
Albania) which also includes Catholics and adherents of the Orthodox Church. 
Since Albanian nationalism began well before the creation of Yugoslavia and the 
consequent political severance of Kosovo from Albania proper, it is not 
surprising that Albanians have never located their national distinctiveness in 
religion. At the end of the nineteenth century the Bektashi, order of dervishes 
was strongly associated with Albanian nationalism. A Bektashi pamphlet printed 
in 1896 prescribes that Bektashis: % 
"Love as themselves their neighb 
than all they love their country 
fairest of all virtues ... Let them 
which the father calls them ... for 
Albanians, for the education and 
ours, both Muslim and 
and their countrymen 
strive night and day 
the salvation of Albý 
civilisation of their 
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Chr is t tan ... But more 
because this is the 
for the nation to 
inia and the 
nation... let not tl,, e 
Muslims be divided from the Christians ... but let both work together. " (Hasluck 1929 p-553) 
Whilst the Bektashi brotherhood was specifically Islamic, in its espousal 
of Albanian nationalism it therefore set the "fairest of all virtues", love of 
Albania, apart from the love of Islam and preached the unity of all countrymen 
without regard to religious faith. In contemporary Kosovo the nationalist 
movement of the Albanians is a secular one. The Albanians of Yugoslavia locate 
their national distinctiveness not in their faith but in their language, history 
and traditionally tribal social structure. 
Two factors, both related to Yugoslav state policy, seem to favour the 
possibility of "vigourous polemic" between suf is and the Muslim establishment. 
The first is that the state does not (overtly) recognise religion as the basis 
of any of its constituent nationalities; it certainly doesn't recognise any 
religious authority as the representative of any nationality. This inhibits any 
suggestion on the part of the Muslim establishment that dervishes are national 
traitors rather than simply religious heretics. 
The second point is that, unlike their Soviet counterparts, the Yugoslav 
secular authorities have not outlawed the dervish orders. The policy is rather 
to legitimate a religious establishment and to leave it to keep its own house in 
order. The fact that the Islamska Zajednica has been unable to put a stop to 
the activitites of ZIDRA does not seem to concern the state which views the 
dervishes as no more misguided than their non-dervish Muslim brethren and 
becomes concerned only when it senses that religion is being put to some 
directly counter-revolutionary use. In such a situation ZIDRA is free to indulge 
in vigourous polemic with the Muslim establishment. 
In view of state policy and of the open hostility shown by the Kosovan 
dervish orders towards the Zajednica, the Bosnian case seems a puzzle. The 
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Bosnian dervish orders have 500 years of history behind them. Some tek1jas and 
hanikahs (dervish guest houses) were set up even before the arrival of the 
Ottomans - Sarajevo's Gaziler tekija of the Naqshbandi order in 1459 and 
Isabeg's Mevlevi hanikah in 1462. Yet they lack the widespread allegiance and 
popularity of their Kosovan counterparts. Furthermore, they do not dispute or 
flout the authority of the Islamska Zajednica; on the contrary, they recognise it 
as legitimate and accomodate themselves to its rulings. 
Derv ish prac t ices have had inf luence on the re 1 ig ious prac t ice of Bosn ia . 
The tevh1d, to be discussed in chapter six, has its origins in dervish ritual. 
The Arabic derived term "zikr" means "remembrance of God in one's heart" and the 
zikr ritual, involving repitition of the names of God, is the central one of the 
dervish orders. A form of zikr is also, however, traditionally performed after 
each of the daily prayers and this practice is even prescribed by the Islamska 
Zajednica. After prayer the worshipper takes a rosary (tesbih) and recites 
"Subha-nallah" (Praise God) 33 times, 'El-hamdu lil-lah" (Thank God) 33 times and 
"Allahu Ekbeil' (God is the most great) 33 times. Furthermore, on the occasion of 
Lejletul-kadr, the 27th day of Ramazan when the Angel Gabriel began the 
revelation of the Quran to the Prophet, Sarajevo's central mosque hosts a zikr 
meeting similar to those held in tekijas. Rituals associated with the dervishes 
thus find many niches in standard Muslim practice in Sarajevo. 
It should be mentioned that of all the Muslims I met, the dervishes were 
probably the most unwilling to speak with a non-Muslim about their faith. It 
was a tekija sheikh who, when I was introduced as a student of Islam by a 
member of a well know family of Sarajevo dervishes, hodjas and bulas (usually a 
good credential) stared into my eyes and spoke in Arabic. He then translated 
into Serbo-Croatian: "Knowledge is In the heart, not in books". With this he got 
uP and left the table to greet some friends. Not all dervishes were quite so 
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uncommunicative but rarely did they show the enthusiasm to tell me about Islam 
that I met with in others. 
Until the 1930s relations between the ulema and the Bosnian orders were 
good, or at least tolerant " ". In Ottoman times the orders were generally seen 
as an integral part of Islam; Gazi Husrevbeg, three times governor of Bosnia in 
the sixteenth century built three religious institutions in Sarajevo under his 
own name; a mosque, a medresa and a hanikah. Dervishes sometimes used a mosque 
rather than a tekija as their meeting place. The Naqshbandi tekija of Oglavak 
was visited by every new governor of Bosnia and granted tax exemption by the 
Sultan. Sheikhs sometimes held, and still do hold, religious positions outside 
the orders. Sheikh Hussein Baba Zuki6, eighteenth century founder of the 
Naqshbandi tekija of 2ivti6, was at the same time a professor at the medresa 
in Fojnica. The contemporary sheikh of this tekija is also the hodja of a mosque 
in a nearby village. Husnije efendija Numanagid-, sheikh of the Fojnica tekija 
On two occasions, in the sixteenth and eighteenth centuries, 
representatives of dervish orders spawned movements of resistance or 
protest against Ottoman secular authorities. The Hamzevi, usually 
considered a branch of the Bajrami order, were active anti-Ottoman 
propogandists in many parts of the Ottoman world in the sixteenth century. 
Their followers were even to be found in the ranks of the Istanbul 
Janissaries. In 1573 Sheikh Hamza Bali was secretly executed in Istanbul. 
His Bosnian followers continued their anti-Ottoman activities and in 1582 
formed their own "government". All were immediately executed and the 
Hamzevi became extinct in Bosnia. 
In the eighteenth century one Sheikh Muhamed of U2ice, believed 
to have been of the Halveti. order, sent three strong letters of protest to 
the Pasha accusing him of maltreating the Bosnian Muslim peasantry and 
threatening him with the Judgement Day. The Pasha 
had him executed in 1750. (Musiý 1951 & 1958) 
Both protests were directed against secular rather than religious 
authority. 
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and founder of the Visoko tek1ja, was in 1914 appointed mufti of Travnik. 
Furthermore, as has been noted in chapter three, Bosnian dervishes have always 
been observant of religious obligations such as prayer and fasting. Those whom 
met were insistent that in order to understand the dervish path I had f irst 
to have a comprehensive knowledge of the Quran and hadiths. 
Officially the tekijas were always under some form of external supervision; 
that of the muftis and kadijas during the Ottoman period and that of the Reis- 
ul-Ulema during the Austro-Hungarian. These religious authorities did not, 
however, attempt to limit the influence of the dervish orders, the relationship 
was rather one of mutual recognition and respect. 
This is not to suggest that there was never opposition to the dervishes. 
The chronicle of Mula Mustafa Ba! teskija, the eighteenth century Sarajevan 
Muslim, hodja, official writer, sometime medresa professor and dervish, bears 
witness to the turbulent nature of religious life in the town. In 1779/80 he 
recorded that: 
"The acrobats came, but in our town there are Kadiýevci who, superficially, 
in their speech, are real wise men but in truth are ... rabble. They went to 
court and, ofcourse, the permission was not given for the acrobats to 
perform. Sarajevo is really that sort of town. There are Kadidevct here 
who, if the Prophet himself allowed something, would raise hell out of pure 
spite. " 
The Kadiýevci were puritans inspired by Kadizade Mehmed of Istanbul. 
Kadizade was a reformist preacher who wanted a return to the ways of the 
Prophet not only in spirit but in every small detail; he forbade the use of 
coffee and cutlery, since the Prophet knew neither, and was dubious about the 
existence of minarets which had been no part of the earliest mosques (see Zilfi 
1986). His particular ire was reserved for the sufi orders which he saw as the 
major source of heresy, Kadizade died in 1635 and his Istanbul following ended 
with the seventeenth century, but in Sarajevo his influence continued well into 
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the eighteenth. Yet it was extremely localised. In the nearby town of Visoko the 
Kadidevci had little influence and Ba: teskija notes that the acrobats moved on to 
this town and were followed by a number of Sarajevans anxious to see the fun. 
The Kadidevci were strongly opposed to the dervish orders and sometimes 
resorted to violence against them. Over the fifty or so years for which 
Bateskija kept his chronicle he often noted the doings of one Emir-Vaiz, a 
medresa professor and Kadidevac who "attacked the sheikhs, dervishes, 
tek Ijas ... dervish orders". In 1770/71 Emir-Vaiz made an attempt, first to take 
over and then to disrupt a mosque which was the meeting place of Mevlevi 
dervishes. 
"After the death of the Mevlevi sheikh ... the fanatic ... Emir-Vaiz, applied for 
the post. However, the kadija refused him and gave the sheikhhood to the 
muezzin of the Tabaý'ka mosque, old Dervish Mustafa ... who had performed his 
duties at this mosque without payment. Later, one day around ikindija [the 
third prayer of the day] as Sheikh Mustafa began the zikr, several 
troublemakers (jaramazi) suddenly appeared with the intention of disrupting 
the zikr. That provoked a quarrel and the dervishes eventually won. The 
hodja of this mosque, a brother of Emir-Vaiz, was replaced and so the 
troublemakers and protestors stopped coming to the mosque. " 
The quarrel here was between Kadidevci and dervishes; it is important to 
note that the kadija took the latter's side in his refusal of the sheikhhood to 
Emir-Vaiz. The ulema was not then wholly hostile to the orders as one might 
expect. In 1780 BaAeskija lists eleven members of the ulema including the 
himself, the mufti, a kadija, a writer at the legal court, a librarian, three 
medresa professors and one professor of the Gazi Husrevbeg hanikah. Two, 
including Emir-vaiz, are said to be hostile to the orders and a third is implied 
to be so. Two, including Bateskija himself, are said to be dervishes and a third 
to "like dervishes". Of three, no hint is given as to their opinions. Of the 
remaining two, one was the professor of the hanikah, a dervish institution, and 
the other was later to become the sheikh of this hanikah. 
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The opinions of the ulema were then diverse; it seems that such diversity 
could even exist within a single family. Thus in 1780 Ba§eskija notes the death 
of "the son of the Mevlevi sheikh ... said to be a Kadidevac". 
The 1930s saw the first blow to good relations between the Muslim 
establishment and the dervish orders. In 1934 the Islamska Zajednica journal 
Glasnik ran a series of critical articles aimed at the dervish orders. The 
tekijas were condemned as heretical and un-Shariatic, the sheikhs as parasites 
and the form of zikr they practised as an abomination. Grudgingly, it was 
conceded that some sheikhs were not wholly unobservant of the Shari'a but the 
journal drew unfavourable comparisons between the contribution made to Islamic 
learning by Yugoslavian dervishes and that made by the Kadiri and Sanusi of 
West Africa. Several of the critics quoted the works of the great sufi writers 
Al-Ghazali and Ibn-al-Arabi. Some branches of the Muslim Press were less 
scathing but all seemed to share the view that some sort of reform was 
necessary. Islamski Svijet (Islamic World) thus stated; 
11rhe tekijas have always been and still are considered one of the most 
important Islamic cultural institutions because they are the source of 
sheikhs and evlije Iwalis], people who don't work for their own personal 
interests and positions but who, with their whole beings, are devoted to 
God ... It is our duty to-preserve this religious institution and so, in the 
new decree concerning the tekijas, all necessary regulations will be made 
in order that the tekijas become an active element in the work of 
Is lam ... [as they were] ... in the first centuries of Islam. " (Islamski 
Svijet 
no. 114 p. 8) 
The decree referred to was that expected from the Sarajevo ulema-medtlis 
(Islamic religious authority, see p. 121) and was to deal with the questions of 
tekija property, the qualifications necessary to become a sheikh and which 
orders could be officially recognised. In 1934 the ulema-med2lfs of Skopje 
brought out such a decree for the tekijas within its territory. In Bosnia, 
however, no decree was forthcoming until 1952 Oe. after the establishment of 
the socialist state), but when it came its impact was severe. Under its 
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provisions all tekijas were to be closed and their property to fall to the 
Islamska Zajednica (no closures had been ordered in the Skopje area), The Kadirl 
tekija of Sarajevo, was to be used as a museum for dervish artifacts, the others 
were to be employed as mesd2ids. It must be underlined that this measure was 
ordered by the Islamska Zajednica and not by the state. Its harshnesss, wa, -, -, 
related to the new organisation of religion in socialist Bosnia. When the 
Zajednica realised that in such a state there was only so much religious 
authority to go round, they were anxious to have as much of it as possible (as 
has been suggested in chapter four) and to quell any potential competitors. 
Bosnian dervishes continued to meet secretly, in private homes, for the 
performance of zikr and leading sheikhs and dervishes wrote letters of protest 
to the Zajednica. However, at no point did they set up any organisation in 
defiance of the Zajednica, the aim was always to win back the right to exist 
through negotiation. Not until 1977 did this strategy pay off, and then to a 
limited extent. The Zajednica agreed to the conditional re-opening of the 
tekijas (one had been destroyed in the meantime) but did not officially lift the 
1952 ban. The tekijas remain under the authority of the Zajednica which may 
send its representatives to visit them at any time and may close any or all of 
them if it sees fit to do so. One of Bosnia's leading dervishes, the sheikh of 
the Sarajevo Kadiri tekija, did not dispute this arrangement. As he put it: 
"with us it is unthinkable that the tarikat be seperate from the Islamska 
Zajednica ... Islamic dervish orders cannot be independent of 
the religious 
community ... That is unfeasible in terms of the Sharf'eel 
(Had2ibajrid 1979) 
The Bosnian orders now have their own organisation, the Tarikat Centre, but 
it exists only subject to the consent of the Zajednica. ýamid (1985) suggests 
that the Centre is extremely bureaucratics being composed of several sub 
committees and unconsciously falling into administrative jargon which seems 
foreign to the nature of the dervish path. It is certain that the Tarikat Centre 
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is an organisation of a type very different from its Macedon i an /Kos ovan 
counterpart, ZIDRA, which exists in defiance of the Islamska Zajednica. The 
Centre's job is to liese with the Zajednica and between the different orders 
within Bosnia. 
These orders are three in number; the Naqshbandi, the Kadiri and the 
Mevlevi. All three are closely linked in a number of ways and those who are not 
themselves directly involved in the tarikats tend not even to be aware of the 
existence of different orders; to such people it is all Just "tekija" and 
"dervishes". Those who are involved stress that the particular order one belongs 
to is less important than the stage of development one has re8ched on the 
dervish path. This feeling may well not be a new one; in 1780 Baý. eskija 
expressed no surprise or disapproval when one Sheikh Osman-dede "son-in-law of 
the sheikh of Had2i Sinanova tekija and until this time a member of the Kadiri 
order, became a Mevlevi". In urban, non-tribal Sarajevo particular dervish orders 
seem not to have been associated with particular social groupings (clans, 
lineages, tribal segments), affiliation to an order was more a matter of 
personal religious preference (21' and for this reason a change of allegiance was 
not viewed as a betrayal in the way that it might be in some parts of the 
Muslim world. In contrast to standard Naqshbandi practice, the zikr of Bosnian 
Naqshbandis is not performed silently but aloud and Algar suggests that this is 
the result of the traditionally close relationship between this order and that 
of the Kadiris in the region (Algar 1973). 
(2) Ba§eskija speaks of his own experience very much in these terms: 
"After I had mastered the concrete sciences I immersed myself in the 
science of mysticism and, contemplating day and night, made a great effort, 
refusing to be exhausted while the doors remained closed ... I put everything 
else to one side because the secret was being revealed to me. " 
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It seems likely, however, that the orders have drawn yet closer together in 
recent years. Of the five regularly functioning tekijas in Bosnia one is Kadiri 
and four Naqshbandi but of the latter four, one houses Kadiri zikr alternately 
with its own and the other (in Sarajevo) Mevlevi. Large annual gatherings held 
at particular tekijas, for example mevlud gatherings, are attended by affiliates 
of all orders and not only of the order to which the host tekija belongs. In 
Sarajevo affiliates of the two tekijas frequently visit and sometimes 
participate in zikr at the other tekija. It is not uncommon for dervishes to 
have secondary ties to other orders; the Kadiri sheikh of Sarajevo is himself an 
affiliate of six seperate dervish orders, some of which he was initiated into in 
Istanbul. 
The system of "author isat ion" of sheikhs illustrates both this closeness 
and a new attitude to the administrative organisation of the orders. The 
Naqshbandi tekija of 2ivdid stands deep in the countryside and can be reached 
only on foot. It was established in 1780 by Sheikh Hussein Baba Zukid who had 
studied with Naqshbandis in Istanbul, Samarkand and Bukhara, the home of the 
original founder of the order, Bahaudin Naqshband. Zikr is held here twice 
weekly but, due to the tekija's remote situation, is not as impressively attended 
as the zikr of the urban tekijas. Nearby, also in a rural setting, stands the 
Naqshbandi tekija of Oglavak, founded by Sheikh Hussein's only pupil, Sirri Baba. 
Today It opens only once annually for the performance of a mevlud. Nevertheless, 
these two tekijas hold a symbolically important place; both are associated with 
the rise of the Naqshbandi order to predominance in the eighteenth century. 
The sheikhhood of Oglavak has always been passed down in the male line of 
descent from its founder, Sirri Baba. The sheikhhood of 2ivtid has been passed 
down in the male line of descent from Had2i MejlI Babe, a pupil of Sirri Babe's 
who married the daughter of the founder of 21vtid and became sheikh there. (The 
- 165- 
founder's own sons decided against taking up the position. ) The two families, 
the Sikirid and the Had2imejlid, have sometimes provided the sheikhs of other 
tekijas. The Naqshbandi tekija of Sarajevo (founded at the turn of the century) 
has had three Sikirid sheikhs, the tekija of Visoko has had Had2imejlid sheikhs. 
Those Naqshbandi sheikhs who were not members of either of the families have 
nevertheless stood in a chain of "author isat ion" from them. Thus Husnije ef. 
Numanagid, who established the Visoko tekija in the early twentieth century and 
the Travnik tekija in the 1920s, had been "authorised" by a Had2imejlid. All 
authorisations thus lead back, via Sheikh Hussein of Lvdid, to the founder of 
the Naqshbandis, Bahaudin Naqshband. This chain of authorisation is known as the 
the silsila. (The Kadiri tekija of Sarajevo never had hereditary succession to 
the sheikhhood and Bateskija's chronicle makes it clear that most Sarajevo 
tekijas did not. ) 
The system of authorisation has become increasingly formal in nature. The 
current sheikhs of the Naqshbandi tekijas of Sarajevo and Visoko were initially 
appointed for a probationary periods as vekil, guardians of the tekijas. In 
December 1983 a joint ceremony for the "declaration of sheikhhood" was held for 
the men. Both were granted diplomas and appointed as true sheikhs. 
The diplomas were given by two sheikhs. One, as might be expected, the 
Naqshbandi sheikh of tivdid, the other, more surprisingly, the Kadiri sheikh of 
Sarajevo. The latter was himself authorised as sheikh of his own tekija by the 
former. This inter-authorisation between different orders suggests the extent to 
which the orders have drawn closer in recent years. 
Sheikh's have absolute spiritual authority over their dervishes and must be 
respected and obeyed. However, this authority extends only over religious 
matters. Dervishes do not perform personal services for their sheikhs, something 
I realised when attending a mevlud held at a disused tekija outside Sarajevo. A 
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Naqshbandi sheikh who was present called one of his dervishes over and ordered 
him to fetch a number of religious books. Hand on heart, the dervish bowed and 
left. On his return, accompanied by another bow, he was brusquely ordered to 
place the books in the sheikh's car. Another bow, and the dervish moved off. At 
that point the sheikh's wife remembered that she wanted her cardigan and bag 
fetched from the car and asked her husband to recall his man and give the 
order. The sheikh refused with the explanation: "Those are personal things". He 
did not feel that his authority extended beyond religious matters 13". 
Furthermore, the role of the Bosnian sheikh is not felt to necessitate his 
leadership of the zikr rituals held in his own tekija. In the tekija of Visoko 
the sheikh and his vekil lead the ritual on alternate occasions. 
Zikr is the central rite of the dervish orders and the focal activity of 
Bosnia's five tekijas. Every meeting includes a zikr performance. Other practices, 
which seem to have been followed in Bageskijals time, have dwindled in 
importance. Ba! teskija notes that he learnt vefk, a method of fortune telling 
still practiced by the Albanian dervishes, from the sheikh of the Kadiri tekija. 
Today such practices are considered out of the question by the tekija's 
dervishes. A document of 1832 notes the existence of 74 tomb cults in and 
around Sarajevo (see Bejtid 1982). Of the cult places 42 were the tombs of dead 
sheikhs and dervishes to which pilgrims came in the hope of being cured by the 
power of the saintly dead. Of these, only one is still known today and can 
hardly be said to be the centre of a cult (see p. 86). Unlike their Albanian 
counterparts, contemporary Bosnian dervishes do not appear to indulge In 
(3) In this respect the Bosnian situation may differ from the Kosovan where: 
"In many cases one would not undertake a serious matter (eg. the marriage 
of one's son, the building of a house or any inportant transaction) without 
having asked the sheikh for advice. " (Popovic 1985 p. 247) 
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practices such as standing on sabres and piercing the cheek with needles 
(although certain evidence suggests that the practice continues in great secrecy 
and with low frequency in the countryside). At the turn of the century, however, 
such practices were performed in the Kadiri. tekija (see Hangi 1900). tamid 
states that they have died out as a result of Islamska Zajednica pressure 
(personal communication). Zikr is then the focus of all dervish activity. 
At Sarajevo's Kadirl tekija zikr is performed every Thursday night (see 
appendix d for an account of a zikr gathering). The sheikh and vekil (deputy) 
preside over ten to fifteen dervish affiliates (murlds who are bound to the 
sheikh through vows), occasional guests from other tekijas (particularly the 
Sarajevo Naqshbandi tekija) and perhaps a few followers who have not yet made 
any vows (muhibs). In Sarajevo both murlds and muhlbs are male, although the 
Visoko tekija has some female muhlbs who participate in the zikr from a 
separate room. 
Occasionally participants of the zikr fall into trance; one particular 
dervish did so regularly. This was not esPecially encouraged by the sheikh who 
sometimes indicated that the trancing dervish be removed from the room or made 
to sit outside the zikr circle until the fit passed. The trance indicated that 
the man was in some mystical union with God, he was not, however, believed to 
be closer to God than those other dervishes who, without falling into trance, 
were concentrating their whole beings on the Almighty during the ritual. 
On occasions such as the Prophet's birthday and other annual festivals the 
tekija was impressively full. Twenty to twenty f ive men participated in the zikr 
but another 150 to 200 were spectators. From the womens' gallery we craned our 
necks to peer down at the spectacle through the wooden grill. Those men who sat 
downstairs outside the zikr circle were equally fascinated by the proceedings. 
There was much whispering and pointing and excitement reached a peak whenever 
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one of the dervishes fell Into a trance. It was always a good show but for most 
people that was all it was. 
Amongst the young in particular there is a strong interest in the orders, 
as they themselves claim. Their appeal lies in the promise of a mystical 
alternative to the Zajednica's Islam. Ba! ýeskija remarked of those ulema members 
who knew nothing of the dervish path: "the [religious] sciences are not enough 
without mysticism ... Just as the bird cannot fly with only one wing, so these 
learned people cannot reach their goal". A young, devout and highly educated 
woman who studied Oriental languages at the University of Sarajevo expressed 
the same opinion to me in her own way: "The orthodox go by foot, the dervishes 
go by aeroplane". 
The promise of a second, mystical Islamic path is what attracts interest 
but this promise is not fulfilled to the satisfaction of many potential 
affiliates for two reasons. Firstly, the strong focus on a single ritual, zikr, 
leads many people to see the tekija simply as a "theatre" in which dervishes 
gather to give a weekly performance. As one young Muslim, himself the second 
cousin of a sheikh, told me: "Today the tekija is just a hobby". Secondly, as a 
result of its submission to Zajednica authority and its increasingly 
bureaucratic structure, the tekija. does not seem to offer a real alternative to 
Islam as presented by the Zajednica. 
It may also be said that the orders lack links with the outside Islamic 
world. In the eighteenth century Bosnian orders had strong ties with dervishes 
elsewhere, particularly in Istanbul. Baýeskija's own sheikh, a Kadiri, had 
travelled as far as India whilst Sheikh Hussein Baba Zukid had spent thirty 
years studying with a Naqshbandi sheikh in Istanbul, a Mevievi sheikh in Konja 
and with the Naqshbandis of Samarkand and Bukhara. Such ties are now uncommon 
and the orders tend to appear introverted. They thus fail to offer Bosnian 
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Muslims any model of identity associated with the outside Umma, and at the same 
time forfeit the possibility of outside support which might offer a measure of 
protection from the Zajednica. 
In this regard It is interesting to compare the dervishes with the 
Franciscan Catholic priests of Bosnia-Hercegovina. In Ottoman times the 
Franciscans were paramount but after the war the Diocesan priests gained the 
upper hand by striking a deal with the secular authorities and espousing a 
rapprochment of Catholicism and socialism in a manner similar to that of the 
Zajednica. In 1981 the situation altered as a result of the famous apparition of 
the Virgin of Medjugorje (a case widely publicised in the Sunday Times, Reader's 
Digest and on the BBC). The Franciscans took control of the Marian devotion and 
consequently gained strength in their struggle to regain power from the 
Diocesans (see Bax 1987). In this struggle they have enlisted the support of the 
Catholic community abroad, many of whom arrive in Medjugorje on pilgrimage, and 
thus allied themselves with the outside Catholic community. As has been seen, 
the Bosnian dervish orders have failed to enlist such outside support and 
remain subservient to the Muslim establishment. 
The Zajednica's rapprochement of Islam and socialism and of Muslim and 
Yugoslav identity finds little support within a population whose discrete 
national/religious identity is of both symbolic and real political importance to 
it. In such a situation the climate is favourable to the emergence of 
alternative religious orientations. Why the Bosnian dervish orders have failed to 
play host to such an alternative is a question hard to answer, particularly in 
view of the action taken by Albanian dervishes in creating ZIDRA. A clue is, 
however, provided by the history of the Bosnian orders and their relationship 
with the ulema. Whilst Individual Bosnian dervish sheikhs at times opposed the 
secular authority of ottoman officials (see footnote p. 159) the relations 
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between ulems and orders were generally good in Ottoman times. Unlike the 
orders of Kosovo, those of Bosnia never indulged in practices deemed beyond the 
pale - the drinking of alcohol, the neglect of the Ramazan fast or the holding 
of orgies (see Halimi 1957 on the heterodoxy of Kosovan orders). They were thus 
not frowned upon by the ulema and never constituted a substitute authority for 
it. In this context their contemporary submission to the Zajednica becomes 
easier to understand for the continuance of a tradition needs less explanation 
than a break with It. At the same time it may be noted that perhaps the most 
influential order of Kosovo, the Bektashi, was historically associated with 
Albanian nationalism. No Bosnian order has such a tradition of political 
involvement which might facilitate its contemporary espousal of a movement of 
religious dissent. 
Those Sarajevan Muslims who seek an alternative to the Zajednica version 
of Islam therefore tend to look in another direction 
The New Mystics 
In Sarajevo and some other Bosnian towns there is emerging an Islamic 
religious tendency which is at the same time strongly scripturalist and 
mystically inclined. The notion of scripturalist mysticism or mystical 
scripturalism has an oxymoronic flavour but this should not lead to any idea 
that the Sarajevan tendency is simply a Balkan freak. The intellectual mystics 
of Cairo described by Gilsenan (1982) seem to bear some similarity to those of 
Sarajevo, as do the Nurqus of Turkey (see Dumont 1986, also Mardin 1982). But 
as I hope to show, the Bosnian Muslims' status as a minority affects their 
intellectual mysticism by creating a desire to identify with the worldwide Umma, 
a desire which might be less relevant within a Muslim dominated society. 
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It is in the mystical aspects of this new tendency that some loose 
structure of religious authority may be discerned. Any fully-blown religious 
organisation or movement distinct from the Zajednica would be opposed by it, 
and, if it seemed in any way threatening to the social order, by the state. The 
new mystics, as they will be termed here, do not constitute such a movement. 
They have no publicly recognisable leaders, organisation, membership or meeting 
places. Sympathisers may meet in each others homes, in cafes or in the mosque 
after pr8yer. Some such gatherings are by appointment but many are simply the 
result of a number of sympathisers being in the same place at the same time. 
These sympathisers do, however, form loose networks around charismatic leaders; 
men who call themselves suf is and who are deemed by their followers to be 
sheikhs. In these loose networks lie the faint outlines of a religious movement. 
The appeal of the new mysticism is not confined to any particular social 
group or groups within the Muslim population yet certain common characteristics 
may be noted amongst its sympathisers. Perhaps the most obvious is that many of 
them are Young, below the age of thirty. Often these young people are members 
of families more traditional and less radical than they themselves, they are 
enthusiastic rediscoverers of Islam rather like the 'Born-agains' of Western 
Christianity. A tiny percentage are converts from Orthodoxy or Catholicism. Some 
study or have studied at the medresa or the Theological Faculty. Some are 
employed by the Islamska Zajednica as imams or act as muezzins in the mosques 
of Sarajevo. It has been said that there is little room in the dervish orders 
for women. At the Visoko tekija a few elderly women participate regularly in the 
zikr (from a separate room) and are muhlbs (uninitiated followers) but not 
murids (initiated followers bound by oath to the sheikh). In Sarajevo women are 
allowed to attend the zikr of the Kadiri tekiJa 1411, though not of the 
Naqshbandi, but none are even muhibs. In contrast, the new mystical tendency has 
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many female sympathisers. It is difficult to estimate the number of new mystics 
since, as has been said, there Is no official membership or organisation. It is 
probable that the number of firm, convinced and active mystics is not great. 
However, the percentage of Muslims admiring and empathising with the aims and 
ideals of the tendency is, in my impression, much larger. Whilst few individuals 
will personally undertake to follow the new mystic lifestyle, many esteem and 
respect it and the situation is thus unlike that of týe Turkish town of Egridir 
where religious enthusiasts are seen as extremists and fanatics (see p. 149). 
The sphere of influence of the new mysticism is not wholly discrete from 
that of the dervish orders or the Islamska Zajednica. Some young male mystics 
attend the tekijas occasionally and participate in the zikr. Both male and female 
mystics may be products of the ZaJednica's educational establishments. All of 
them attend prayers at the mosques which are ofcourse run by the Zajednica; 
there is no attempt to set up separate mosques, mesd2ids or places of prayer. 
The new mystics do not believe themselves to have aims wholly other than that 
of the dervish orders and the Islamska Zajednica, yet neither is their attitude 
to them wholly favourable. On the contrary. 
The common criticisms of the Zajednlca noted in chapter four (p. 153/4) are 
most strongly voiced by the new mystics. Believing that my aim in Sarajevo was 
to learn about Islam as a religion and hoping to educate me about it, they 
(4) But this only during the warm summer months when the dervishes gather in 
the tekija's large semahana which has a special gallery for women. During 
the cold weather they meet in a smaller room which cannot accomodate 
women. 
(5) Many Muslims found it hard to understand that I was principally interested 
in Muslim society rather than in Islamic religion. This was particularly 
true of the new mystics. 
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felt my interest in the Islamska Zajednica to be misplaced. When I asked one 
young mystic about the organisation. and teaching of the 7ajednica she was first 
uncomprehending and then disappointed. She told me that she had no interest in 
the Zajednica but supposed that I could buy some books about it at their shop. 
As for the tekijas, they were criticised for their "formalnost" (formality) 
and felt to be over-concerned with ritual practice and wanting in spirituality. 
Some new mystics openly criticised the spectacular sabre and skewer piercing 
practices of the Albanian dervishes, saying that these had nothing to do with 
true sufism at all. The subdued zikr of the Bosnian tekijas was not so 
outrightly condemned and the mystics had nothing against It in principle, 
indeed they sometimes attended the tekija or engaged in zikr within their own 
circles. It was felt, however, to be of potential danger since those who 
frequented the tekija might be led into thinking of the ritual experience of 
zikr as an end in itself. They might thus mistake a bit of the path's paving 
(the zikr) for the path towards God itself. The tekija's emphasis on ritual was 
therefore not to their taste for, as one new mystic put it: "In suf ism all is 
spiritual and nothing is practical". 
This concern with the distinction between the spiritual and the practical 
also influences their view of the authority of sheikhs. It has been seen that 
tekija sheikhs are "authorised", after a period of probation, by their peers and 
that those of FojnIca (and historically of Oglavak) are hereditary sheikhs. To 
the new mystics such routes to sheikh-hood seem insufficiently spiritual. For 
them, sheikh-hood is a gift of God, to be revealed to the recipient in a dream 
or by some other message and not to be attained through such practical means 
as genetic inheritance or probation. 
The charismatic leaders of new mysticism are created by no such practical 
means and are consequently more elusive than the tekija sheikhs. Within a few 
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weeks of my arrival in Sarajevo I knew the names of the sheikhs of the town's 
two tekijas and had been introduced to one of them in his capacity as sheikh. On 
the other hand it was months before I learnt the identity of two other men 
known by their new mystic followers as sheikhs. Neither had a tekija or had been 
formally authorised. Both were imams of mosques and I had thought of them 
simply as such until I was told otherwise. One of them, sheikh Abdullah efendija, 
I was to speak with several times, the other I never met but heard much of from 
his admirers. 
The elusiveness of the mystical sheikhs is related to a belief in evIije 
(see p. 88 above). EvIIje are people with God given supernatural powers and the 
belief in them is particularly, though not exclusively, associated with the new 
mystics. Evllje are forbidden by God to publicise their status and it Is thus 
deemed impossible to know with certainty whether or not any given individual is 
an evIija 116ý. Certainly nothing in their outward personality provides proof for, 
as Abdullah ef. explained to me, all the Prophets were evIIje yet Moses (Musa) 
was strict and stern in character whilst Jesus Usa) was gentle and quiet. The 
second mystic sheikh was, however, widely believed to be such, the evidence 
lYing in the miracles he performed. For example: 
I)A young man went to visit this sheikh but didn't pay attention to what he 
was told. He was daydreaming instead about Mostar, the capital of Hercegovina. 
Immediately the sheikh began to talk of Mostar; he had read the young man's 
m ind. 
2) Another young man had to leave for Switzerland the next day but had no 
(6) The sheikh whom I knew did, however, give me a clue. "Look for someone 
who's hated, look at Khomeini, for example, because the unGodly cannot 
stand the evIija" 
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money. In the street he met the sheikh who gave him 4,000 dinars (about E8 at 
the time I was told the story). The man found that after he'd bought his ticket 
and food for the journey he still had 4,000 dinars in his pocket. It had lasted 
all the way to Switzerland. 
3) One day after friday dffums I stood in the courtyard of the mosque with 
some new mystic friends who claimed that the sheikh was an evIija. I asked for 
evidence and they explained- "A minute ago he was inside the mosque but now 
he's gone, yet no-one saw him come out and this is the only exit". 
Of sheikh Abdullah ef., none whom I met would affirm a positive belief in 
his being an evlija but many suspected that he was so. 
For the new mystics there is a relationship between being a sufi, being a 
sheikh and being an evlfja. One mystic put it to me that all real suf is are 
evlije. In this regard it must be noted that whilst sheikh Abdullah ef. claimed 
to be a sufi none of his admirers made such claims of themselves. New mystical 
sympathisers said that they were interested in sufism or would like to be sufIs 
but not that they were such. 
Theoretically it is impossible to clearly identify an ev11ja. In practice in 
Sarajevo it is not easy to identify a mystic sheikh. One must be apprised of a 
man's sheikhly status by those who believe in it. The mystic sheikh's 
elusiveness then affords him a resemblance with the evIIJ6. This resemblance is 
important for the evIija has powers directly granted by God and, according to 
the new mystics, the true sheikh has his status directly from God, through 
spiritual and not through practical means. By resembling the evIfja in 
elusiveness the mystic sheikh may be taken by his followers as resembling the 
evIija in having directly God given power. The tekija sheikhs who are known to 
the Zajednica, the Oriental Institute and the secular authorities and who may be 
known by anyone who takes the trouble to ask, lack the evIija's aura of secrecy. 
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It has been said that the new mystics are less concerned with ritual 
practice than are the frequenters of tekijas. Their meetings rarely involve 
zikr, although at one gathering I witnessed, after several hours of talking 
those present did perform a short zikr. But the goal of coming closer to God is 
by them achieved more through talking and teaching than through ritual. When 
new mystics met without a sheikh they would frequently exchange explanations of 
the symbolic and hidden meanings of things in the everyday world. For them 
everything in the world has a meaning and a purpose and I was often told to 
remember that "nothing is coincidental". They would point to the fact that the 
lines on the palm of the left hand spell the number 18 in Arabic whilst those 
on the palm of the right spell 81. Now 18+81=99 and at the same time 1+8=9 and 
8+1=9 and 9 and 9 together make 99. It is not coincidental that the names of 
God are 99 in number. The positioning of the hands in prayer had its meaning 
too. Hands raised in the phrase "Allahu Akbar" mean "I am poor, I have nothing". 
Hands crossed over the breast (female) or waist (male) mean "I am powerless, I 
can do nothing". Such meanings were said to exist in everything and on such S 
occasions it was only regretted that the sheikh was not present to explain them 
properly. 
When Abdullah ef. was present his role was precisely to explain and 
instruct through speech. In the mosque or in someone's home followers would 
listen as he spoke on a variety of theological topics. On the question of the 
influence of prayer on God he explained that it could have no influence since 
God was not a separate person to be affected by human pleas. Rather we should 
think of prayer as having three aspects. prayer, praying, prayed for, or wisher, 
wishing, wished for, or lover, loving, loved. All three go together and are one 
thing because God Is in some way within us and we reflect him if we lead a 
"dist" (pure) life. 
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On the significance of dreaming he taught that the difference between 
dream and waking life is great and may reflect the vast difference between this 
earthly life and the life of the hereafter. On the existence of pain and 
suffering on earth he explained that its purpose was that we might later 
understand the meaning and feel the good of heaven. Good is meaningless unless 
it is contrasted with bad. 
These and other philosophical thoughts were interspersed with more 
concrete points and stories. For example, the sheikh told us of how his own 
sheikh had, by virtue of a God given power, known of the "UnIslamic sin" which 
he and his wife had committed in absolute privacy. He said that both silent and 
voiced zikr were Islamic but that the Prophet had practised the silent variety 
whilst Ali had performed zikr aloud. 
During long sessions of the sheikh's teaching and expounding such matters 
his followers remained relatively quiet, listening and attempting to take in all 
they heard. Occasionally they asked questions with great deference and 
politeness - "Forgive me, but may I ask ... 11 Although not bound to the sheikh by 
oath, followers were strongly influenced by him in their private lives. One man 
introduced his potential bride to the sheikh to ascertain the latter's opinion. 
Abdullah ef. decided that the girl's name (Mirsada, a common one) was not a good 
Islamic name and suggested that it be changed. It duly was and the groom 
publicised the new name to all who knew the couple. 
The sheikh's attitude to me affected that of his admirers. One of these 
was initially rather hostile towards me, thinking my enterprise a mistaken one 
and myself incapable of understanding Islam or sufism. Another, whilst perfectly 
polite and amiable, was clearly not especially interested in me or my work. When 
Abdullah ef. decided and stated that I was a sincere person and "one of us", 
both of these men's attitudes changed. The hostility of the former was softened 
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to the extent that, whilst still unsure that I could learn much, he did engage 
in conversation with me and once even visited me. The attitude of the second 
man changed even more decisively. For mere courtesy he exchanged great 
attention and enthusiasm, apologising for not having had much time to see me 
before, asking about my family, work and future and introducing me to his 
relatives. He said that because the sheikh liked me he also liked and wanted to 
know me. 
The sheikh called himself a sufi and his followers professed an interest 
in suf ism. But theirs is less the suf ism of experience, of trances and zikr, than 
of the intellect 111; 1. Neither was their sufism in general in dischord with the 
scriptures (911. They did see a difference between suf1sm and standard Islam. At 
my first interview with Abdullah ef. (which had been brought about by some 
friends who hoped that the sheikh would enlighten me in a way which they felt 
themselves unable to do) my first question to him was about the nature and 
meaning of dreams. Before answering he asked me whether I wanted his reply as 
an imam or as a sufi. Clearly he saw a distinction between the two types of 
(7) During the ten days of itikef' in the month of Ramazan the sheikh 
introduced myself and others briefly to a young 11sufill who was spending 
the period in a tiny room curtained off inside a mosque in a town outside 
Sarajevo. He spent his whole time praying and each day ate less and less. 
The young man kissed the sheikh's hand and cried. These, the sheikh told us 
approvingly, were tears of Joy, and he added that within a few days the 
sufi would begin to go into a trance. It must be noted, however, that this 
act was deemed worthy not simply for itself but because the sufi was 
already close to God. On its own such an act of asceticism would have 
meant nothing. 
(8) The young mystic who was intially hostile towards me was something of an 
exception. He told me that he had once seen God during a zikr gathering, 
and been terrified at the sight. He also said that this claim of his was in 
contradiction with the Shari's and punishable by death and asked me not to 
tell anyone of it because they wouldn't understand. 
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understanding. However, this distinction did not amount to anything approaching 
a divorce and as one mystic told me no-one who does not pray, fast and fulfill 
all the Quranic requirements can be a sufi. 
The sheikh said that he was of the Naqshbandi tarikat although he did not 
attend the Naqshbandi (or any other) tekija. Like all mystics, and indeed like 
the tekija dervishes, he believed the tarikat to which one belonged to be of 
little importance; it was seen as a matter of personal taste. For his taste the 
Naqshbandi was the most appropriate order because, he said, it was the most 
scripturally inclined. 
This emphasis on scripture was apparent in all his thought. One day, after 
I had asked many questions about God, he explained to me that love is more 
important than understanding and that this was why the heart is placed right at 
the centre of the body whilst the brain lies at an extremity. In order to get 
close to God then, and to have true closeness to him, one has to stop asking 
philosophical questions and let love take over. I asked him whether this wasn't 
a bit dangerous. If we don't use our minds how can we distinguish the state of 
true closeness to the one true God from the state of a shaman or the user of 
hallucinogenic drugs. 
Abdullah ef. 's answer was that whilst it was indeed hard to be certain 
that one was experiencing the real thing, there were two important ways in 
which the likelihood could be increased, two external checks on the possibility 
of mistake. One was the criticism and guidance of a sheikh. The other was 
adherence to the kitab, the Holy Book: if you're not living in accordance with 
this you're bound to be wrong. 
In new mystic circles great emphasis is laid on the inerrancy and 
perfection of the Quranic revelation. Many mystics make efforts to learn Arabic 
in order to read and comprehend the Holy Book in its original form and some 
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study long and hard to become hafiz (see p. 103). The hadiths (sayings and 
actions of the Prophet and his compaLnions) are also quoted in support and 
complement of contemporary behaviour. This is interesting in as much as many 
ordinary Muslims do not even know what a hadith is (those who told me the tale 
of Abu-Bakr didn't know it was a "hadith"). I once sat with a young woman and 
her mother whose conversation reminded me of a hadith I'd been told by a mystic 
friend. I quoted it, saying that it was a hadith, but the mother looked bemused. 
The young woman told me that her mother didn't know what a hadith was and 
promptly demonstrated that she herself didn't know either by explaining: "You 
know, mother, a hadith, like they have in the Quran". 
It has been noted (in chapter four) that many Muslims claim that modern 
science has proved the truth of Quranic teaching on pork, fasting and 
homosexuality. New mystics make yet more intricate claims on the basis of less 
clear and unequivocal hadiths and Quranic verses. Thus a hadith in which 
Muhammed claims that God knows each individual down to the very fingertip is 
said to have been proved by twentieth century fingerprinting techniques. The 
Quranic statement about a mysterious boundary placed in the world by God is 
said to have been obscure in meaning In the seventh century but later clarified 
by science which shows that salt and fresh water do not immediately mix where 
( ISO rivers run into the sea 
This interest in and reliance on scientific explanation may seem to 
contrast oddly with the new mystics belief in the hidden meanings of lines on 
the palms and that "nothing is coincidental". The cohabitation is explicable In 
(9) Jacques Cousteau's realisation that f ish will not cross salt/fresh water 
lines at river outlets is said to have been the reason for his conversion 
to Islam. 
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terms of a desire to combine twentieth century science's invention of 
aeroplanes, kidney machines and light bulbs with the revelation of Islam. The 
discoveries of science are so powerful aLnd pervasive that Muslims throughout 
the world seek to incorporate them within the Islamic vision. 
For most Bosnian Muslims, and many new mystics, this combination is simply 
the mixture of bits and pieces of science with an assortment of other ideas. 
Yet it is not wholly self-contradictory and Ba! teskija's chronicle for the year 
1779//80 provides an interesting illustration of how scientific discoveries may 
be accomodated with religious truths. For about three months there had been no 
rain so it was decided that special prayers should be made in the mosques and 
by mekteb children. After a month the rain came and was greeted by the 
townsfolk as an answer to their prayer. Bateskija, however, said that the prayer 
had not brought about the rain - "to pray for rain is simply a sign of 
submission and service to God". He said, furthermore, that through his study of 
astronomy he had already known that there would be rain at the end of the 
month. For this he was criticised by those who thought he was suggesting that 
the rain was governed by the material world rather than by God. But Baý. eskija 
points out that his conclusion on the basis of the science of astronomy does 
not disprove that God causes the rain for "things will be as God wills, whether 
we know of it (in advance) or not". Scientific investigation is merely a way of 
gaining knowledge about God's will and scientific discoveries do not disprove 
that this will is the cause of earthly phenomena. 
Sarajevo's new mystics seem to be in accord with Baý. eskija. Bosnian Muslims 
believe that individual dreams have meanings not only for the dreamer but for 
those who are dreamt about. The new mystics are particularly interested in 
dreams which they feel a sheikh is most capable of being able to interpret. One 
night I dreamt that the sister of a mystic friend of mine had married a 
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Cambridge anthropologist and had a baby. I went to ask my friend the meaning of 
this dream and she told me that babies usually meant trouble and anxiety but 
that if I wanted a more detailed explanation I should ask the sheikh. So I asked 
her a larger, more general question: "How can we know what our dreams mean? ". 
Her immediate reply was: "Well, you know what Freud says about it". 
This woman had learnt about Freud at school and believed him to be a 
modern scientific psychologist. Through my question I had hoped to learn 
something about the Islamic interpretation of dreams but to her it did not seem 
out of place to raise the psychologist's name, and she did so to prove neither 
science's inadequacy in comparison with Islam nor Freud's inadequacy in 
comparison with the sheikh. The "scientific" explanation was not seen as 
disproving that the dreams were messages caused by God, for both the Freudian 
and the Islamic interpretation of dreams, although different, seemed to her to 
be true. 
For the new mystics both interpretations gave the meaning of a dream 
which is the product of the unconscious mind which Is created by God. The root 
of both meanings is therefore God and the meanings are joined in God's will. An 
example from Islamic philosophy of the 14th century illustrates this idea of the 
co-existence of scientific and hidden religious meanings. Ibn Qayyim posed the 
question of why the newborn baby cries and answered that there were two true 
explanations. One was the apparent reason, sahab zahir, (the scholar Implies that 
this is the fact that the baby is delivered into a cold, new environment and is 
shocked), the other a hidden reason, sahab batin, which is that every human has 
its own demon and this demon stabs the child at the moment of its birth. (See 
Musallam note 75 p-142). 
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Islamic Revival? 
In many parts of the contemporary Muslim world disatisfaction with secullar 
and religious leadership has led to the emergence of new, religiously inspired 
tendencies or movements, and thence to the widespread observation that some 
'Islamic Revival' is underway. Sarajevo's new mysticism bears a relationship to 
these other tendencies and movements but it is necessary to mention two 
Ca Vea ts. 
The first is that whilst it may be said that there Is Islamic Revival in 
Sarajevo, there is not Islamic Revivalism. A number of the town's Muslims, after 
years of comparative religious laxity, have become inspired by the Islamic faith 
and now attempt to live their lives in what they see as strict accordance with 
Its teachings. Always Muslims in name, they feel that they have now rediscovered 
Islam. A smaller (far smaller) number of individuals born into Christian families 
have taken on the Islamic faith. These people speak of themselves not as 
converts but as having "returned" to Islam since they believe that all humans 
are born as Muslims and only later diverted from the true path. The consequent 
increase in highly self-conscious and strict adherence to Islam objectively 
constitutes some sort of revival. At the same time, the individuaJs in question 
feel the increase to be a revival since they see themselves as rediscoverers or 
returners, not as discoverers or converts. 
Yet the tendency is not revivalist in nature. In Muslim dominated societies 
Muslim activists often insist on the need for a return to the ways of the past, 
of the Prophet, his companions and the early Muslim community. This, as has been 
seen, was the case of the eighteenth century Kaditevci. In modern Sarajevo too 
the early days are taken as a model but a desire for a return to the past is 
not the main thrust of the tendency. Rather than looking to a former time, the 
Muslims in question look to another place. This place is the Arab and Turkish 
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world. Far more than seeking to Identify with a bygo-ne era, t-hey seek to 
identify with the outside Islamic Umma, a community to which the Kadiýevci I. / 
legally belonged but from which contemporary Bosnia is politically cu, ý off. 
The second caveat concerns the term "fundamentalism". The beliefs of the 
revived Muslims of Sarajevo share many features with those of Islamic 
fundamentalist movements in other parts of the world. There is a strong 
emphasis on the scriptures and on Islam as a universally and timelessly 
applicable religion, as true in twentieth century New Zealand as in seventh 
century Arabia. For this reason, and because the term fundamentalism has no 
clear or clearly agreed upon definition, It is tempting to include the Sarajevan 
tendency under the broad banner of fundamentalism. There are, however', two 
reasons for avoiding such a course. 
The first lies in the common disassociation of fundamentalist and sufi or 
mystical trends. It is frequently the case that the proponents of fundamentalism 
are hostile to mysticism and the sufi brotherhoods. This Is not always so and a 
hatred of mysticism or sufism can form no proper part of any definition of 
fundamentalism. However, because it is often the case, the term "fundamentalism" 
to many readers implies an antagonism towards sufi mysticism. The Sarajevan 
tendency is not, as has been seen, opposed to such mysticism and to style it 
'fundamentalist' would therefore be a source of confusion. 
Secondly, and more importantly, those movements commonly identified as 
fundamentalist tend to have political aspirations with regard to the stati! s of 
Islamic law. They aim to establish S'hari'd law as state law. in Sarajevo there is 
no movement pressing for changes in the law, there is a tendency pressirlQ', for 
changes In the values and behaviour of Muslims in their personal and familial 
lives. This focus on personal behaviour rather than on legal change Is a 
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response to Muslim status as a minority in a socialist state which will tolerate 
no overt political demands from religious communities. 
New Mysticism and IdentU 
At this point I want to return to the question of identity. For most 
Bosnian Muslims religious and national affiliation are closely linked and 
therefore the woman who asked what my nationality was could not be satisfied 
until I told her my religion (see p. 20). These Muslims tended to accept me as a 
member of another group, an English "Protestant", whatever that was. They were 
occasionally interested in the rituals and customs of my people and the 
differences between these and their own. Their enquiries as to whether I would 
consider conversion were light hearted and usually based on the joke about my 
marrying some nice Muslim boy and settling in Sarajevo for good. The idea was 
thus that I would convert only if I joined their society through marriage. 
For the new mystics being a Muslim is less a matter of nationality or 
family origin than one of personal choice. They respected the fact that I had my 
own faith and many thought that "the most important thing is to believe" rather 
than be an atheist. They did not, however, feel my religious identity to be fixed 
in consequence of my birth and provenance. I might be English but they knew 
that there were Muslims in England and there was always the possibility, and 
often the hope, that I would convert to Islam out of personal conviction. For 
them Islam was a universally applicable faith to be joined by choice and it was 
for this reason, and not only because of the frequent similarity in our ages, 
that they tended to be particularly eager and loquacious informants. 
If non-Muslim birth and provenance are not seen as a strong barrier to 
Islamic faith it is also the case that Muslim birth and provenance are not seen 
as a guarantee of It. Even the person born into 8 Muslim family must choose 
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Islam In order to be a true Muslim. This fact explains the strange conversation 
I heard between a new mystic friend and his nine year old cousin. The cousin 
had aske d whether he himself was a Muslim. The ordinary answer to such a 
question from a child would be a simple yes, but my friend asked the boy 
whether he thought he was a Muslim. Either out of curiosity or mischief the 
child said no, and received the reply: "Well then you're not". Naturally this 
small boy had neither converted from Islam nor insisted that he was an atheist 
so that for most Bosnians there would be no question but that he was a Muslim. 
For the new mystics, however, a person must choose and believe in Islam to be a 
true Muslim. 
The Islamic community is seen as a community of choice. Those nominal 
Muslims who do not positively choose their faith are therefore no closer to the 
Islamic community than are Christians to whom Islam is potentially open if they 
choose to embrace it. 
For the new mystics then, the three way divide between Muslim, Serb and 
Catholic Is of lesser importance than the two way divide between those who have 
chosen Islam and are therefore part of the true Islamic community, and all other 
Muslims plus Christians, Jews, Hindus etc. (The category of atheists is perhaps 
a third, and the lowest ranking of all. ) From those other Muslims new mystics 
feel a distance which in some respects they accentuate in their behaviour. Some 
mystic women mark this distance by dressing in long skirts, sleeves and 
headscarves. This outfit is said to be adopted in obedience to Quranic 
prescription but one obvious effect is to distinguish the true Islamic believer 
from the general public for in a town where Western style is the general ideal 
of the young, the abundantly clothed young woman is a conspicuous oddity. 
Sometimes marking distance amounted almost to a rejection of those on the 
other side of the divide. This became clear with regard to their attitude 
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towards a close female friend of mine. Her family were of peasant origin, her 
father a skilled worker who did not practice his faith, her mother a housewife 
who fasted and occasionally prayed but who was illiterate and relatively 
ignorant of the scriptures. The friend herself believed in God but was at the 
same time a Communist Party member who neither prayed nor fasted. My new 
mystic friends were extremely sceptical of this woman and of her influence on 
me. Some were openly rude about her, many were impolitely dismissive and all 
were unwilling to meet her. 
This friend of mine could be shunned by the new mystics but it was not 
possible for them to treat their own families, many of whom were little 
different from that of my friend, in the same way. Only one new mystic, a woman 
who had converted from Catholicism had actually broken off relations with her 
family. Amongst the others, however, some desire to create distance between self 
and family was apparent. Many new mystics had married young or were impatiently 
awaiting the man's acquistion of a job in order to do so. They supported the 
Ideal of early marriage by quoting a hadith in which the Prophet says that only 
five things should be done with speed - paying debts, praying, burying the dead, 
serving guests and marrying. Yet it was clear that part of their impatience for 
marriage was related to a desire to break away from their natal families and 
establish their own autonomous nuclear family units; units within which the 
children would be brought up in true piety and religious observance, as members 
of the true Islamic community. 
This community Is of course conceived of as one adhering to the principles 
of Islam, hence the new mystics reliance on Quran, hadiths and sheikhly guidance 
to Justify their behaviour and beliefs. At the same time it is seen as 
community, membership of which lifts the Sarajevan Muslim beyond the bounds of 
Bosnian Islam and into the worldwide Umma. Westerners like Cousteau and Quinn 
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form part of this Umma but it is above all Arabia and Turkey which figure in 
the new mystics' vision of the Islamic community. 
In their ordinary conversation topics such as the beauty of Turkish 
mosques and the spirituality of Ramazan in the Arab world are frequently raised. 
The idealisation of Arabia may go to the extent of asserting, as did one new 
mystic, that Saudi women wear the veil aswell as a head covering because they 
are so beautiful that men would otherwise be distracted in the streets. 
It has been said that new mysticism does not seek the enstatement or 
recognition of Shari's law in Bosnia but to promote values seen as Islamic 
within personal and family relationships. Chief among these virtues are modesty 
and respect. Thus, for example, they are against seaside holidays (because of 
the scanty clothing) and physically expressed affection of any sort before 
marriage (other Muslim girlfriends and boyfriends may kiss and caress, the new 
mystics do not). Any mention of the need for modesty and respect is frequently 
followed by some reference to Muslim practice in the Arab or Turkish world. 
One recently married woman told me of the promise that her husband had 
made on their wedding day. The groom said that now he had married her he would 
love her just as much tomorrow "without arms, without legs, without a nose". 
This, she concluded, was "Pravi. Islamski Ljubav" - the True Islamic Love - and, 
she added, a love of the type so lacking in modern Yugoslavia but existant in 
Muslim countries. A great admiration was felt for the fact that young Turkish 
boys are adept recitors of the Quran. This was felt to be the result of proper 
relations of respect and obedience between parent and child, the former guiding 
the latter in the service of God. Conversations about modest clothing for women 
might be followed by observations that such covering explained low rates of 
adultery and sexual harrassment in Muslim countries. 
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Such examples are just indications of the new mystics, interest in, 
reverence of and wish to be identified with those places which seem to them to 
be the heartland of the Muslim world. This wish was such that they were 
sometimes bemused by my own desire to study in Sarajevo. Other Muslims might 
wonder why I was interested in Islam or Muslims at all; the mystics could 
understand that but wondered why I chose Bosnia rather than an Arab country. 
The new mystics are intellectuals rather than sensationalists. They appear 
similar, in certain respects, to the contemporary Islamic fundamentalists whilst 
in others they seem close to the sufi thinkers of old. Why has such a revival 
come about in this form? It cannot be overlooked that, to some extent, the 
young Sarajevan enthusiasts simply resemble other young people of the West who 
turn to Hare Krishna, Baghwan Shree Rajneesh and charismatic Christianity. 
Indeed one of the young male mystics had previously had a Buddhist phase, was 
fascinated by the mysticism of Carlos Castaneda and believed firmly in a 
worldwide conspiracy of Freemasons. He sought the mysterious and colourful 
everywhere and perhaps Islam provided the best version of this for him. Islam is 
fashionable and as one mystic put it: "it's modern to be Muslim". At the same 
time it is the case that the Iranian revolution and the Afghan war have proved 
an inspiration for Muslims in Bosnia and throughout the world, at least to the 
extent of demonstrating that Islam need not be a waning force in modern times. 
However, the scale and intensity of the revival call for some more specific 
explanation, for whilst the numerical strength of the mystics themselves is not 
great, their aims and beliefs inspire admiration and respect on the part of many 
Muslims. Even the friend of mine who was shunned by them was somewhat awed, 
thought the mystics good Muslims and would not criticise them as she had been 
criticised. In part we may seek such an explanation in the failure of Bosnia's 
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existing formal religious authorities, the Islamska Zajednica and the dervish 
orders, to present Islam as sufficiently separate from Yugoslav socialism, the 
ideology of a multi-religious, multi-national state. The Zajednica (and the 
dervish orders by virtue of their acquiescence and submission to Zajednica 
authority) present Bosnian Muslim society simply as one component of the 
brotherly and united federation of Yugoslavia. In this regard it is of 
significance that the new mystical tendency has sprung up in the 1980s, a 
period in which the Zajednica has espoused the notion of Yugoslav Socialist 
Patriotism with particular vigour. 
Those Muslims who seek a more compelling identity must also seek an 
alternative religious orientation. A nationalistic Islamic fundamentalist 
movement such as exists in some Muslim majority societies is not currently a 
realistic alternative in Bosnia. The religious alternative that has emerged in 
this Muslim minority is not fundamentalist, but it is scripturalistic and 
puritan. It is not nationalistic in the usual sense of the term, but it does 
provide a strong model of identity, that of unity with a vast and powerful 
worldwide Islamic fraternity. 
Yet this identity might be asserted without the mysticism, the sheikhs and 
the miracles. It is principally in their strict adherence to Quranic prescription 
and values seen as Islamic that the mystics distinguish themselves from 
ordinary Muslims and from the Zajednica, and identify with the outside Umma. The 
importance of mysticism and sheikhs lies elsewhere. To discover where, it is 
instructive to consider the case of another Muslim minority in a socialist 
context; the case of the Soviet Muslims. Bennigsen and Wimbush speak of 
Fundamentalist Suf ism" in the Soviet Union and state that: 
"Contrary to the situation in other countries which have Sufi orders ... where 
fundamenatalist currents and organisations are independent and often 
opposed to Sufi activity, in the Soviet Union fundamentalist and radical 
Sufi tendencies are often, but not always, in harmony ... It Is logical that 
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these two trends, the poorly organised fundamentalist- intellectual and 4-he 
highly structured Sufi-popular, should meet and, at critical junctures, 
merge. " (Bennigsen & Wimbush 1985) 
The Soviet recipe Is then Sufi organisation plus fundamentalist thinking, 
and this basic recipe seems to hold good in Sarajevo. It is through their firm 
scripturalism that the new mystics make some sort of opposition to the 
Zajednica. Sufi mysticism alone could not do this since it has never historically 
been seen in urban Sarajevo as a substitute for the practice of standard ulems 
and Shari's prescribed Islam. At the same time it is the scripturalist trend that 
provides the possibililty of identification with the wider Islamic world. 
It does not, however, provide any sort of organisation. As has been said, 
no formal fundamentalist or scripturalist movement is practically possible in 
Sarajevo and in the abscence of such a movement scripturalism has no leaders, 
authorities or structure. 
It Is this structure which sufi-related mysticism provides. Through their 
reverence for and obedience to the unofficial sheikhs, Sarajevo's new mystics 
create loosely structured networks revolving around these charismatic leaders. 
They do not, of course, constitute a formally bounded group or association and 
are far less organised than their Soviet counterparts. Nevertheless, mysticism 
provides some level of organisation within which the mystics' aims and ideas 
may be expressed. 
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6. MEN, WOMEN AND DEATH RITUALS 
This chapter examines the role of one particular class of religious 
rituals, death rituals, in the assertion of group identity. Sarajevan Muslims 
perform two rites for their dead. The burial service, d2enaza, is performed 
by men in the town's central mosque. Women perform a series of five tevh1d 
rituals in the home of the deceased. I will suggest that in contemporary 
Sarajevo these two rituals express Muslim identity as, on the one hand, a 
subset of wider Islamic identity, and on the other, distinction from the 
Serbs, Catholics, Albanians and other identity groups of the local 
environment. 
If it is the case, as suggested in chapter one, that these two aspects 
of identity have become both more salient and more consciously recognised as 
distinct, since the nineteenth century (and particularly in twentieth century 
socialist Bosnia) then one would expect the dffenaza and the tevhld to have 
had different significances in pre-nineteenth century Bosnia. This, I propose, 
Is indeed the case. Documentary evidence suggests that in Ottoman Bosnia the 
tevhfd was primarily associated not with ordinary women, as it is today, but 
with male dervishes. Its significance at that time was primarily as an aspect 
of mysticism and the dervish path rather than as an expression of Muslim 
identity as distinct from Serb, Catholic and other local identities. That it 
has lost that significance today reflects both the general decline of the 
dervish orders and the rise of new conceptions of identity. 
I will further suggest that examination of the women's tevhid casts 
light on two important questions. The first is the broad question of 
the role 
of women in funerary rites in monotheistic societies. Recent studies of 
the 
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treatment of death in non-monotheistic societies based on traditional 
authority suggest that death Is the occasion for the creation of an ideology 
which legitimates authority (held by men rather than women) within that 
society (Bloch & Parry 1982). Here death rituals carry the message that the 
holders of temporal authority, who are male, are at the same time the 
regenerators of life. Women's roles in funerary rites do not (as proposed by 
Huntingdon & Metcalf 1979) suggest their association with fertility and 
regeneration, rather, women are associated with the polluting and sorrowful 
aspects of death. For monotheistic societies Bloch and Parry state that: 
"funerary rituals only consist of the first of the two sides we have 
mentioned, the polluting and sad aspect of the funeral; the second half, 
the ideological creation of timelessness and fertility, is largely 
absent. " 
For the Bosnian Muslims the authors would then hold that whilst death 
rituals do not assert that the hAers of temporal authority are the source 
of the regeneration of life (fertility lies with God, not with men), the death 
rituals of women do stress the polluting and sorrowful aspects of death. I 
hope to show that this Is not the case. On the contrary, in the attempt to 
assert distinct identity, Bosnian Muslim women stress the sobriety, 
prayerfulness and lack of sorrow of the tevhld as compared to the funerary 
rites of Serbian, Catholic and Albanian women. 
Secondly, I will suggest that the case of the Bosnian womens' death 
ritual casts light on an important but little examined question about gender 
relations in the Muslim world. In recent years a large amount of 
anthropological research has been conducted into the religious role of Muslim 
women in various parts of the world. This research has questioned týýe idea 
that: "Muslim men are expected to be more devout than women... religious 
work is chiefly entrusted ... to men" (Davis 
1984, quoted in Tapper, N& Tapper, 
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R 1987) by demonstrating the fact that Muslim women, as well as performing 
standard rituals such as daily prayer, often conduct their own religious 
rituals and have their own, female religious leaders. However, a question 
remains. This is that of the male attitude to women's religious practices. 
Some of the research into female religious practices has been content merely 
to show that they exist (Fernea E& Fernea R 1972). Some has stressed the 
ways in which women's religious behaviour effects that of men, thus Dwyer 
notes the ways in which women's choice of saints and sufi orders in the 
Taroudannt region of southern Morocco effects that of their sons and 
husbands (Dwyer 1978). Little, however, has adressed the question of men's 
overt attitude to women's religious behaviour; do they denigrate, ignore or 
value it, and why? Thus Dwyer notes that men are disdainful of women's sufi 
cults but does not suggest why this should be so. The Bosnian women's death 
ritual is deemed, by men as well as women, to be one of religious 
significance and value. I will suggest that this evaluation is related to the 
fact that it is a vehicle for the expression of group identity. 
In Sarajevo, in the midst of life one is in death. As one Muslim woman 
put it: "We're all dead already, it's just that we get picked off one by 
one". Muslims find death an absorbing topic of conversation, it is certainly 
their favourite aspect of the daily news. Hardly anyone showed interest in 
watching television news about political events, what stirred them were 
reports of multiple car crashes, aeroplane disasters and loss of life on a 
grand scale 1ý ". The daily newspaper of Bosnia-Hercegovina, Oslobocfenje, 
includes at least four whole pages listing recent deaths and 
displaying the 
photographs of the deceased, Muslim, Serb and Catholic. 
Many readers turn 
straight to these pages which may provide the starting point 
for a 
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conversation on the topic of death. The consensus in these conversations is, 
amongst Muslims, that death is inevitable and likely to strike at any moment. 
Such conversations are not considered in the least ghoulish, even when they 
refer to the physical details of particular deaths. Thus, when one of my own 
relatives died during my fieldwork, Muslim acquaintances were surprised that 
the burial took place several days after the death and questioned me as to 
what was done with the body in the intervening period. Was it frozen? Left 
in the house? It was not considered that I might be disturbed by such a 
conversation because, whilst people are ofcourse upset about the death of 
their relatives, the corpse is only a corpse, a thing to be washed, buried 
and forgotten as quickly as possible (usually by the following day). The 
ensuing death rituals focus on the fate of the soul and the grave is little 
tended '12-. 
Death has such a high profile in Sarajevo that it is hardly surprising 
that it becomes an occasion on which all three groups make assertions of 
their identity. The city graveyard includes five separate sections for 
Muslims, Serbs, Catholics, Jews (of whom a tiny number remained after the 
Second World War) and "Communists". The latter section in fact houses the 
remains of only a small percentage of Communists, the committedly atheist. 
Even some atheist Communists will not be buried in the "Communist" section, 
preferring on death to stress their group identity than their Ideology. 
One exception to this rule was the American bombing of 
Libya. Muslims 
found American (and British) conduct unacceptable and were interested in 
the political dimensions of the event aswell as in the 
loss of life. 
(2) This is in contrast to the Serbian tradition. 
Serbs hold a series of 
graveside banquets on fixed dates after a death. 
See Ribeyrol & 
Schnapper 1976. 
- 196- 
The assertion of Identity is made in another way by the smrtovnica, a 
paper handbill which Bosnians print and have posted on fences and telegraPh 
poles to announce the deaths of their loved ones. The Muslim smrtDvnfcs has 
a green border and is adorned with a star and crescent. The Serbian 
smrtovnica has a cross and either a black or a blue border depending on the 
age of the deceased (Ribeyrol and Schnapper op cit. ) Many Muslims were 
unsure of the exact significance of these non-Muslim smrtovnIce. Some told 
me that the black denoted a Serb and the blue a Catholic. Others believed 
that both were for Serbs but that the blue denoted an atheist Serb. All, 
however, understood the most important thing: that the deceased person 
referred to in the handbill was not a Muslim. 
Assertion of identity through the choice of graveyard plot and assertion 
of identity through the smrtovnica differ in that the former is more 
"exclusive" than the latter. In deciding where to lie in the city graveyard 
atheist Communist Sarajevans must make an exclusive choice as to whether 
they want to stress their group identity or their ideological affiliation. A 
single body cannot rest both in the Communist section and in the 
Muslim/Serb/Catholic/Jewish section at the same time. The smrtovnica does not 
pose this problem since it is possible to combine different decorative 
elements. Thus the Communist Muslim may choose a smrtovnice with a green 
border and a Communist Party red star. 
The fact remains that some assertion of identity is made at death. This 
is not true of the other major event celebrated by all Bosnians regardless 
of their group identity, the event of marriage. In the case of deaý! r,, only 
the most committed atheist and Communist will choose the graveyard's 
Communist section. At marriage, on the other hand, only a few of the '-he 
most devout and meticulous individuals choose to follow the oblýw-3tory civil 
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ceremony with a religious one, be it Islamic, Catholic or Orthodox 13). 
Weddings take place at the town hall and are purely secular in character. 
Muslim newly-weds follow this ceremony with a celebration held at the home 
of the groom's parents. This is devoid of any overt assertions of group 
identity or religious affiliation, although naturally most of the guests, 
family and friends, are also Muslims. Even practising believers are unlikely 
to supplement these arrangements with a religious ceremony. Death and death 
rituals then hold a priveleged place in the arena of identity assertion. 
When a Muslim lies dying those whom he or she has known in life should 
come to the bedside to halaliti (Halalltl is a verb formed in the Serbo- 
Croatian manner and deriving from the Arabic term halal, 
forgiveness), to forgive and be forgiven. Neighbours, as people who live 
nearby, are particularly important in this process. As one turn-of-the- 
century Muslim put it: "a neighbour is more valuable than a first cousin, if 
he lives far away, because while a kinsman is arriving a person could die 
waiting! " (Hangi 1900). 
As the end draws near those present should pray with the dying one, 
encouraging him or her to join in if possible. A woman whom I knew told me 
of the death of her father-in-law. In his last moments he called out for his 
mother so she gently advised him: "No, not like that. Eshedu en ]a illahe 
J11a ]a, eshedu enne Muhammeden resulullah... " Q believe and bear witness 
that there is no God but God, I believe and bear witness that Muhammed is 
his Prophet... ) After death the body is immediately laid on the floor with its 
(3) In Islam marriage Is a civil contract rather than a religious sacrament, 
a fact which may make the Muslim, if not the Christian, lack of 
adherence to religious wedding ceremonial more comprehensible. 
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right side facing Mecca. It must be prepared for burial as soon as possib. 'e. 
If the surviviors have personal friends who are bulas (for a female corpse) 
or imams (for a male corpse) they will call them in to perform the ritual 
washing of the corpse which must be scrubbed three times all over with scap. 
Otherwise they send the corpse to the Muslim mortuary for washing. After 
this purification the body is wrapped in a white shroud and a tesbfh 
(rosary) is laid upon it. It is then put into an open coffin. In Sarajevo 
Muslim burials are performed at midday so unless the deceased has died early 
in the morning the body is likely to remain unburied until the following day. 
In this case it must be watched over all night either by employees of the 
mortuary or, if the corpse remains in the home, by poor Muslims paid by the 
survivors for the task. The deceased's family must also arrange for the 
printing and posting of the smrtovnice. 
Graves are very little tended or visited although close kin may make an 
annual visit on the occasion of Kurban Bajram. The rituals which follow death 
focus on the fate of the soul and involve prayer to God for that soul. 
Indeed, every mention of the dead one's name in the years to come will 
involve a prayer for the soul. This prayer consists of adding the prefix 
rahmetli, "God's mercy on him/her", to the deceased's name. (Rahmet; Arabic, 
mercy. ) Thus one does not say: "My grandmother/father always told me 
but: "My rahmetli grandmother/father always told me... " 
Two types of death ritual follow the demise of any Muslim, male, female, 
child or adult. These are the dtenaza, the burial service performed by men, 
and a series of five tevh1d, performed by women. 
- 199- 
The D2enaza 
As a female I did not have the opportunity of attending a d2enaza and 
this description of the ritual relies on oral accounts given by male 
participants and on educational literature published by the Islamska 
Zajednica. As a Sharila prescribed ritual the d2enaza is dealt with in such 
publications alongside topics such as the correct way of performing daily 
namaz, the giving of alms, the Ramazan fast and so on. 
In Sarajevo dffenaza are performed in the town's central mosque and 
attended by male friends, relatives and neighbours of the deceased. Atheist 
work colleagues may show their respect by gathering in the mosque's 
forecourt but will not join in the service. This begins at 1 o'clock, after 
the midday prayer. The coffin will already have been brought, in a white van 
which serves as a hearse, from the mortuary or from the deceased's home. It 
is laid on the floor at the eastern end of the mosque with its right side 
facing Mecca. The imam stands facing the coffin at the level of Its finger 
tips. Behind him stand the all male congregation in orderly rows (however 
small the congregation, at least three rows must be formed). Apart from the 
presence of the cof fin the scene thus resembles that of daily farz namaz as 
conducted within the mosque. Indeed the d2penaza itself is formally accounted 
prayer of the namaz category. 
The service is a short one conducted entirely in Arabic. It begins with 
the joint recitation of the dzfenaza niflet, the decision and commitment to 
perform the d2enaza. Some form of niJJet is the preface to all namaz, to the 
taking of abdest (ritual purity through washing) which preceeds prayer, to 
the performance of the Hajj and to other religious rites. 
After the nijjet all proclaim the takbfr, "Allahu Ekber", God is the most 
great". This is followed by the subhaneke, a second taktir, salavat, a third 
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takbir, d2enaza dova (the form of which varies according to the age and sex 
of the deceased), a fourth takbir, the selaam and, finally, the fatiha. This 
ends the service and the coffin is taken in the hearse to the city graveyard 
where it is buried. 
I do not intend to give details about the subhaneke, salavat, dova and 
selaam, what is important is that each of these elements is also present in 
standard daily namaz. Informants say of the d2enaza simply that it is the 
Islamic funerary service. This sounds trivial, but in the light of their 
attitudes to the women's tevh1d it is not so. The dffenaza is seen as the 
standard Muslim funeral service which is performed by Muslims the world 
over. The fact that it is performed in the central mosque in which standard 
Islamic services such as those of the two Bajrams and of Lejletul-Kadr are 
celebrated, emphasises the idea that the dffenaza is a standard Muslim ritual 
akin to these. Through their own performance of the dffenaza Bosnian Muslims 
then link themselves with the wider Muslim world. 
The Tevhid 
While men are performing the d2enaza, women are holding the first of 
five tevhids which follow the death of any individual, male or female. The 
word tevhfd is the Serbo-Croatian version of the Arabic tawhid, meaning the 
perfect uniqueness and oneness of God. The concept of tewhid is expressed in 
the shahada, the phrase ]a illahe Ilia ]a, there is no God but God. The 
repetitive chanting of the Shahada forms one section of the tevhid ritual. 
The ritual is held in the home of the deceased and hosted by the 
deceased's wife, daughter, daughter-in-law and/or other close female 
relatives. Most of the women who participate in the tevhid are neighbours 
and close relatives. It is not unusual for more distant kin and affines, even 
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those who live within Sarajevo, not to attend, whereas for a woman to absent 
herself from a tevhid held by a neighbour would be seen as wrong, unless the 
absentee had some good Justification. Such a Justification might be severe 
illness or the need to look after very young children. Children from about 
the age of three Qe. those who are capable of sitting still) may accompany 
their elders to the tevhid. 
The five tevhids; are held on: the funeral day (the 2alosni or sorrow 
tevhid. . Ztalost is a Serbo-Croatian word), the seventh day after death (the 
sedmina tevhid, another Serbo-Croatian term), forty days after death, half a 
year after death and one year after death 111. The "year" in question is that 
of the Islamic lunar calendar, not the state calendar. The f irst, third, 
fourth and fifth of these three dates (calculated, however, by the state 
calendar) are also times at which Serbs perform rituals for their dead. 
Bosnian Muslims are aware of this coincidence of dates but treat the fact 
as an irrelevant one and emphasise how very different their own death 
rituals are from those of non-Muslims. 
The five tevhids differ from each other in some resDects, in particular 
the ffalosni tevhid differs from the other four, but the prayers, chants and 
Quranic recitations are essentially the same in all cases. These are in 
Arabic and, as has been said in chapter three, few people understand their 
meanings, with the exception of such frequently repeated phrases as "Allahu 
Ekber" and "La Illahe illa la". The stated purpose of the tevhid is prayer for 
(4) The Muslims of Montenegro and the Sand2ak, on the other hand, hold 
rituals for the dead only on the day of burial, the seventh day after 
death and the 52nd, the day on which the soul is said to depart from 
the body. These timings correspond to those celebrated by Turkish 
Mus 1 ims. 
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the soul of' the deceased; such prayer is believed to have some influence 
with God 
The tevhid ritual is led by two or more specialist women, known as 
bulas, who are educated in Quranic recitation, the Arabic alphabet and the 
recitation of Turkish and Serbo-Croatian mevlud poems. At two points in the 
service, which lasts for between one and a half and two hours, the bulas may 
choose to speak in Serbo-Croatian, to preach about Islamic teaching on heaven 
and hell or to inform women of imminent Islamic festivals and the behaviour 
appropriate to them. 
As the women arrive (between 50 and 100 of them) they are given coffee 
(except at the falosni tevhid) which is prepared and distributed by daughters 
or young neighbours or relatives of the tevhid holder. Bowls of cigarettes 
are laid out on the tables but few women smoke before the ritual. There is 
quiet gossiping and rearranging of chairs and cushions, the bulas arrive, are 
given coffee and then begin the chant of "Allahu Ekber". On hearing this the 
participants, who are distributed about different rooms of the house, stop 
their conversations and don their headscarves if they have not already done 
so. All have made their ritual ablutions (abdest) before leaving home. The 
bulas take turns in reciting sections of the Quranic chapter known as Ya Sin 
which speaks of heaven, hell and the Judgement Day. After this a bula may, at 
her discretion, choose to comment on the chapter in Serbo-Croatian. 
After these Quranic teachings the women may jointly chant one or two 
salavats. Again, whether or not they chant is decided by the bulas. 
(5) It is not a tenet of the Hanaft School, as It is of the 
Hanbali, that 
prayer for the souls of the deceased always has 
inf luence with God. The 
belief is, nevertheless, held by Bosnian Muslims. 
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The bulas hand out giant tesbihs (rosaries) of 1,000 or 2,000 bead-, -- and 
each woman holds part of the rosary. If there are not enough to go round 
some women may bring out their own individual 33 or 99 bead tesbihs, but it 
is considered more desirable for women to share in a large tesbih. Counting 
off the beads the women repeat the shahada, "la illahe illa Ilah", there is no 
God but God. It is stated that the phrase should be repeated 1,000 times, 
however, an exact one thousand is never counted. During the tesb1h section of 
the ritual each of the bulas, one at a time, will stop her own chanting, pick 
up a book of Quranic passages and read silently to herself. The tesbfh 
chanting is more likely to finish when each of the bulas has finished her 
reading than when any particular number of shahada has been repeated. 
The tesbih chanting is brought to a close when one of the bulas recites 
a short Quranic passage. This is followed by the women passing the tesbih, 
but this time in great handfuls rather than bead by bead. The action is 
accompanied by the chanting, three or four times, of a hymn or flahfja (such 
llahija are also characteristic of the zikr meetings of dervishes and others). 
This sequence of a bula reciting from the Quran followed by joint passing of 
the tesb1h is repeated three times. 
The tesb1h are now gathered up and there is a noticeable relaxation of 
the women's concentration. At this or some later point (except in the case of 
the 281osni tevhid) one or more of the bulas may speak in Serbo-Croatian 
about any impending Islamic festival and the prayers and rituals appropriate 
to it. Bulas may also use this opportunity to promote publications or events 
organised by the Islamska ZaJednica, the official Muslim establishment.. 
The bulas now recite short Quranic chapters, any women who know them 
Joining in. This is followed by joint recititation of some of the more well- 
known chapters, including the fatiha. The bulas then call on individu3l women 
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to recite a chapter alone. After this comes the bulas enjoinment to, for 
example, say three fatlha for the deceased's parents, seven sura ihIas for 
the deceased, three of some other well-known Quranic chapter for all the 
recently dead etc. The final section of the tevhid is the "Amins". The bulas 
pray for forgiveness of sins, the women responding "Amin". This is considered 
an important part of the ritual and the women gather their strength and 
readjust their headscarves for it. (One bula I knew complained of a tevhid 
she had been at where one of the hostesses relatives, a non-believer, did not 
join in the Amins. Whilst finding it strange that the woman should attend at 
all, the bula was not upset by her refusal to join in most of the prayers, 
she was, however, scandalised at her refusal to say the Amins. ) 
Whilst the Amins are being said the young women in charge of coffee- 
making distribute kifla, a type of bread loaf which, although eaten at other 
times is especially associated with the tevhid. Each of the women present 
receives the gift of a kifla which is said to be given by the tevhid holder 
in return for the woman's prayers. 
The formal ritual is now over and the women take off their scarves and 
relax. If it is a 2alosni tevhid most will say a few words to the hostess 
and leave fairly promptly. At later tevhids coffee is handed out again and 
the women settle down to cigarettes and conversation. As the bulas leave the 
hostess hands each an envelope containing money. The money is said to be 
given not for the bula's Quranic recitation, which must be given free of 
charge, but for her time. However, the sums involved are well above the 
average rate of pay for two hours of labour. 
Following Bloch and Parry's surmise we would expect the tevhid to be a 
ritual stressing the sorrow and pollution of death. Pollution, however, is a 
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concept which seems to have little place in the Muslims' view of deýýth. It is 
true that the corpse must be washed for burial but this is taken ; -; s a 
routine ablution similar to that of the taking of abdest, ritual purity 
before prayer. The corpse is not a ritually contaminating object and týi(---: )e 
who wash it need not perform any ablutions or safeguarding prayers and 
rituals before or after they do so. The body is buried quickly and the grave 
largely ignored. 
Sorrow does hold some place in the customs surrounding death. The 
distress of the bereaved is socially recognised and women of the deceased's 
household are, for this reason, not expected to prepare meals for their 
family for the few days following a death. Instead, food will be prepared and 
brought by neighbours. Bereaved women should leave off their Jewellry and 
wear a headscarf for a week after the death in token of their mourning. To 
do so for longer is seen as unnecesary, ostentatious and a level of 
lamentation unacceptable to God by whose will the death has occurred. 
Private grief is recognised and accepted but open and emotional displays 
of it are not. During the fortnight following a death, relatives and female 
friends and neighbours visit the home of the bereaved woman na 2alost, in 
sorrow. They bring small gifts of coffee and sugar which the bereaved woman 
will serve to those who attend the tevhids. The expression na 2alost belies 
the tone and purpose of these visits. The bereaved woman is expected to 
discuss the circumstances of the death but should she cry her visitors will 
encourage her to stop. They make no expressions of regret, instead ofýering 
remarks such as: "S/he was dear to you but must have been dearer t-ý 'Of'. 
If the deceased had suffered a painful illness visitors may comment thal- it 
Jes t", Is better for them to be out of their misery. When an old person 
may tell their hostess: "At least your son/daughter/any young re!; ýtive ýs 
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alive". In the early days of fieldwork I made the mistake of offering the 
bereaved English-style expressions of sorrow. My remarks were met with 
somewhat blank faces until I was informed by a friend that mine was not the 
correct approach. The emphasis of the visits is thus on suppressing rather 
than expressing sorrow. 
Islam forbids lamentation and weeping for the dead 1c--1 and at the 
tevhid, as at the d2enaza, displays of sorrow are strongly discouraged. Of 
course some women do cry at tevhids. I saw one middle aged woman weep at 
the seven day tevhid of her husband; she was politely ignored by most of the 
particpants and discreetly comforted by one close friend and a bula, who 
advised her that she'd do better to pray than to weep. At one forty day 
tevhid a woman wept for her father but was reprimanded for this by her own 
daughters who eventually made her leave the room. 
In their death rituals then, women do not emphasise the sorrowful nature 
of death, they attempt to ignore and overcome it and to concentrate on 
prayer for the benefit of the dead soul. This they are proud of and this, 
very importantly, they contrast with the rampant emotionalism displayed on 
death (so they assert) by women of other identity groups. Serbian women 
lament their dead at the graveside with wailing dirges (Kukatl; to 
wail/lament loudly). Halpern (1967 p. 228) records one such dirge as heard in 
a Serbian village: 
Kuku mene ffto ostavi tvoJu dJecu 
Ko 6e nji gledatf kad njima majka nema?... 
(Woe is me that you have left your children 
Who will look after them when they have no mother?... 
(6) See, for example, Ibn Qayyim al-Jaw--Iyya (d. 1351) Zad a]-Maad vol. l. 
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Sarajevan Muslims are aware of this Serbian custom (many Muslims of 
rural background have heard funereal wailing emanating from the graveyards 
of neighbouring Serbian villages) and find them a subject of mirth. Children 
are sometimes encouraged to amuse the adults by screwing up their faces and 
moaning in imitation: "Kuku mene ... Oti moji... Kuku menell (Woe is me... Oh my 
eyes ... Woe is me). As has been noted in chapter one, Muslims know little of 
the doctrines and beliefs of their Christian neighbours but do know details 
of certain of their rituals, for example, that coloured eggs form part of the 
Easter celebrations. Details of the Serbian funeral with its women's dirges 
are particularly well known and came up often in conversations. They were 
almost invariably contrasted with the decorum of the tevhid. Conversely, 
abstract discussions of the tevhid ritual usually included a favourable 
comparison with the ludicrous and unseemly funereal wailing of Serbs. 
Whether the initial topic was the tevhid or the Serbian funeral, a 
comparison, favourable to the former, was almost inevitably drawn. 
The number of Catholics in Bosnia is about half that of Serbs and they 
form a but a small percentage of the population of the Sand2ak from whence 
originate many Sarajevan Muslims. Most of the Muslims whom I met therefore 
knew less of Catholic funerary rites, and indeed of Catholics in general. 
Nevertheless they tended to assume that Catholic funerary rites included the 
same type of emotional lament as the Serbian funeral. Thus they too could be 
classed in the category of laughable non-Muslim rituals. 
The Albanians (who are also of the Islamic faith) fell victim to the 
same criticism, although phrased in a less humourous and more condemnatory 
style. Albanian women are said by Muslim women to mourn 
loudly and 
uncontrollably, making no efforts to pray for the dead. 
This, I was told, 
was "unislamic", a sin and of no use to the soul of the 
departed. When I 
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brought up the fact that certain other Muslim women, Bangladeshis, for 
example, also wailed for the dead I was told that these women were then in 
error . 
The Muslims are thus aware not only that the tevhid is not performed by 
their Serbian and Catholic neighbours, but also that it is not performed as a 
standard ritual by Muslims the world over. A few are in addition aware that 
it is in fact a ritual unique to the Muslims of Bosnia-Hercegovina. What is 
important is that the tevhid ritual is always spoken of in relation to the 
death rites of other groups, and distinguished from them. The tevhid is then 
seen as distinguishing the Bosnian Muslims from other local groups. 
In contrast, the significance of the d2enaza is that it links the Bosnian 
Muslims with the wider Islamic world. In the sense that it is a Muslim 
rather than a Serbian or Catholic rite, it does of course, in the Bosnian 
context, say something about Bosnian Muslim identity vis-a-vis the other 
groups. (In the same way, the fact that the tevhid involves prayers to Allah 
and praise of the Prophet makes it a rite which is consciously felt to 
belong to and be in accordance with the Islamic faith. ) However, its main 
import lies not in the fact that it is not performed by Serbs and Catholics. 
but in the fact that it is a Sharia prescribed ritual performed by Muslims 
throughout the world. Thus discussions of the d2enaza do not include 
comparisons with the funeral services of Serbs, Catholics and others, what is 
said about the ritual is that it should be performed by all Muslims in 
accordance with the scriptures. 
That it is the worhen's ritual which expresses group identity as 
distinction at home, and the men's ritual which identifies 
Bosnian Muslims 
with the outside Muslim world, is comprehensible in the 
light of social 
relations in Sarajevo. As has been said in chapter two, women exist in and 
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hold together the purely Muslim neighbourhood group whilst the mix-2, -4 world 
of the town is principally the sphere of men. In social and econom.; ý: life it 
is thus women who form the basis of the most cohesive and the most highly 
interacting social group above the level of the nuclear family - the 
neighbourhood. (The kin group, as has been seen, is of relatively little 
importance in terms of social and economic interaction. ) It is men through 
whom families and neighbourhoods are linked to the wider life of Sarajevo. 
The two sorts of identity assertion made by the male and the female death 
ritual then accord with gender roles in the wider field of social and 
economic life in Sarajevo. 
If the strong distinction between the two aspects of Identity as they 
are currently conceived in Muslim Sarajevo is a relatively new phenomenon, 
what significance did the tevhid have in earlier times? Documentary evidence 
suggests that it was strongly associated with the dervish orders. The f irst 
written reference to the ritual is found in a document dated 1612 which lays 
down the obligations of the sheikh and dervishes of the Naqshbandi hanikah 
of Mostar. The document states that the sheikh and dervishes must perform 
tevhid, to prolong the life of the hanikah's founder and to benefit his soul 
after death, every day following morning prayer. Using a tesbih each of 
the 
participants must say 1,000 shdhada, 100 salavat, three sura fhlas and one 
fatihe (ýehajid 1986). 
In his chronicle for the year 1779/80 Baseskija notes that 
he and some 
friends got together every Thursday evening to perform tevhid 
"like in the 
tekija". In 1782/83 he notes the death of the son of the sheikh of 
the 
Sarajevo Kadiri tekija. As the body was carried away from t-, tý d2enaza 
to be 
bur ied: 
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"the Mevlevi sheikh Osman-Dede loudly recited tevhid... Mula Omer, imam of the Kebkebirove mosque, attacked sheikh Osman and screamed 'Why are you shouting like that? Bringing in innovations! ' However, in an instant, 
sheikh Osman grabbed him by his huge beard and tugged him to the 
ground ... The people began to recite salavat to the Prophet and to rebuke the Kadldevcl. " (The Kadidevci were a puritanical sect strongly opposed to the dervishes. See chapter five. ) 
Bateskija does make one mention in the chronicle he kept for over f if ty 
years of the fact that women performed tevhid. In 1780/81 he notes the 
death of: 
"old dervish Mujo who never married. Very pious and poor, he was, 
feminine in character. He liked to associate with old people and 
especially with women with whom he'd recite tevhid. " 
However, the tevhid seems, in Ottoman times, to have been primarily 
associated with the dervish orders. Today it has lost this association. Women 
who perform tevhid are unaware of its origins and many do not even know 
what the term "dervish" means, even those who live within a few minutes walk 
of the Sarajevo Kadiri tekija. 
It is true that a mu. 4ki tevh1d, male tevhid, is sometimes performed for 
and by dervishes. This occurs not on five separate occasions after a death 
but only on the anniversaries of a death and only for particularly 
distinguished and well known dervishes. The mu. 4ki tevh1d may be performed in 
a mosque, tekija or private home. It may be attended by both men and women 
but the two will sit in separate rooms of the house or areas of the mosque 
or tekija. The basis of the ritual is the hatma, the complete recitation of 
the Quran. Each of the men present quietly recites to himself a certain 
number of pages of the Quran, the net result of their joint efforts being a 
hatma. The women may recite Quranic chapters to themselves, sit silently or 
even gossip quietly. The muAl tevhfd does not include the repetition of the 
shahada. la Mahe J11a ]a which is characteristic both of zikr, the central 
rite of the dervish orders, and of the women's tevhid. Furthermore, it Is 
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seen very much as an optional ritual which need not be performed. This is 
not true of the tevhid. The word tevh1d itself is commonly taken as 
referring to the women's ritual, and not to the men's. 
The decline of the association of dervishes with the tevhid is related 
to the general decline of the orders. The fact that the tevhid has gained a 
new significance is related to the emergence of new conceptions of Bosnian 
Muslim identity. 
At this point some mention should be made of the Islamska Zajednica's 
influence on the tevhid ritual. In 1952 the Muslim establishment officially 
pronounced the tevhid an acceptable customary death ritual. As has been seen 
in chapter four, it has also taken bulas into its own employee structure; 
those who require a bula to conduct a tevhid now contact her through the 
Zajednica rather than through personal connections. Both actions may be seen 
as aspects of the Zajednica's attempt to control an ever greater sphere of 
Muslim religious activity. In this case the strategy has been to bring both 
the ritual and its conductors, the bulas, under its wing, whereas In the case 
of the dervish orders the initial tactic was to crush them completely. 
At the tevhid bulas may choose to speak in Serbo-Croatian on the subject 
of impending Islamic festivals and Islamska Zajednica organised events, or to 
sell copies of newspapers and magazines published by the Za, ý, ednfca. In this 
way the establishment spreads its message into spheres which were previously 
immune to it. However, certain of the Zajednica's attitudes to the tevhid are 
resisted by women. I once attended a tevhid to which the Zajednica office 
had sent not only two bulas but also a male imam who gave a sermcn. 
Although neither the tevhid hostess nor the participants complained openly, 
all grumbled about this innovation behind the man's ba, --'K and 
de! -i, --e-ý 
ZaJednica's action. 
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Both the tevhid and the dlenaza are viewed, by women and men, as being 
rituals of religious significance and value. It is true, however, that whilst 
the d2enaza Is seen as a ritual which must be performed for all Muslims, the 
tevhid is not. Only the most committed atheist Communist of Muslim origin 
will choose a secular funeral ceremony instead of the d2enaza. On the other 
hand, economic and other factors may dissuade a household from hosting 
tevhids for their dead. If the house is not large enough to hold the 
potential participants, or the family can not afford to pay the bulas, they 
may not perform the tevhid. Instead they pay a small sum to the Islamska 
Zajednica in order that a hatma be performed for the deceased's soul in the 
local mosque during Ramazan. This, however, is viewed as a vastly inferior 
option and only those in the most straightened of circumstances will resort 
to it. Many tevhid holders complained about having to host the ritual, saying 
that women came only to pry into the running of the household, the number 
of coffee bowls, the quality of the furniture and so on, rather than out of 
respect for the dead and to pray sincerely for the soul. Sometimes they 
remarked that they would rather have paid for a hatma to be made in the 
mosque. That most do not In fact choose this alternative is due to the need 
for households to present a good image to the world, an image Of orderliness 
and material well being. In this regard it is interesting to note that Muslim 
Gypsies who have settled in Sarajevo and hope to improve their status 
(Gypsies are typically viewed in Bosnia as lazy and thieving) have begun to 
perform the tevhid ritual (Softid 1984). 
Although not a necessary one then, the tevhid is universally regarded 
as a rite of religious importance. Men do not see it as peripheral or 
religiously irrelevant. In this respect it differs from many of the rituals 
performed by women in other parts of the Muslim world. 
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Historically, the Muslim society most closely related to the Bosnian 
Muslims is, by reason of four hundred years of Ottoman rule, that of the 
Turks. It Is therefore instructive to look at the death rituals performed by 
Turkish women in an attempt to understand what it is about Bosnia that 
allows women's rituals to be so highly regarded by men. In the Turkish town 
of Egridir, women perform mevluds for the dead (Tapper, N 1983, and Tapper, 
N& Tapper, R 1987). The ritual is based on the recitation of a long, Turkish 
language mevlud poem about the birth and life of the Prophet. The men of 
Egridir perform meviuds on three types of occasion; for death, for marriages 
and circumcisions, and for the five annual kandil festivals. These male 
mevluds: 
"vary little in style. They are short and formal, allow little display of 
emotion, and offer little scope for the cantors or sponsors to manage or 
vary the impact of any particular service. " (Tapper N& Tapper R op. cit) 
Women's mevluds are almost always performed in the context of death and 
occur on the the funeral day and any or all of the following occasions: the 
seventh, the fortieth and the 52nd day after death and on the anniversary of 
death. They are held in private homes and attended only by women. They are 
longer, more emotional and more complex in structure than the mevluds of 
men. Further, the women who lead the ritual, known as hogas, may improvise 
and innovate in order to vary the content of particular different mevlud 
rituals. The section of the poem which deals with the confinement and 
delivery of the Prophet's mother is performatively the most elaborate of the 
women's ritual. Nancy Tapper (op. cit) has argued that the women's mevlud Is 
an intense religious experience which focuses on birth and motherhood and 
emphasises the equality of all women as mothers. In this it is opposed to 
the secular "reception days" hosted by women of high social standing and in 
which women come together, not as equals, but as adjuncts of their husbands 
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or fathers and thus as competitors for social status. 
In many respects the Bosnian women's tevhid and the Egridirlan women's 
mevlud are similar. Both are performed for the dead and both are attended 
only by women and conducted by female specialists. Both are longer and more 
complex in structure and involve a higher level of improvisation than the 
male rituals with which they are associated (Bosnian d2enaza and Egridirian 
male mevlud). In an important respect, however, they differ. Bosnian Muslim 
men have a high regard for the religious value of the tevhid. Egridirian men, 
on the other hand, whilst admitting that the women's mevlud is broadly 
"spiritual" (manevf) as opposed to "worldly" (dunyevi), deny that it has any 
religious significance and criticise its over-emotionalism. 
How can we account for this specific difference and, looking beyond 
Bosnia and Turkey, what conditions seem to be associated with those Muslim 
contexts in which men overtly recognise women's rituals and religious 
pursuits and leaders as worthwhile? Initially, a clue seems to lie in the 
fact that the Egridirian women's ritual emphasises motherhood and the 
equality of all women rather than more general values. It seems a possible 
hypothesis that men will undervalue those rituals which are not only 
exclusive to women but appear to concentrate on issues specific to women. 
This is certainly not the case of the Bosnian women's tevhid which consists 
of prayer for the soul of the dead and not of any specifically feminine 
traits. 
Yet such a correlation will not provide a broad explanatory framework. 
Turning back to Dwyer's work on the Muslims of the Taroudannt region of 
southern Morocco (see p. 195 above) we see that this is so' In the Taroudannt 
a large percentage of both men and women are Involved in saint cults and 
Sufism. Dwyer suggests a figure of 92%. Whilst women may have 
loyalties to 
- 215 - 
saints who are specifically believed to offer help and protection in matters 
of fertility and childcare Qe- saints whose powers are deemed to be of 
particular value in women's lives), they are at the same time members of sufi 
orders which are also adhered to by men. In some cases these orders have 
separate male and female sections, each with its own hierarchy of religious 
officials. For example, the Jilaliy, ben Nasriy and Derqawiy orders all have 
female sections which are formally organised and have their own female 
leaders. Members of these female sections meet to worship at their own 
shrines. The female sections initiate their own new members. However, 
members of the male and female sections of, for example the Jilaliy order, 
are still conceived as belonging to the same order and bearing loyalty to 
the same saint-founder of the order. Beyond the fact that the female section 
is composed of and lead by women, there is nothing specifically female about 
it. Nevertheless: "From a male perspective, these groups are peripheral" and 
are "ignored and scorned by men" (op. cit p. 594). It does not thus seem to be 
the case that female religious groups or rituals will be respected by men 
when their aims do not appear to be specifically related to female concerns. 
Perhaps an obvious place to look for explanations of the difference 
between male evaluation of the Sarajevan tevhid and of the Egridirian mevlud, 
is the general field of gender relations in the respective towns. SaraJevan 
Muslim women are not closeted in the private sphere of the home and 
inhibited from meeting any but their closest kin and aff ines, they are 
the 
basis of the social world of the neighbourhood. They are not 
felt to be 
dangerous in that they are the route through which shame may enter a 
family, 
for example, through premarital loss of virginity. In contrast, 
Turkish 
society segregates the sexes more rigidly, ideas of 
honour and shame prevail 
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and women are seen as having a propensity for bringing the latter upon their 
families. 
However, the hypothesis that the general field of gender relations 
conditions the view that men take of female religious activities is 
confounded by the case of the Mzab of Algeria. The Mzab are a group of Ibadi 
Muslims surrounded by Sunni populations (see Farrag 1969). In Mzbite society 
men and women are strictly segregated. Women veil in public to the extent 
that only one eye is visible and even this one eye may be turned to the wall 
when a man passes by. During the Ramazan fast a post-pubescent woman must 
not be seen (even when veiled) by any non-related male or the fast will be 
considered as broken. The premarital loss of a women's virginity is a shame 
which can only be expunged by her death at the hand of her father or 
brother. Men see this shame as the result of the woman's unrestrained sexual 
desires whereas women take it as caused by a combination of the woman's 
foolishness and the man's evil passions. Both sexes, however, agree that it is 
through women that shame is brought upon a family. 
One might then expect that this would be a society in which female 
religious activities and leaders would be ignored or denigrated by men. This 
is not, however, the case. Traditionally, each of the seven Mzbite towns in 
the region had its own Ozzaba, a council of elected men who oversaw the 
religious and moral life of men, punished offenders and presided over rituals 
at which the offenders came to repent publicly. A women's council, the 
Azzabat, performed the same functions with regard to women. In post- 
independence Algeria the Ozzaba began to lose its authority over men who 
flouted its rulings to the extent that some would drink within 
the walls of 
the town - previously a grievous offence. The 
Azzabat did not find its 
authority slipping in this way (at least not amongst all 
but the wealthiest 
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of women). It was not simply that women continued to recognise the authority 
of the Azzabat as legitimate; men also continued to do so, even when its 
rulings ran counter to their own personal interests. Thus when the Azzabat 
forbade women to listen to the radio (which caused problems for men whose 
wives would run out of the house if the radio were switched on) the men did 
not instruct their wives to ignore this ruling but went to their own council, 
the Ozzaba, and requested it to reason with the Azzabat, the women's council. 
Negotiations between the two councils began but the Azzabat was adamant and 
women continued to refuse to remain within hearing of a radio. Eventually 
the Azzabat did change its ruling when it decided that it might result in 
Mzbite men marrying non-Mzbite women who were not averse to the radio. The 
motivation was thus to prevent the out-marriage of Mzbite men. Many of the 
Azzabat's other rulings had a similar intent, for example, the ruling that a 
woman could not leave the Mzab region was intended to prevent them from 
accompanying their husbands when they went to do wage labour in the north 
of Algeria. It was felt that this would eventually lead to the permanent 
settlement of whole Mzbite families outside the Mzab region and the 
acculturation of Mzbite children into Algerian society. The women's Azzabat 
thus sought to preserve the distinct collective identity of the 
Mzab. This 
point is an important one. 
The prevalence of notions of honour and shame or of strong sexual 
segregation does not then seem to govern the light in which men view 
the 
rituals and religious leaders of women. I suggest that 
the occurence of a 
positive male evaluation of women's religious activity 
is associated with 
Muslim societies which are minorities and define 
their identity (at least 
partially) in terms of distinction from other neighbouring groups. 
The 
Bosnian Muslims obviously fit this description; so 
too do the Mzab. As has 
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been said, the Mzab are Ibadi Muslims who are immediately neighboured by 
Sunni populations and who exist within the Algerian state. They characterise 
their Sunni neighbours as lazy and shiftless and are concerned to protect 
themselves as a group from acculturation into wider Algerian society. In this 
context, the women's Azzabat is respected by men as a religious body because 
it emphasises and seeks to maintain boundaries between the Mzab and their 
non-Mzab neighbours and fellow countrymen. In contrast, the question of 
group Identity and inter-group boundaries is of little Importance in the 
Taroudannt region of Morocco, and the Turkish Muslims of Egridir are staunch 
Turkish nationalists and supporters of the republican state and do not 
define their identity in terms of distinction from neighbouring groups (7. ). 
(See chapter four and Tapper R& Tapper N 1987) 
(7) The Egridirian population do distinguish themselves from the local and 
supposedly transient population of migrant Kurdish labourers whom 
they 
characterise as lazy and troublemaking. However, the Turks clearly 
have 
the upper hand economically, politically and numerically, 
in Egridir as 
throughout Turkey, and cannot be said to define their identity in terms 
of distinction from the Kurds. 
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CONCLUSIONS AND SOME COMPARISONS 
Throughout the world stateless minorities are pressing for various forms 
of political recognition and in many parts of it Islam is taking on new 
political roles. In the Bosnian Muslim case both themes are accentuated for the 
historical and political context of Yugoslavia makes the necessity of asserting 
identity and the centrality of religion to it, inevitable. Thus whilst Bosnia's 
Muslims have spawned neither a fierce and outspoken nationalism nor an Islamic 
fundamentalist movement (although increasing instability in Yugoslavia makes the 
former a possibility and the latter, at least in a modified form, not wholly 
implausible), their example nevertheless offers insight into the roots of these 
phenomena. It is these roots, the popular understanding and use of ideas of 
national identity and of Islam, that I hope to have illuminated. 
It should by now be clear that Islam is crucial to the Bosnian Muslim 
minority's self-perception of collective identity, Just as Catholicism is central 
to that of the Croats and Orthodoxy to that of the Serbs. Nems Erpstva bez tri 
prsta - there's no Serbianlness without the three f ingers (a reference to the 
Orthodox manner of crossing onself), and there's no Croat without Catholicism or 
Muslim without Islam. But a question remains. Islam may be of importance to the 
Muslims identity, but is there anything we could call "Islamic" about the social, 
political and religious trends discernible in Muslim Sarajevo? Is there anything 
about these processes here which allows us to see them as sharing meaningful 
features with those of other Muslim societies, or should we see this case 
merely as another example of ethnic assertion (like that of the Sikhs, Bretons, 
and Palestinians), albeit opportunistically pursued under the banner of Islam? I 
suggest that there Is something peculiarly Islamic here, that the organisational 
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forms and the philosophies which have developed in Muslim Bosnia share 
something fundamental with those of the Muslim world in general, both past and 
present. 
The history of Islam is the history of societies in which a variety of 
religious styles have always co-existed and sometimes competed. Voll (1982) 
outlines four such basic orientations: 
1. The adaptationist which implies pragmatic adjustment to new circumstances. 
The early Empires (Ummayad, Abbasid), the Sultanates and the religious 
syncretism of India's Akbar provide examples. 
2. The conservative. Typically espoused by the ulema, conservatism checks the 
rise of serious deviations and compromises springing from adaptationist 
styles of leadership. Conservative forces may accept change once it is 
firmly established and in this differ from... 
3. The "fundamentalist" orientation, intent on drawing the community back to 
the original revelation, to the Quran, the hadiths and Sunna (Sunnis) and 
the traditions of Ali and the Imams (Shl'ites). The Kharijites, the 
eighteenth century Wahhabis and the contemporary Iranians provide 
examples. (It should be pointed out that whilst twentieth century 
fundamentalism shares the the ideals of its forebears its potential for 
social effectiveness is much greater. Whilst the dissenting Kharijites 
merely separated themselves from the Sunnis, Iranian fundamentalists may 
draw on police forces, military and civilian technology and the modern 
state structure to encourage or impose fundamentalism. ) 
4. The individualist which relies on charismatic leadership and mediation 
between God and man. The Shilites early split from the Sunnis was the 
result of the former's Insistence that Ali was divinely and specifically 
ordained as leader of the Islamic community. The popular belief in mahdfs 
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(for example, in Sudan) and the sufi orders tradition of spiritual guidance 
between sheikh and follower also embody this style. 
In Bosnia these orientations, particularly the first, third and fourth, are 
evident. The Islamska Zajednica is clearly adaptationist in outlook whilst the 
new mysticism (like the Parallel Islam of the Soviet Union) combines both 
individualist and fundamentalist traits. Bosnia's Muslims thus appear to draw on 
the common pool of forms available to and characteristic of Muslims throughout 
h is tory. 
But Is this observation trivial? It may be objected that adaptationism, 
individualism and fundamentalism are such obvious and basic reactions that they 
are common not only to Islam but to all world religions. In the case of 
adaptationism this certainly seems true; it is hard to imagine a religion 
without adaptationist trends and we have seen that Bosnia's Christian 
establishments are as amenable to allying socialism with religious ideology as 
is their Islamic counterpart. The picture is less clear for individualism and 
fundamentalism. The Roman Catholic Church is frequently held up as an example 
of the mediationist variety of Christianity. In Martin Luther's Protestantism and 
in some contemporary Protestant sects - Plymouth Brethren, Amish, "Born Agains" 
- we may see fundamentalism. Yet the fact that the two trends are found on 
opposite sides of the Catholic/Protestant divide is revealing in that it 
suggests their inability to co-exist within a single Christian Church. In Islam 
the presence of diverse orientations within a single society has sometimes led 
to schism, as for example in the cases of Kharijite and Shi'ite. However, the 
doctrinal distance between Shilite, Kharijite and Sunni is far less than that 
between the Catholic and the Protestant Churches, a fact which at least 
suggests that both individualism and fundamentalism are somehow contained 
within a basic menu of Islamic action shared by all Muslims. Furthermore, in 
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those more common cases where no schism has occured, Muslim societies have 
simultaneously, or in frequent turnover, hosted adaptationist, individualist and 
fundamentalist trends. Thus an adaptationist society may spawn a mahdi movement 
followed by a ref ormist/f undamenta list tendency followed by another mahdi 
movement, and all at the same time as the local sufi orders carry on promoting 
their mediationist version of Islam. Christianity has experienced occasional but 
severe and lasting schisms. The distinctiveness of Islam lies in the co- 
existence and turnover of varying religious styles. 
In saying this I do not wish to deny or diminish the fact that Bosnia's 
Muslims are a minority group comparable to many others, and that like those 
others they attempt to preserve and assert collective identity in order to gain 
political advantage. It would be wrong to see them only in an Islamic framework 
or to imagine them uniquely propelled by some internal Islamic motor. The form 
of their action is indeed Islamic but its motivation is not wholly so. 
Much of socialist Europe and the Soviet Union is now experiencing 
nationalistic tensions and Yugoslavia is no exception. But in Yugoslavia the 
problem is not so much one of individual nationalisms but of a whole system of 
nationalisms. By this I mean that nationalistic action on the part of any one 
nationality is bound to trigger the incipient nationalism of other nationalities, 
and the net effect is to threaten the very fabric of the federated state. That 
this is so Is due to the historical fears of each group with regard to the 
others, and the highly decentralised nature of political power. 
To take one example we may consider the problems that followed the 
granting of narod status to the Muslims in 1971. The Macedontans feared that 
those members of the Islamic faith living within Macedonia, individuals who had 
previously styled themselves "Macedon ians", would now want to be "Muslims". The 
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concern was thus that a Muslim narod would start eating away at the Macedonian 
narad. Macedonia thus insisted that religion and nationality were totally 
distinct and that the Muslims of Macedonia were inalienably Macedonian. The 
Bosnian reaction to this was to feel that Macedonia was undervaluing the 
development of Muslim national consciousness and treating the Muslims merely as 
a religious group. At this point Albanian dominated Kosovo waded into the debate 
insisting that membership of any nationality was a matter of personal choice 
and conviction; if individuals living within Macedonia considered themselves 
members of the Muslim narod then they were such. The dispute spread to Croatia 
where an eminent economics professor published an article stating that Muslim 
national consciousness was underdeveloped and implying that the Muslims were 
really just Croats of the Islamic faith. The president of the Central Committe 
of the Bosnian Communist Party replied immediately with accusations that the 
Croatian attitude undermined the principle of equal status for all nationalities. 
Finally, Serbia supported the Bosnians and Kosovans, declaring that all Yugoslavs 
were free to account themselves members of whatever nationality they pleased 
(see Ramet op cit. p. 150-152). Eventually this particular issue was settled 
without too much damage to the credibility of the state but the triggering 
effect is clearly a potential threat. In 1988 its possible consequences are more 
disturbing. The conflicting nationalisms of Albanians and Serbs have led to a) 
Serbian demands for increased power over Kosovo and Vojvodina, b) the Slovenes 
and Croatians, who have their own grievances against the Serbs, opposing 
them, 
and c) the Montenegrins supporting the Serbs. Each of the groups 
has its own 
demands and desires, the expression of which may be triggered off 
by the 
actions of others. Yugoslavia is a system of interactive centrifugal 
nationalisms which tear and strain away from this state. 
In the Soviet Union this is less the case. The Estonians current requests 
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for greater autonomy may Inspire other nationalities to make similar demands 
but do not seem to trigger incipient nationalisms as in Yugoslavia. In this 
highly centralised political Empire a single nationalism may be of concern to 
the state but does not necessarily let loose the fears and demands of other 
nationalities. Ofcourse there are limited cases of triggering between pairs of 
neighbouring nationalities - the Armenians and Azerbaijanis and, certain 
evidence suggests, the Tajiks and Uzbeks. Yet in these conflicts we have not 
seen the Lithuanians joining the fray or the Ukrainians taking sides and making 
their own demands. This is due to the centralisation of political power which 
has two effects. Firstly, centralisation facilitates the repression of nationalism 
- too many rampant nationalisms here would almost certainly lead to a general 
crackdown on them all, whereas in Yugoslavia the outcome is less predictable (an 
army coup? the disintegration of the state? a stand-off between various allied 
nationalisms and the consequent continuance of the shaky federated system? ). 
Secondly, centralisation means that Lithuanians have less to fear from Armenian 
nationalism than do Slovenes from Serbian nationalism. Since most power lies in 
the hands of central government, the success or failure of Armenian demands for 
Nagorny Karabakh will have little direct effect on Lithuanians, it will not alter 
the balance of power. In Yugoslavia this is not the case and the incipient 
nationalism of the Bosnian Muslims must therefore be considered not simply in 
terms of minority/state relations but as part of a system of interactive 
nationalisms. 
At the beginning of this work I addressed myself to three specific 
questions concerning the Muslims of Sarajevo (p. 4). In concluding I want to 
summarise some of the answers that have emerged and, very briefly, to note some 
revealing parallels and divergences within comparable societies. 
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How does the political context of Yugoslavia affect religious life? 
Yugoslavia's system of socialist self-management regulates the fields of 
education, employment and government but is also felt to be out on the very 
streets. For this reason, although freedom of religious expression is granted, 
ordinary Muslims feel the necessity of keeping it apart from the public and 
officially visible world. Thus the Muslim neighbourhoods, which were already of 
high social Importance even in the pre-socialist period, come to be seen as the 
home base of Islam, domains in which it's influence is deemed wholly legitimate 
and its principles are overtly relied upon. Within the neighbourhood Muslims can 
feel confident that Islamic values are shared whilst in the town this is not the 
case and, except in the context of specific services held in mosques, religious 
affiliation is played down. 
The psychological atmosphere created by socialist self-management 
therefore affects Islamic religious life. At the same time the state's policy 
with regard to the religious communities has far reaching consequences. These 
communities all have officially authorised leaderships which must fight a battle 
on two fronts. On the first front they must endeavour not to antagonise the 
state and this endeavour entails tactical efforts to ally religious and Yugoslav 
socialist ideology. In the case of the Muslims, such efforts make it impossible 
for the community, and irrelevant for the anthropologist, to see in Muslim 
Sarajevo a sharp divide between the Orthodox and the Popular. Since the 
religious establishment cannot hope to have any claims to priveleged 
knowledge 
of Orthodoxy widely recognised by the public, the source of Orthodoxy cannot 
be 
located, or at least cannot be agreed upon. 
The Orthodox/Popular polarity is not, however, redundant in all Muslim 
minorities and that it is so in Bosnia is due not to minority status 
itself but 
to the Muslims' social structure and political situation. A comparative case may 
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clarify this point. Malawi's Yao Muslims form a minority to the Christian 
majority. Here there is a sharp distinction between urban, educated Muslim 
society and the village life of rural Muslims. Conflict has arisen between 
between Arab financed urban Islamic intelligentsia who claim Orthodoxy, and 
villagers who, whilst admitting the superior learning of their accusors, still 
want to retain the traditional customs which they reallse are generally deemed 
to be un-Orthodox (see Thorold, forthcoming). In this case there is then a 
recognised social divide (urban/rural) corresponding to a recognised religious 
divide. In Sarajevo this is not the case and the Orthodox/Popular classification 
loses its descriptive and analytical value. 
The Zajednica's Islamic/socialist line leads to the possibility of religious 
dissent which in turn leads to the Muslim establishment's second battle front; 
the attempt to preserve or gain control of the population's religious practice 
and to combat potential rivals for its allegiance. This is as characteristic of 
Christian as of Islamic Yugoslavia; the Catholic Diocesans (see p. 170) made every 
effort to discredit the Franciscan priests whose championship of the Marian 
devotion of Medjugorje has afforded them influence over the Catholic population 
of Bosnia-Hercegovina. 
The Yugoslav secular authorities do not in general outlaw alternative 
religious tendencies and associations, preferring to let the official religious 
establishments deal with them (secular authorities have not, for example, 
outlawed ZIDRA, the dervish organisation). However, they will not countenance the 
existence of any religious movement seen as potentially politically disruptive. 
Thus the champions of the Virgin of Medjugorje were initially deemed to be 
nothing but Croatian nationalists using religion for political ends and some 
were arrested. This fact places a constraint on the scope of Islamic revival 
in 
Sarajevo. In many parts of the Muslim world fundamentalist movements 
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aggressively seek changes in the social order (the Muslim Brotherhood of Egypt, 
for example). In Bosnia such a movement is not currently a realistic possibility. 
Religious dissent such as that of the new mystics does not then take an open or 
highly organised form and dissenters do not call for changes in the law. Rather 
they form a secretive and loose tendency and direct their efforts- towards 
transforming personal and familial values. 
Yugoslavia's political context therefore affects Islamic religicus life in a 
number of ways. It is important to underline that this is not simply the result 
of the atheistic element of its ruling ideology. The state seeks to regulate 
, Ious expression not only becau-se it disbelieves and disapproves religion as relig 
such. but also because it fears the use which nationalists may make of it (in 
Croatia in the late '70s and early '80s, for example, the Catholic Church came to 
be seen as the guardian of Croatian tradition and became a figurehead of 
Croatian nat-'ona lists). If Bosnian Muslims cannot accept the Zajednica's 
rapprochement of Islam and Bosnian Muslim identity with Yugoslav scciallism and 
Yugoslav identity, this is not only because the state's ideology is atheistic bý-A 
also because it i-s multi-national. The fact. that Yugoslavia is a federation, and 
one pervaded by incipient nationalisms and currently racked by active ones, is 
of as much conseauence for religious behaviour as is the fact that its ideology 
is atheist. The ability of Turkish Muslims to ally Islam and Turkish republican 
nationalism (see chapter four), in spite of the state's fierce secularism and 
f religion, emphasises that the attitude of se,: 'L1"-;: - historical repression o. 
tionliiý- the popular ly factor condi. authorities towards religion is not the onL 
acceptance of rapprochements of religious and state ideologies. 
- 223 - 
On what sources may the Muslim minority draw in its construction of identlW. 
I have spoken of the Bosnian Muslims as possessing a double identity; an 
identity as a group distinct from that of the Serbs, Croats, Montengrins etc. 
and an identity as members of the worldwide Islamic Umme. In a sense both were 
present in the Ottoman era but the nature of the first, and the relationship 
between the two, has altered in modern times. In Ottoman Bosnia Muslims saw 
themselves as distinct from their Christian neighbours; they belonged to a 
different millet. With the arrival of the Austro-Hungarians the political 
importance of the three way Orthodox/Catholic/ Muslim divide heightened. Muslims 
not only had taxes and civic duties distinct from those of non-Muslims, they 
also found themselves capable of exerting political influence through the 
electoral college system. During the inter-war period the status of 
ethnic/religious groups as political units grew, and in contemporary Yugoslavia 
the federated system creates a situation in which the possession and assertion 
of distinct national identity is vital to the political well-being of the 
community. Today's Muslims therefore see themselves as a group distinct (both 
religiously and nationally) from Serbs and Catholics and this distinction must 
be maintained and underlined. 
As members of the Ottoman Empire Bosnia's Muslims were conceptually 
members of a vast Islamic community extending to Anatolia and beyond. 
Linguistically they did not always distinguish themselves from the Ottomans, 
using the term "Turci" self-referentially. The mental picture was this: within 
the Empire there are Muslims (us), Catholics, Orthodox, Jews and others. After 
the creation of a Yugoslav state the picture became: within Bosnia there are 
Muslims, Catholics, Serbs/Orthodox, Jews and others. Politically cut off from the 
Empire, the Muslims view of themselves as members of the Umma and as distinct 
from non-Muslim neighbours separated. The birth of the Socialist 
Federated 
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Republic furthered this separation for the state treated religion as irrelevant 
to (national) identity and the Muslims' association with worldwide Islam as 
irrelevant to their status within the Yugoslavia. Although official policy does 
not ofcourse determine popular perception, and Muslims did not come to see 
their membership of the Umma as irrelevant, in this political context they could 
not help but view their identity as non-Serb/Catholics and as members of the 
Umma as separate. 
If Bosnian Muslims have a double identity, why not a triple? Why does 
membership of the Yugoslav community have so little influence on their self- 
perception? In fact in this Yugoslavia's Muslims differ little from their non- 
Muslim counterparts and this is comprehensible in view of Yugoslavia's history 
and current political situation. Initially the Communist Party had hoped that the 
Muslims, who were seen merely as a religious group, would take a lead in 
embracing a new Yugoslav identity. However, the diversity of languages, 
traditions and religions and the fact that the various Yugoslav peoples had so 
frequently made war on each other made the idea of a single Yugoslav nation an 
unrealistic one, a fact which the Party itself eventually recognised. Yet the 
idea of Yugoslav socialist patriotism which was put in its place did nothing to 
discourage the narrower patriotisms of the various nationalities and in a sense 
even encouraged them since Yugoslav socialist patriotism was founded on the 
notion of nationalities living together in brotherhood and unity. National 
identities were thus implicitly put before Yugoslav identity and most citizens, 
including Muslims, follow up the implication wholeheartedly. The country's 
disastrous economic situation and the gross regional inequalities in living 
standards serve but to reinforce adherence to narrow national identity at 
the 
expense of Yugoslav identity. 
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The double identity of the Bosnian Muslims has been shaped by historical 
and political circumstances. Under different circumstances similar minorities may 
evolve other varieties of multiple identity. For example, in Soviet Central Asia 
the post-revolutionary government attempted to create a number of new 
nationalities, each with its own national literature and heroes, out of the clay 
of tribal societies. Although little is known of identity perception in this 
region we may speculate that Muslims see themselves in any or all of the 
following ways: members of the nationalities to which they legally belong, 
members of traditional tribal groups, members of the worldwide Umma (this 
perhaps particularly since the nearby Iranian revolution and Afghan war), and 
members of the Soviet federation. 
For a clear case of the triple identity which Bosnian Muslims lack, we may 
turn to the example of America's indigenous "Black Muslims". There are a number 
of Afro-American Muslim communities in the USA but the largest is the American 
Muslim Mission which stresses its identity on three levels: 
a) as a group culturally and spiritually distinct from decadent non-Muslim 
America (with the emphasis on white America). 
b) as a group which forms a true part of the worldwide Islamic UD7ma. (The 
AMM has made great efforts to bring Itself doctrinally In line with the 
Muslim world and to forge contacts with it. ) 
C) as a community which, whilst morally superior to the majority of the 
state's inhabitants, is loyal to and integrated within the USA. (This 
loyalty is such that in 1984 the organisation's annual conference was 
rounded off by the singing of "America, the beautiful". ) 
Triple identity then seems possible in the USA, but not in Yugoslavia. The 
reason for this discrepancy may lie in the respective benefits to be gained by 
Bosnian and American Muslims through wholehearted integration, as a group, 
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within the state. In America it is both possible and acceptable for 
ethnic/religious groups to wield disproportional economic or political power, for 
example, through block-voting or economic empire building. There may be 
complaints about the Jewish lobby or WASP economic domination but these are not 
actually seen as threats to the state. The AMM makes full use of these facts, 
for example, in the 1984 elections its leadership spoke out against voting for 
Jesse Jackson, the high-profile black candidate. The community has also made 
attempts to enhance its economic status, opening businesses and gaining catering 
contracts with the US Army. Whilst assimilation with white, non-Muslim America 
is rejected, integration as a group within the system is a goal for such 
integration may benefit the community. In this context the third string of a 
triple identity becomes palatable 
In Yugoslavia the situation differs. Because economic life is regulated by 
the federal state, the extent to which any nationality may wield economic power 
is limited. Thus Slovenia's economic strength affords Slovenians a standard of 
living above the average, but does not allow them to exert disproportional 
influence within the federation as a whole. In the political field, the attempts 
of individual nationalities to increase their influence always sets off alarm 
bells within other nationalities and within the federal government. In this 
context the Muslim minority cannot see integration as a group within Yugoslavia 
(and consequent triple Identity) as a route to self-preferment, whilst the AMM 
can and do do precisely that. 
These observations are based partly on research which I undertook in 1984 
in New York, Chicago and Washington. For a published analysis of the 
contemporary AMM see Lincoln 1983. 
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What is the relationshIR between religious orizanisation and the assertion of 
, 
iden ti ty? 
For all Bosnians the relationship between national and religious Identity 
is fundamental. Given this fact it is unsurpristng that the fields of religious 
action and of identity assertion overlap. 
It has been seen that for Muslims the neighbourhood Is the most Important 
social unit above the level of the nuclear family. This unit is nationally pure 
in that all or the vast majority of its members are Muslims. At the same time 
it is the domain in which "Islamic" principles and values are overtly relied upon 
and referred to. Through this reliance and through the persistent use of 
Muslim/Islamic cultural behaviours - Arabic greetings, coffee fild2ani etc. - the 
inhabitants gently but consistently create and reinforce their own identity. 
Muslims have a double identity and this duality is of relatively recent 
date. As the conceptualisation of identity has changed, so too have traditional 
rituals such as the tevhid and d2enaza been reconceived by Muslims and assigned 
new significances. Thus where the tevhid was once seen principally as a mystical 
and sufistic rite, it is now seen as one distinguishing Muslims from Serbs, 
Catholics, Albanians and others. Conversely, its counterpart, the d2enaza, is 
popularly stressed as a ritual through which Sarajevan Muslims assert their 
membership of an Islamic world transcending the boundaries of Yugoslavia. I have 
further suggested that it is because the tevhid bears a burden of identity 
assertion that, although it is performed by women, men value and esteem it in a 
manner largely unparalleled within Muslim majority societies. 
In Sarajevo rivalling religious orientations promote varying attitudes to 
Bosnian Muslim identity. The Zajednica stresses the Muslims' loyal membership of 
the Yugoslav community whilst the new mystics look constantly to the outside 
Islamic world, seeking to ally Bosnian Muslims with it. It is easy to 
Identify 
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forms of religious rivalry within other Muslim minorities. In the Soviet Union, 
for example, the outlawed dervish orders form a "Parallel Islam" to that 
promoted by the official Muslim establishment (see Bennigsen & Wimbush 1985). 
However, the extent to which Soviet dervishes and legally recognised Islamic 
authorities promote different visions of Soviet Muslim identity is not known. 
Turning again to the American case, however, we may see the Bosnian style 
correspondence between alternative religious orientations and alternative 
conceptions of identity. The AMM's biggest and bitterest rival Is the Nation of 
Islam, led by the headline hitting Louis Farrakhan. The two Muslim communities 
are in open conflict (it was in fact largely due to Jesse Jackson's ties with 
Farrakhan that the AMM leadership spoke out aginst him In 1984). The Nation 
places most of its eggs in one identity basket, that of distinction from white, 
non-Muslim America, and may properly be termed a black nationalist movement 
(for example, it sometimes claims that one or more of the united states should 
be turned over to the rule of the Afro-American population). The AMM, as has 
been seen, has a very different view of Afro-American Muslim identity. (For an 
account of this schism see Mamiya 1983. ) 
This work has considered one specific Muslim minority living within one 
specific state, yet some of the themes which have emerged are, I suggest, of 
relevance to Muslim minorities in general. Most notable among these is the 
perceived posession of multiple identity and its relationship to religious 
organisation. It may be objected that multiple identity occurs only occasionally 
and as the result of specific, local circumstances, that it Is not the norm for 
Muslim minorities. Thus it may be said that most Muslim minorities have 
traditionally seen themselves as somehow distinct from their non-Mus'lim 
neighbours but not as sharing an identity with the distant Islamic community 
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beyond their own locality. Further examination of such minorities would clarify 
this point but in its absence it seems a plausible conjecture that the 
circumstances which lead to multiple identity are not in fact so unusual or 
unlikely. With the possible exception of the remotest and most isolated 
communities, the world's diverse Muslim populations have always, I would 
suggest, identified at some level with the Islamic world in general, an 
identification fostered through the common ritual use of Arabic, the idea of the 
Hajj, notions of Islamic hospitality and other shared cultural traits. I do not 
want to make too much of this point or to suggest any romantic, intangible 
Islamic unity created through common customs. However, the traditional existence 
of this low level identification in combination with modern and widespread 
political circumstances - the rise of nationalism throughout the world and the 
success of Islamically inspired political action in certain parts of it - leads 
to the strong possibility that contemporary Muslim minorities will seek to 
emphasise and activate their previously low profile identification with the 
Umma. Thus multiple identity becomes more significant and apparent in the 
modern world. The themes which have emerged in the Bosnian case do not then 
appear peculiar or unique, although further research on other Muslim minorities 
would be necessary to illuminate their importance and functioning elsewhere. 
The present thesis is then, amongst other things, one contribution to a 
potentially larger study. 
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Appendix A: Bosnian "ethnic" jokes 
Note: Mujo and Fata are the names given to male and female Muslims in these 
jokes, just as the joke Irishman is known as Paddy. 
1. Mujo leaves Bosnia to work and earn money. He writes back to Fata: "Life 
is great here, lots of money and an easy time. I'm not coming back". Fata turns 
over the envelope to check the postmark and see where her husband is. It says "Sloven ia". 
(Many Bosnians work abroad to earn money and this is where we expect Mujo 
to be. The joke is that for Bosnians Slovenia is abroad - rich and 
prq8-ressive. ) 
2. A Muslim, a Serb and a Croat each get granted a wish by God. The Serb 
asks for all Croats to be anihilated. "What? ", says God, "even though your friend 
here is a Croat? " The Serb says yes, even though his friend is a Croat. 
The Croat requests that God exterminate all Serbs. God asks him: Are you 
sure? Even though your friend here is a Serb? ". Yes, in spite of that the Croat 
is sure. 
Then God asks the Muslim what he wants. Mujo answers: "Now they've both 
had their turns I've nothing left to wish for. " 
3. Mujo is asked "What are our three national colours? " He answers: "Green, 
light green and dark green". 
(The Yug-oslav flag Is red, white and blue. Green is the colour of Islam. ) 
4. A Bosnian, a Russian and an American are in a coach going to Sarajevo. The 
American takes out a pack of original Marlboro cigarettes, smokes one, then 
throws the box out of the window. Everybody asks him: "What are you doing? Why 
throw away a full pack of Marlboro? " He answers: "It doesn't matter, we have 
loads of them. " 
A few miles up the road the Russian pulls a bottle of genuine Russian 
vodka from his pocket, takes one swig and tosses the bottle through the window. 
"What are you doing? Why waste a whole bottle of vodka? " The Russian answers: 
"It's not important, we have plenty of it. " 
The coach drives on a bit and the Bosnian turns to his Hercegovinan 
neighbour, grabs him by the lapels and hurls him out the window. Everyone is 
aghast: "What are you doing? You can't throw that Hercegovinan out the window! " 
The Bosnian answers: "It doesn't matter, we have lots of them here. " 
(Many Hercegovinians now live and work in Sarajevo and are not always 
popular with Bosnfans. ) 
Q. What's the best place to hide something from a Montenegrin? 
A. In af ie Id. 
(Montenegrins are too lazy to plou8-h their fields. ) 
6. Q, What's the best place to hide something from a Bosnian? 
A. In a book. 
(Bosnians are too stupfd to read a book. ) 
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7. A mocking Slovenian asks Mujo: "Do you know how you were born? " Mujo says 
he does not and the Slovenian explains that his mother was sitting under a 
honey tree and got pregnant from it. 
"Aha, so that's it", says Mujo, "and do you know how you were born? " The 
Slovenian says no and is told: "You're mother had a fuck and got you". 
(The Slovenfan takes the Bosnian Muslim for a fool but is outwitted. ) 
8. An Albanian goes to the cinema, buys a ticket and presents it at the door. 
The doorman tears it in half so he goes back to buy another. Again he presents 
it to the doorman who tears it in half so the Albanian decides to sneak into 
the auditorium instead. 
He settles down to watch the cowboy film but when the baddy creeps up 
behind the goody he calls out: "Look behind you! ". The man in the next row taps 
him on the shoulder and tells him to be quiet. 
The next time the baddy approaches the Albanian shouts: "Watch out! ". 
Again the man behind him complains. 
The third time this happens the Albanian is ejected from the cinema and 
leaves complaining: "Those people must be in league with the baddy. " 
9. How do Montenegrin soldiers count off? 
Not "First, second, third, fourth etc. " but "First, the one next to him, the 
one next to him, the one next to him... " 
(The Montenegrin male Is too proud to admit himself less than first In 
any th Ing. ) 
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Appendix B: Population of Bosnia-Hercegovina 1953 - 1981 
1953 1961 1971 1981 
Muslim 31-32% 25.69% 39-57% 39-52% 
Serb 44.39% 42.89% 37.19% 32.027. 
Croat 22.98% 21.71% 20.62% 18-38% 
Montenegrin 0.26% 0.39% 0.35% 0.34% 
Slovene 0.22% 0.18% 0.11% 0.07% 
Macedonian 0.07% 0.07% 0.05% 0.05% 
Romi 0.08% 0.02% 0.04% 0.18% 
Jewish 0.01% 0.01% 0.02% 0.01% 
Albanian 0.06% 0.11% 0.10% 0.11% 
Yugoslav 8.42% 1.17% 7.91% 
TOTAL POP. 2,847,459 3,277,948 3,746,111 4,124,256 
The confusing rise and fall of the figures for Muslims and Yugoslavs 
requires some explanation. The 1953 figure of 31.32% Muslims is a backdated 
official estimate on the basis of the responses given to the census question on 
religious faith - at this time "Muslim" was not accounted as either narod or 
narodhost. 
In 1961 Muslims were allowed to style themselves "Muslims in the ethnic 
sense" but were still not seen as constituting either narod or narodhost. They 
were, however, for the first time allowed to style themselves "Yugoslavs" rather 
than "Serbs" or "Croats" and many chose this option which accounts for the high 
percentage of "Yugoslavs" in 1961. 
In the 1971 census this percentage fell as dramatically as that of the 
Muslims rose. The category "Muslim" had been accounted a nar-od and many 
therefore chose to call themselves Muslims. 
In 1981 the percentage of Yugoslavs rises sharply. It is difficult to 
explain why but the 5% fall in Serbian nationals suggests the possibility that 
many of the new Yugoslavs had previously styled themselves Serbs. 
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Appendix C: Income of the Islamska Zajednica 
Before the Second World War the greater part of the Muslim establishment's 
income derived from its vakuf property. After the ravages of the war and the 
1958 nationalisation of much of the still existant vakuf property, new sources 
of income had to be found. Today its income may be classified as being of seven 
types. 
1- Income from remaining vakuf property. 
2. Donations made by individual Muslims. It is particularly common to donate 
money in memory of a deceased relative. Memorial donations are announced, 
usually along with a photograph of the deceased, in the fortnightly Muslim 
newspaper Preporod. They are often des18-nated by the donor for specific 
purposes, most frequently for the Islamic Theological Faculty, the Sarajevo 
medresas, for Preporod itself or for the deceased's own parish. 
3. Payments made for specific religious works. For example, the payment made 
for a hatma (complete recitation of the Quran) to be performed for a dead 
re la t ive. 
4. A voluntary annual tax on Muslim households. In 1986 this stood at 1,500 
dinars (approximately E3 at the time it was collected). 
5. Income from the collection of zekat and sadekatul-fitr. The donation of 
kurban to the Islamska Zajednica Is also a type of income, the meat going 
to feed medresa students. 
Contributions from the outside Muslim world. 
7. Contributions from the state. In 1977 this was said to provide 10% of the 
Zajednica's total income (Had2ijahi('- 1977). 
Much of the Zajednica's income is poured into education. In 1977 the 
Islamic Theological Faculty was opened and in 1978 the women's medresa (closed 
in 1952) re-opened. The rebuilding and renovation of mosques and mesd2ids 
("mosques" without minarets) is another area of expenditure. After the war 1,022 
mosques and mesdlidl stood in Bosnia-Hercegovina, about 200 of them dilapidated 
and unusable. By 1970 the number of places of worship had risen to 1,473, 
by 
1976 to 1,661 and by 1980 to 1,818. Islamska Zajednica Income is also spent on 
a number of publications including the fortnightly Preporod (Renewal, a 
Bosnian 
publication), monthly Glasnik (Bulletin), monthly Islamska Mfsao (Islamic 
Thought, 
again a Bosnian product), monthly Zem-Zem (produced by the students of 
the 
Sarajevo medresas) and annual Takvim (produced by Ilmije, the associatfon of 
Zajednica employees, and containing a calendar of the Islamic year and 
times of 
prayer). 
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Appendix D: A zikr meeting at the Kadiri tekija 
Lejletul-Berat is the day on which the angels begin to write man's fate 
for the forthcoming year. In 1986 it fell on the 23rd of April and was also the 
day on which a dervish of the Kadiri tekiJa got married in a ceremony held at 
his home. (He had previously been married in a secular ceremony in accordance 
with legal requirement. ) On the evening of this day, a Wednesday, a special zikr 
was held at the tekija. The final prayer of the day (jacija) was scheduled for 
9.21 pm. During the forty five minutes before this the dervishes began to arrive 
in the semahana, the main room of the tekija. Those who had not yet prayed the 
fourth prayer (akffam) did so. They then sat in a horseshoe on white sheepskins 
facing the portal at the eastern end of the tekija. Here the horseshoe was 
closed off by a row of six elders including the sheikh and vekil. On this 
occasion no guests from other tekijas were present as they frequently were at 
other times. The horseshoe was Joined by more men, some of them dervish murids 
in grey or beige fez's, others muhfbs and sympathisers in white skull caps. One 
of the latter, a man of about fifty, was shooed from the semicircle by the 
sheikh. Eventually there were twenty three men in all, plus the six elders. They 
sat reciting salavats (salutations to the Prophet) and repeating zikr chants 
many times over. At 9.21 ezan was heard and the fifth prayer made by all 
present, including the spectators. As usual, the prayer ended with 33 repetitions 
of "Subhan-allah", of "El-hamdu-lillah" and of "Allahu Ekber". 
Those in the horseshoe now rose to their feet and sang a Serbo-Croatian 
hymn to the accompaniment of the tambourine played by the son of the vekil, a 
dervish in his thirties who organises the musical component of the zikr 
meetings and handles the microphone. 
Now the central part of the meeting began. The vekil began the rythmic 
chant of "La illahe illa la" which was taken up by the participants and 
accompanied by movements of the head to left and right. On the vekil's 
pronouncement: "Qalbi! " ("From the heart"), the chanting grew more intense, the 
first and second words being particularly emphasised. The vekil now stood in 
front of the sheikh and bowed to him with his hand on his heart. He then 
progressed around the inside of the horseshoe, bowing to each of the men he 
passed and receiving their bows in return. At this point, one of the dervishes 
well known for his trances began shouting incoherently, one finger held out 
before him. The finger denotes the uniqueness and oneness of God expressed In 
the phrase "La Illahe illa la", there is no God but God. He was supported by the 
men on his left and right and did not fall. When the vekil had completed his 
circle he returned to his place and soon brought the chant to an end by saying, 
rather than chanting, the phrase in a loud voice. 
A Serbo-Croatian song about the dervish path was sung and was followed by 
the rythmic chanting of "Allah", again with physical movements of the head and 
body. Percussion instruments were played by certain of the dervishes. The elder 
who had started this chant made his way round the inside of the horseshoe 
bowing to the participants as the vekil had done. This time the trancing dervish 
shouted wildly and dropped. He was caught before hitting the floor and laid 
gently face down by his neighbours. The sheikh signalled to the men to let him 
lie. Throughout this trance his finger remained pointing in witness to the 
unicity of God. About a minute later he recovered and stood up again. 
Another Serbo-Croatian song and another rythmic chant, that of "Allah, hoi, 
hoi, hoi! ". This time no-one circled the horseshoe. The trancer shouted, spun and 
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dropped. He remained down so long that the sheikh moved to his side, laid a 
hand on his heart and recited salavats to revive him. 
After another Serbo-Croatian song came the final chant, that of "Hu!, Hu! ". 
This is always the last and the least repeated of chants, as "La ilia-he ilia la" 
is always the first and the most repeated. 
Everyone sat down and the sheikh said a few words about the meaning of 
Lejletul-Berat, warning the younger members of the horseshoe: "You young ones, 
remember this! ". He then requested several of the participants to recite verses 
from the Quran, prompting one who forgot some of the words. He then spoke of 
marriage and congratulated "the loyal member" of the order on his own recent 
nuptials. Prayers of the type known as dove were said. 
The groom was invited by the sheikh to be photographed with him by 
another dervish. The photo was taken and the sheikh congratulated the groom who 
kissed his hand several times. He then kissed the hands of the vekil and other 
elders. Upstairs in the women's gallery the bride, who had been watching the 
zikr, was congratulated by the women. 
This was the end of the meeting and, after greetings and conversation, 
people made their way home. It was after 11 o'clock. 
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